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One might well wonder . . . what consequences of the
human genome project raise these kinds of anxieties in
contemporary cultural life, but it seems a displacement, if
not a hallucination, to identify the source of this social
threat, if it is a threat, with lesbians who excavate sperm
from dry ice on a cold winter day in Iowa when one of them
is ovulating.1

1. Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Despite innovations in assisted reproductive technologies in the latter
half of the twentieth century, individuals and couples in the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI)2 community who wish to
create families that include children face many hurdles in both law and
informal practice.3 The cloning of Dolly the sheep from an adult somatic
sheep cell in 1996 signaled the possibility of new opportunities for
members of the LGBTI community to have genetically-related children
with minimal reliance on third parties. Cloning is thus heralded as a
solution to some of the obstacles the LGBTI community faces today.4
The suggestion that cloning might enable non-heterosexual couples to
produce offspring has triggered debate both inside and outside the LGBTI
community.5 Much of this discussion centers on the potential dangers and
benefits of this new technology. Yet important legal and political questions

CRITIQUE 229, 251 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) [hereinafter Is Kinship

Always Already Heterosexual?].
2. I use the term “LGBTI” to describe individuals who self-identify as lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, and/or intersex. I do not include individuals who self-identify as
“queer” in this group because those who identify as queer often do so precisely to claim
freedom from a stable sexual identity; appropriating them into a list of identity categories
would therefore be at odds with this goal. I also do not include “questioning” in the
acronym because I believe we should all question the existing categories and binary view of
sexuality. When I intend to refer only to a specific segment of the community, I use a more
specific word to do so; however, at times, I use the term “gay” (especially “gay rights”)
interchangeably with LGBTI for the sake of clarity in writing. In doing so, I do not intend
to erase or obscure other identities. I also frequently make reference to the LGBTI
“community,” which is a theoretical construct much more than it is a reality. “Alternative”
sexualities and gender identities are defined and grouped together by virtue of what they
are not: straight or heteronormative. Thus, a monolithic “community” of LGBTI
individuals does not exist in any meaningful way. At times, the multitude of interests within
this “community” converge; at other times, they diverge significantly. Acknowledging this
to be the case, I nevertheless refer to a “community” throughout this paper, and I attempt
to be clear about those times when interests within the community are most likely to
diverge, particularly vis-à-vis cloning. Finally, I have tried to adhere to the Gay and Lesbian
Alliance Against Defamation’s recommendations on terminology as much as possible. See
GAY & LESBIAN ALLIANCE AGAINST DEFAMATION, GLAAD MEDIA REFERENCE GUIDE
6–14 (2010), available at http://www.glaad.org/document.doc?id=99 (describing
recommended terminology).
3. I use the term “family” in this paper primarily to describe two-parent families that
include children. I recognize that this usage is not unproblematic, and that many family
arrangements do not look like this. However, because this paper is focused on cloning and
other reproductive options, I have chosen to use the term in this way rather than
consistently referring to “two-parent families with children.”
4. See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, The Prospect of Human Cloning: Improving Nature or
Dooming the Species, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 511, 528 (2003) (noting that a “possible
benefit of cloning would be to assist single individuals and same-sex couples in their efforts
to reproduce”) .
5. See infra Part V.
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about the funding and regulation of cloning research are bound up in these
philosophical and moral debates. The U.S. government currently bans the
use of federal funds for such research.6 While President Barack Obama
overturned the former presidential administration’s ban on embryonic
stem cell research for cell-based regenerative therapies, he has made it
clear that he will not support lifting the ban on research related to
reproductive cloning.7
In this article, I argue that, because reproductive cloning may offer the
LGBTI community the chance to have genetically-related children, bans
on federally funded research that would help refine and ensure the safety
and efficacy of these procedures unconstitutionally deny LGBTI people a
right that is not denied to similarly situated opposite-sex couples, who
enjoy generous support from the state in their efforts to conceive either
“traditionally” or by using assisted reproductive technologies. I contend
that these barriers to cloning research are in large part the result of fear-

6. See Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Constraints on the Regulation of Cloning, 9
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 495, 495 (2009) (stating that federal funding for
experimentation with human embryos has been banned since 1995). In 2009, the National
Institutes of Health issued guidelines for the use of stem cell research, effective as of July 7,
2009, and made it clear that funding for this research cannot be used for human
reproductive cloning. Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,170,
32,175 (Nat’l Inst. of Health July 7, 2009) (“Research using hESCs derived from other
sources, including somatic cell nuclear transfer, parthogenesis, and/or embryos created for
research purposes, is not eligible for NIH funding.”). For a more in-depth discussion of
funding for research cloning, see generally Catherine D. Payne, Stem Cell Research and

Cloning for Human Reproduction: An Analysis of the Laws, The Direction in Which They
May Be Heading in Light of Recent Developments, and Potential Constitutional Issues, 61
MERCER L. REV. 943 (2010). Some states have also passed laws banning the use of state
funds for cloning research. See, e.g., The Human Cloning Funding Prohibition Act, MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 333.26403 (1998) (“A person shall not use state funds to engage in or
attempt to engage in human cloning.”).
7. President Barack Obama, Signing of Stem Cell Executive Order and Scientific
Integrity Presidential Memorandum (Mar. 9, 2009) (“[W]e will ensure that our government
never opens the door to the use of cloning for human reproduction. It is dangerous,
profoundly wrong, and has no place in our society, or any society.”), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-As-Prepared-for-DeliverySigning-of-Stem-Cell-Executive-Order-and-Scientific-Integrity-Presidential-Memorandum.
Embryonic cells have the unique ability to develop into nearly any cell type, which
makes them promising for use in the treatment of injuries and diseases such as Alzheimer’s,
Parkinson’s, heart disease, and kidney failure. See NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N,
ETHICAL
ISSUES
IN
HUMAN
STEM
CELL
RESEARCH
1
(1999),
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/execsumm.pdf. One of the central controversies
surrounding stem cell research involves the source of embryonic stem cells. Embryonic
stem cells can be derived from four different sources: (1) existing stem cell lines, (2)
aborted or miscarried embryos, (3) unused in vitro fertilized embryos, and (4) embryos
created through therapeutic cloning. Thus, while stem cell research and its applications do
not necessarily involve therapeutic cloning, one way to create stem cells is via therapeutic
cloning. See Embryonic and Fetal Research Laws: Stem Cell Research, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2008), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?
tabid=14413.
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mongering, misinformation, and confusion. The promise of this new
reproductive technology challenges the normative regulation of sex and
reproduction in our society, threatening both “traditional” family
structures and male dominance. Perhaps because of this, discussions about
the potential harms of cloning have escalated to become, in some quarters,
a masked rhetoric for homophobic assertions that cloning—particularly
when used by the LGBTI community or by other “nontraditional”
families—will undermine the traditional heterosexual family structure.8 In
the midst of broader, arguably less politicized debates over the safety and
ethics of cloning, homophobic and traditionalist arguments have gained
legitimacy. Some opponents of cloning claim that the practice will
adversely affect the welfare of society in general and cloned children in
particular, especially if those children are born to gay parents.9 Others
suggest that cloning will be detrimental to future generations by
diminishing genetic diversity,10 and that cloning will allow the LGBTI
community to deliberately produce gay offspring in order to “preserve
their kind.”11 In making these arguments, opponents present cloning as a
practice that drastically departs from natural reproduction and is therefore
inherently suspect.12
8. See infra Part V.
9. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, The Paradox of Cloning, WKLY. STANDARD, May 26,
1997, at 23–24, 26 (“More troubling is the possibility that a lesbian couple will use cloning
to produce a child. Do we wish to make it easy for a homosexual pair to have children? . . .
Cloning humans, if it can occur at all, cannot be prevented, but cloning unmarried persons
will expand the greatest cultural problem our country now faces.”).
10. See STEPHEN E. LEVICK, CLONE BEING: EXPLORING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 229–30 (2004) (“The partial merger of the genomes of two individuals
to constitute a new and unique one may well be the basic biological fact underpinning the
rest. Cloning puts into conflict the ‘selfish’ genes of the individual with the need for the
survival of community and society absolutely necessary for the survival of humans as a
social species.”).
11. LEON R. KASS & JAMES Q. WILSON, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN CLONING 86 (1998)
(suggesting that gay-rights organizations have argued that “should homosexuality be shown
to have a genetic basis, homosexuals would have an obligation to reproduce through
cloning, to preserve their kind”).
12. These opponents of cloning find themselves alongside unexpected bedfellows:
some feminist scholars argue against cloning on the grounds that it may further exploit
women by providing men with “the absolute power over reproduction” that they have
always wanted. Andrea Dworkin, Sasha, in CLONES AND CLONES: FACTS AND FANTASIES
ABOUT HUMAN CLONING 73, 76 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 1998).
Dworkin goes on to note, however, that cloning may also allow women to reproduce
themselves, leading to an “all-female world, which would, probably, end at least rape,
prostitution, incest, and forced pregnancy.” Id. See also Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic
Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 EMORY L. J . 843, 856 (2007) (“Cloning and
other genetic technologies are not necessary to ameliorate women’s inequalities with men,
and indeed . . . one can easily imagine how these technologies might someday be used to
undermine women’s equality.”). While a discussion of feminist approaches to cloning
technologies is beyond the scope of this paper, it bears noting that not all feminists have
responded to cloning in the same way. Since Dolly was created, some have questioned
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These arguments lack merit or empirical support and are grounded
largely in homophobic assumptions. In the face of this fear-mongering, I
present a more realistic and systematic assessment of the potential benefits
cloning offers to LGBTI individuals. I argue that, while cloning does pose
some potential risks that must be taken seriously, it can provide many
benefits to society as a whole, and to the LGBTI community in particular,
if properly regulated by law. The LGBTI community might be welladvised to consider lobbying for increased funding and regulation of
cloning, in hopes that new technologies may make it possible to create
alternative family options and new forms of kinship.
While I argue that cloning would offer great benefits to LGBTI
individuals, it is important to emphasize that many LGBTI families are
satisfied with the current ways available for creating families. Further, my
argument is not intended to privilege or encourage genetic relations over
other forms of kinship. Rather, I argue that the choice to be genetically
related to one’s children should be available equally to LGBTI and
heterosexual people.
Indeed, there are still a number of troubling issues related to cloning
that the LGBTI community and its allies should consider. For example,
given the expense of the procedure,13 is cloning a viable option exclusively
for those families with the resources to pay for a genetically-related child
and therefore only marginally beneficial to the community as a whole?
Will having the option to clone place further pressure on LGBTI couples
to imitate the heterosexual family, leading to a sense of shame or failure if
they refuse to do so? What implications might cloning have for LGBTI
rights more broadly? Does lobbying to fund cloning research
inappropriately privilege the notion of a genetically-related family over all
other family arrangements? Might cloning adversely affect the adoption
market, leaving prospective adoptees homeless? If two men wish to clone a
whether cloning might lead to a true feminist utopia—a world without men. Ann Northrop,
a columnist for the New York gay newspaper LGNY, caused a stir when USA Today
quoted her saying that because cloning gives women “complete control over reproduction,”
it could, “[if] carried to its logical extreme, eliminate men altogether.” Anita Manning,
Pressing a “Right” to Clone Humans, Some Gays Foresee Reproduction Option, USA
TODAY, Mar. 6, 1997, at 01.D (quoting Northrop). Northrop later tempered her comments,
explaining that “while some women might go so far as to refuse to replicate men at all,
which would be an interesting concept, at the very least it would change the balance of
power somewhat.” Id. The idea that women could use parthenogenesis in order to
procreate without men is much older than Dolly. As early as 1915, in her famous book
Herland, Charlotte Perkins Gilman described an island composed only of women who
reproduced themselves asexually using parthenogenesis and lived a life free of war and
domination. See generally CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, HERLAND (1915).
13. See, e.g., Matthew Herper, Cloning’s High Cost, FORBES (Nov. 26, 2001, 10:19
AM), http://www.forbes.com/2001/11/26/1126cloning.html (stating it may cost $1,000 per
egg—and may require 100 eggs—to perform therapeutic cloning; however, some of these
costs are associated with compensating the egg donor).
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child together, they must rely on a surrogate egg donor; will cloning
therefore only further perpetuate the exploitation of women to the benefit
of gay and transgender women in need of eggs?
The structure of this article is as follows: Part II examines the
difficulties that members of the LGBTI community face when trying to
build families that include children and concludes that each currently
available method of reproduction has some disadvantages, either because
they require some involvement of third parties and/or because they do not
allow for the creation of a child who is genetically related to both partners.
Part III provides an overview of the science of reproductive cloning and
summarizes the arguments in favor of cloning generally. In Part IV, I
discuss the benefits that cloning offers to different groups within the
LGBTI community and suggest that cloning provides new opportunities
both for this community and more generally for all couples who seek to
reproduce. Drawing on insights from queer theory, Part V examines and
critiques the assumptions underlying key arguments against the use of
reproductive cloning. In Part VI, I question the constitutionality of a ban
on funding cloning research and suggest that a ban on human reproductive
cloning may violate the guarantee of equal protection by discriminating
against LGBTI individuals. The article concludes with a discussion of the
role that cloning should play in LGBTI politics and legal strategy.
II.
CURRENT OPTIONS FOR CREATING LGBTI FAMILIES AND THE
ASSOCIATED BARRIERS
According to recent research, more than half of all gay men and fortyone percent of lesbians in the United States want to have children.14 When
deciding whether and how to become parents, the LGBTI community
faces greater obstacles and must ask different questions than fertile,
opposite-sex couples wishing to have a baby. Should they adopt or use an
egg or sperm donor? If they decide to use a donor, should they choose
someone they know or rely on an anonymous donor? If both partners are
able, which should gestate the child? Should they choose surrogacy? The
questions and available options differ depending on the sex, gender, and
sexual orientation of the person (or people) involved. Although some
options may offer more advantages than others, all can present significant
legal and social hurdles to building the LGBTI family. Ian Wilmut, the
creator of Dolly the sheep, argues that using methods as risky as
reproductive cloning cannot be justified “given the range of alternatives on
14. GARY J. GATES, M.V. LEE BADGETT, JENNIFER EHRLE MACOMBER & KATE
CHAMBERS, THE WILLIAMS INST. & URBAN INST., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY
AND
LESBIAN PARENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2007), available at
http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/FinalAdoptionReport.pdf.
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offer: adoption, surrogacy, and a huge range of infertility treatments.”15
For the LGBTI family, however, the currently available options are not
without their own serious drawbacks and risks.

A. Adoption
An estimated two million LGBTI individuals in the United States are
interested in adopting.16 Adoption is an appealing option since it does not
pose any health risks to the adoptive parent(s) and provides children in
need with loving homes. Nevertheless, the adoption process can be
challenging for LGBTI couples who wish to start a family. Some states
17
prohibit gay couples from adopting. Even when adoption is available, it is
often prohibitively expensive. In some instances, families may be limited to
“open” adoptions, which can be frustrating to those who prefer not to
maintain contact with the birth parents.18 Finally, the waiting period to
adopt can be anywhere from a few months to several years.19 I discuss
these obstacles further, as well as the other disadvantages of adoption,
15. IAN WILMUT & ROGER HIGHFIELD, AFTER DOLLY: THE USES AND MISUSES OF
HUMAN CLONING 222 (2006).
16. GATES, BADGETT, MACOMBER & CHAMBERS, supra note 14, at 5. LGB parents are
major players in the adoption field in the United States. An estimated 65,500 children are
living with LGB parents, and these parents raise four percent of all children in the United
States. Id. at 3.
17. See infra notes 26–27.
18. Today in the United States, open adoption or semi-open adoption is a standard
practice, particularly in private adoptions. See, e.g., Open Adoption, MAMA’S HEALTH,
http://wwww.mamashealth.com/adopt/openadopt.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2011). In an open
adoption, the adopted child has the opportunity to develop a relationship with her birth
family. Anita L. Allen, Open Adoption is Not for Everyone, in ADOPTION MATTERS 47,
47–48 (Sally Haslanger & Charlotte Witt,\ eds., 2005) Prospective adoptive parents are
often encouraged to agree to an open adoption in order to be more desirable to the birth
parents. This arrangement usually requires the adoptive parents to meet—sometimes
through long periods or even in perpetuity—with the biological parents. Id. at 49 (providing
a fictional illustration of a couple that choose open adoption because they were “[f]earful of
not being selected to adopt. . . . ”). This arrangement can be very emotionally, socially, and
practically complex for everyone involved. Anita L. Allen suggests that open adoption
rituals—such as face-to-face meetings between the adoptive and biological parents—make
adoption less appealing to those who place a high value on intimacy and privacy in their
families. Id. at 61. On this basis, some LGBTI individuals and couples might want to avoid
the outside interference and potentially probing questions about their sexual orientation
and partnership and therefore prefer to rely on other options for building a family. As with
heterosexual couples, many LGBTI individuals would prefer to live their lives without the
need to share their children and their family intimacy with their adopted child’s biological
parents.
19. See Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoptions, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1415, 1432 (2006) (noting that, while “there are many applicants for every
healthy, white infant in the United States, resulting in a wait as long as seven years,”
African-American infants are readily available for adoption); What is the Waiting Period to
Adopt?, ADOPTION SERVS., http://www.adoptionservices.org/adoption/adoption_waiting_
period.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2011) (“For a healthy US-born Black or bi-racial
(Caucasian/African-American) infant the estimated wait is approximately 2 to 6 months.”).
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below.
First and foremost, adoption does not provide LGBTI parents with
the opportunity to have genetically-related children or to experience
childbirth. Adoptive parents may face stigma or social shame because their
families differ from traditional models.20 Research suggests that many
people place significant value on having a genetically-related child, at least
in part because they see the child as the successor to their “dynasty,”21
holding a place in an ancestral line that reaches backward and forward in
time.22 Additionally, those individuals who are able to do so may want to
experience pregnancy.23 Thus, for those who want a genetically-related
child or who desire the experience of pregnancy and childbirth, adoption
may not be the best option. Some couples might also be concerned that
adopted children are likely to face greater emotional and social obstacles.
Research suggests that adopted children may be more likely than their
nonadoptive counterparts to suffer from emotional difficulties and
learning problems.24 Nontraditional couples—many of whom are already
acutely aware of what it feels like to be stigmatized—might be even more
20. See VIVIAN B. SHAPIRO, JANET R. SHAPIRO & ISABEL H. PARET, COMPLEX
ADOPTION AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 17 (2001) (“When the family
history differs from ‘mainstream’ family models, prejudice and family isolation often
become part of the subjective experiences of children and parents.”).
21. See S. Camporesi & L. Bortolotti, Reproductive Cloning in Humans and

Therapeutic Cloning in Primates: Is the Ethical Debate Catching Up with the Recent
Scientific Advances?, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 1, 3 (2008) (“The assumption here is that, if
potential parents want to reproduce by cloning, they do so in order to be able to pass on
their genes to their prospective children . . . .”); Carson Strong, Cloning and Infertility, 7
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 279, 281–82 (1998) (arguing that an infertile couple
may wish for a genetically-related child because this will “enable them to participate in the
creation of a person,” serve as a representation of their mutual love, and provide them with
a “link to future persons”). See also Charlotte Witt, Adoption, Personal, Identity, and
Genetic Essentialism, in ADOPTION MATTERS, supra note 18, at 135, 135–36 (noting that the
genetically-related family is a socially constructed ideal reinforced by feminist theorists and,
ironically, the adoption community).
22. See, e.g., MARY L. SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES: WHAT
MATTERS MOST IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION,
AND SAME-SEX AND UNWED PARENTS’ RIGHTS 90 (2001) (“Having a child genetically
related to one member of the couple gave a sense of continuity both to the genetically
related parent and to the spouse who would see his or her partner reflected in their child.
The genetic tie linked the parents not only to their child, but also to the generations that
preceded them and, through the possibility that their child would have children, to those
following them.”).
23. See SUZANNE M. JOHNSON & ELIZABETH O’CONNOR, THE GAY BABY BOOM: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF GAY PARENTHOOD 91 (2002) (stating that “eighty-eight percent of the
primary lesbian mother families [surveyed] conceived their own children” and that “[m]any
mentioned their strong desire to give birth to their own children as the reason for choosing
this option”); Strong, supra note 21, at 281 (noting that people may value having genetically
related offspring because it “involves experiences of pregnancy and childbirth”).
24. See JOHNSON & O’CONNOR, supra note 23, at 28 (noting that “adopted children, as
a group, show higher rates of emotional difficulties and learning problems than do
nonadopted children,” and that poor prenatal care may trigger later problems).
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sensitive to the social difficulties that adopted children face.25
For those LGBTI couples or individuals who do wish to adopt, the
process often presents serious legal challenges. Mississippi explicitly
prohibits same-sex couples from adopting.26 Other states have passed
statutes stipulating that only married couples may adopt, a requirement
intended to prevent gay and lesbian parents from adopting.27 There may be
some indication, however, that things are changing. In Florida, a thirtythree-year-old law prohibiting adoption by LGB individuals was recently
struck down as unconstitutional.28 In 2008, Arkansas voters approved a
ballot initiative that prohibits adoption by cohabiting couples,29 but it was
held unconstitutional by the Arkansas Supreme Court in April 2011.30
Even when LGBTI individuals are permitted to adopt under state law,
they may face additional obstacles. Many adoption agencies refuse to work
with gay couples.31 If a social worker is required to make a home visit,
lesbian or gay partners may pretend to be roommates for fear that their
sexual orientation will preclude them from adopting.32 In other instances,
25. Of course, this could cut both ways: LGBTI parents may be more sensitive to their
children’s experience of discrimination, but they may also be more concerned about
compounding this discrimination with the added stigma of having nontraditional parents.
26. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2007) (“Adoption by couples of the same gender is
prohibited.”).
27. For example, in Utah “a child may not be adopted by a person who is cohabiting in
a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state.”
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (West 2008). In many states, family court judges decide
whether to permit LGB adoptions on a case-by-case basis with a focus on the “best interest
of the child.” See HUMAN RTS. CAMPAIGN, PARENTING LAWS 1 (2011), http://www.hrc.org
/documents/parenting_laws_maps.pdf (“In many states the status of parenting law for
LGBT people is unclear. The determination of parenting rights is always made on a caseby-case basis and it is ultimately the decision of the judge whether to grant the adoption
petition.”). For a comprehensive review of adoption laws by state, see THE LIBERTY
COUNCIL, SAME-SEX ADOPTION LAWS BY STATE, http://www.lc.org/profamily/samesex_
adoption_by_state.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
28. In 2010, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision
holding the ban unconstitutional under the state constitution’s equal protection clause
because it found there was no rational purpose to the ban. Fla. Dep’t of Children &
Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 91–92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). The Florida
Department of Children and Families announced that it will not appeal the ruling. John
Couwels, Florida Won’t Appeal Ruling Stopping Adoption Ban by Gay Men, Lesbians,
CNN (Oct. 12, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-12/us/florida.gay.adoptions_1_adoptionban-frank-martin-gill-appeal?_s=PM:US.
29. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-8-304 (Supp. 2009) (“A minor may not be adopted or placed
in a foster home if the individual seeking to adopt or to serve as a foster parent is
cohabiting with a sexual partner outside of a marriage which is valid under the constitution
and laws of this state.”).
30. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Cole, No. 10-840 (Ark. Apr. 7, 2011)
(finding that Initiated Act No. 1 violated LGBTI couples’ fundamental right to privacy),
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/DHS_v_Cole_ Opinion.pdf.
31. JOHNSON & O’CONNOR, supra note 23, at 90.
32. Gerald P. Mallon, Assessing Lesbian and Gay Prospective Foster and Adoptive
Families: A Focus on the Homestudy Process, 86 CHILD WELFARE 67, 74–75 (2007).
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one member of the couple may attempt to “pass,” presenting herself as a
single person who wishes to adopt. In still other cases, an agency may be
aware of the couple’s sexual orientation but turn a blind eye to it.33 Birth
parents may also refuse to place their child with gay parents.34 Thus, gay
parents may fare better when they are able to conceal their sexual
identities from birth parents, a task made easier when the birth parents are
not involved in the adoption process.35 Gay parents may face problems in
international adoptions as well, because some countries prohibit placement
of children with LGB parents.36 Those agencies that are willing to work
with LGBT couples may still require these couples to meet higher
standards than their heterosexual counterparts before being considered
suitable adoptive parents.37 Many agencies appear to prefer adoptive
parents who comply with traditional gender roles, treating “feminine”
lesbians and “masculine” gay men differently from prospective parents
who present in non-gender-traditional ways.38 In light of these hurdles,
anecdotal evidence suggests that many LGBTI individuals feel they are
considered undesirable candidates for adoption and are therefore reluctant
to participate in a process that delves into their private lives and leaves
them feeling judged.39
33. John D. Matthews & Elizabeth P. Cramer, Envisaging the Adoption Process to
Strengthen Gay- and Lesbian-Headed Families: Recommendations for Adoption
Professionals, 85 CHILD WELFARE 317, 327–28 (2006) (noting that many adoption agencies
operate under a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy).
34. See id. at 323 (finding that about one quarter of responding agencies had worked
with birth parents who objected to placing a child with gay parents).
35. See David M. Brodzinsky, Charlotte J. Patterson & Mahnoush Vaziri, Adoption
Agency Perspectives on Lesbian and Gay Prospective Parents: A National Study, 5
ADOPTION QUARTERLY 5, 20–21 (2002). Brodzinsky, Patterson and Vaziri’s research
suggests that international adoption agencies view adoption by LGB parents favorably. Id.
This is surprising, as many foreign countries prohibit adoption by LGB parents. Id. at 20.
The authors speculate that there are three possible ways for agencies to negotiate this
contradiction. Id. at 21. First, the adoption agency may conceal the sexual orientation of the
prospective family. Second, some agencies may adopt a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy and
not ask the prospective parents about their sexual orientation. Id. Third, agencies can
disclose the parents’ sexual orientation, but this may impede the adoption of some children
by appropriate LGB parents. Id.
36. See, e.g., OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S ISSUES, DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY SPECIFIC
INFORMATION FOR CHINA (Jan. 23, 2009), http://adoption.state.gov/country/china.html
(“Chinese law permits adoption by married couples, defined as one man and one woman.
They must adopt the child jointly.”).
37. Lori Ross, Rachel Epstein, Corrie Goldfinger, Leah Steele, Scott Anderson &
Carol Strike, Lesbian and Queer Mothers Navigating the Adoption System: The Impacts
on Mental Health, 17 HEALTH SOC. REV. 254, 255 (2008).
38. See id. at 256 (“In order to successfully negotiate the adoption process, it has been
suggested that lesbians (and by extension, gay men) must present themselves as similar to,
or indeed the same as, heterosexual applicants, that is, to be ‘the good lesbian.’”) (citing
Stephen Hicks, Good Lesbian, Bad Lesbian: Regulating Heterosexuality in Fostering and
Adoption Assessments, 5 CHILD & FAM. SOC. WORK 157, 162 (2000)).
39. JOHNSON & O’CONNOR, supra note 23, at 91–92. For a discussion of similar issues
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Even if a couple surmounts these legal and emotional obstacles, other
issues remain. Adoption costs vary depending on the agency the couple
uses. Adoption may cost $2,500 or less, if the couple adopts through a
public agency, or as much as $30,000 if the couple adopts through an
independent domestic agency.40 The price of international adoption
depends on the country of origin, ranging from $25,000 (including travel
expenses) for a child from Ethiopia to more than $50,000 for a Russian
child.41 As there is some evidence to suggest that gay men earn less on
average than their heterosexual counterparts,42 there is good reason to be
concerned that adoption is economically prohibitive for at least a portion
of the LGBTI community.
Finally, even if an LGBTI individual is able to adopt a child, legal
barriers may prevent the parent’s same-sex partner from being recognized
as the child’s parent. When one partner is a legal parent of a couple’s child
(often by virtue of biological relation) but the other is not, the couple may
initiate a second-parent adoption, a legal process by which one partner can
become an adoptive parent without terminating the rights of the other.43
Second-parent adoption is an important option for LGBTI people because
without it the partner of the biological parent will not have any parental
rights.44 In the absence of second-parent adoption, a child might be left
confronted by transgender individuals, see SHANNON MINTER & CHRISTOPHER DALEY,
NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS. & TRANSGENDER LAW CTR., TRANS REALITIES: A LEGAL
NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF SAN FRANCISCO’S TRANSGENDER COMMUNITIES 13 (2003)
(“[T]ransgender people who are attempting to become adoptive or foster parents face
discrimination from public and private adoption and foster care agencies.”).
40. Cost of Adopting, ADOPTION.COM, http://statistics.adoption.com/information/statisticson- cost-of-adopting.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
41. Cost of Adoption Update: 2008-2009, ADOPTIVE FAMILIES, http://www.adoptive
families.com/articles.php?aid=2076.
42. See M.V. Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 48
INDUS. & LABOR REL. REV. 726, 737 (1995) (finding that from 1989 to 1991, “behaviorally
gay/bisexual men earn[ed] eleven to twenty-seven percent less than behaviorally
heterosexual men”). See also Dan A. Black, Hoda R. Makar, Seth G. Sanders & Lowell J.
Taylor, The Earnings Effects of Sexual Orientation, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 449, 463
(2003) (suggesting that unmarried gay men typically earn less than married straight men,
but that lesbian women earn more on average than heterosexual women).
43. See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender and
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 SO. CAL. L REV. 1177, 1192, 1213–15 (discussing the
process of second-parent adoption and its significance for nonmarital families).
44. Additionally, while in many states the law provides that the non-biological parent
of a child born through artificial insemination is the child’s legal parent, these statutes
typically apply only to heterosexual married couples. Thus, when a same-sex couple uses
assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) to have a child together, the child will be legally
connected to the biological mother only. See id. at 1179 (“[I]n 2010 only four states and the
District of Columbia have statutory ART provisions that extend the consent [to artificial
insemination] = legal parent rule to non-marital children. Moreover, three of these five
jurisdictions have provisions that, by their literal terms, are limited to heterosexual
couples.”). Some transgender individuals who try to establish their paternity through
artificial insemination laws face the same problem, since many of the artificial insemination
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without a legal guardian if her documented parent dies, or the
undocumented parent can lose her parental rights if the couple separates
and a custody battle ensues.45 While many states allow second-parent
adoption,46 Kentucky,47 Wisconsin,48 Nebraska,49 and Ohio50 have held that
second-parent adoption by same-sex partners is not allowed. Recently, the
North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that second-parent adoption by
nonmarried partners is illegal, potentially invalidating all previous such
adoptions in the state.51

laws refer specifically and are limited to male and female parents. Thus, the Illinois
Appellate Court held that the Parentage Act of 1984, under which a child born from
artificial insemination to two married parents retained his right to parentage with both
parents even if the marriage was subsequently held invalid, did not apply to transsexual
males. In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 309–10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2005)
(“[The section of the Parentage Act] which confers a presumption on a ‘man’ to be the
natural father of a child . . . is based on the premise that the parties who are involved are a
man and a woman. As we have previously determined, petitioner is not a man within the
meaning of the statute, and that, therefore, the statute does not apply.”).
45. State courts have taken different positions on the rights of non-adoptive parents in
cases where a couple had children together but one of the parents did not adopt the child
and the legal parent subsequently died or the couple separated. Compare Janice M. v.
Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 74 (Md. 2008) (holding that “de facto parenthood is not
recognized in Maryland”), and In the Matter of C.M. v. C.H., 789 N.Y.S.2d 393, 402 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding that a woman lacked standing to seek any contact with the child
born to her former same-sex partner), with In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 157 (W. Va.
2005) (holding that the same-sex partner of a deceased woman had standing to intervene in
custody proceeding under the “exceptional cases” provision, as the partner was the child’s
psychological parent, unusual and extraordinary circumstances existed, and awarding the
partner permanent custody served the best interests of the child).
46. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 9000–9007 (West 2004) (describing the process of
second-parent adoption and its availability to domestic partners); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 18, § 421.16(h)(2) (2008) (“Applicants [for second-parent adoption] shall not be
rejected solely on the basis of homosexuality.”).
47. S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 815–20 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the
stepparent adoption of a child by the same-sex domestic partner of the child’s biological
mother without the termination of the biological mother’s parental rights was prohibited by
statutes; adoption statute only allowed a stepparent adoption without the termination of a
biological parent’s rights if the stepparent was married to the biological parent, and samesex marriages were prohibited by statute).
48. See In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 684–85 (Wis. 1994) (holding that the
same-sex partner of the child’s adoptive mother is not permitted to adopt the child, as this
would terminate the adoptive mother’s parental rights).
49. See In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Neb. 2002) (holding that a
same-sex partner cannot adopt the partner’s child without terminating the other partner’s
parental rights).
50. See In re Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1072–73 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that a parent’s parental rights are terminated upon adoption of the child by a nonspousal partner).
51. Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 505 (N.C. 2010). The case generated publicity
in part because the non-biological mother petitioner in the case, Julia Boseman, was the
first openly gay member of the North Carolina General Assembly.
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B. Using Assisted Reproduction Technologies
Broadly defined, assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) are “noncoital methods of conception that involve manipulation of both eggs and
sperm” that allow individuals to reproduce without heterosexual
intercourse.52 Common ART methods include artificial insemination, invitro fertilization (IVF),53 and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).54
ARTs came into common use in most developed countries in the mid- to
late twentieth century.55 The main advantage of ARTs over adoption for
LGBTI couples is that one partner will be genetically related to the child—
an advantage that is significant for some families.56 For example, gay male
couples may conceive a child who possesses genes from one parent by
combining one partner’s sperm with a donated egg and relying on a
surrogate mother to gestate the child. Lesbian couples may use ART to
include both mothers in the biological components of childbirth: one may
donate the egg while the other gestates the child.57 Nevertheless, even with
all of the ART options currently available, most LGBTI couples cannot
currently conceive a child who is genetically related to both parents and
must continue to rely on donated eggs or sperm to use ARTs.58
LGBTI ART users must decide whether to use an anonymous or
known donor to supply eggs and/or sperm. Finding an egg or sperm donor
can be a fraught and complicated process. While the nature/nurture debate
is still going strong, choosing half of the genes for one’s child can make a
52. Linda Beckman & S. Marie Harvey, Current Reproductive Technologies:
Increased Access and Choice?, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 1, 2 (2005). Federal law defines ART as
“all treatments or procedures which include the handling of human oocytes or embryos,
including in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer, [or] zygote intrafallopian
transfer.” 42 U.S.C. § 263a-7 (2006).
53. CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 327 (2006)
(describing IVF as “fertilization of an egg by sperm outside of the womb in a petri dish in
order to produce an embryo that can be placed either in the potential birth mother’s
reproductive organs or in cryopreservation for future use”).
54. Id. (describing PGD as “a biopsy on a cell taken from an embryo to determine its
genetic characteristics and condition prior to implantation”). PGD is a technique that can
identify genetic defects in pre-embryos.
55. Id. at xi, 8.
56. See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Beyond Cloning: Expanding Reproductive Options
for Same-Sex Couples, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 651, 653 (2000-2001) (“Gay couples have the
same strong interest as heterosexual couples in raising children with whom they have
biological ties.”).
57. Suzanne Pelka, Sharing Motherhood: Maternal Jealousy Among Lesbian CoMothers, 56 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 195, 196 (2009). This option is both complicated and
expensive because it requires at least one cycle of IVF (which involves hormonal therapy
and anesthesia) to transfer the egg from one woman to the other.
58. This may not be the case for some transgender and intersex individuals, or for any
other LGBTI-identified couples whose biological configurations allow them to contribute
both egg and sperm.
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potential parent feel like she is gambling with the child’s identity and
health.59 Some couples may thus prefer to use a known donor to avoid both
the potentially complicated process of finding the right anonymous donor
and at least some of the risks inherent in anonymous donation.60 Although
most sperm banks offer a great deal of information about donors,61
personal acquaintance with the donor can provide answers to questions
about the donor’s character, behavior, and appearance—factors that most
parents wish to consider before selecting the genes they will pass along to
their child. Furthermore, some parents may prefer to select a donor they
can contact in case of an emergency or even contact down the road with
questions about family history if unexpected health concerns arise. If the
child were to need an organ transplant later in life, parents who chose a
known donor would be able to contact her.62 Not only would she be more
likely to be an appropriate donor for the child, but she may also be more
inclined to assist because of her relationship with the family.63

59. Some diseases may be transmitted through donated sperm without the donor’s
knowledge simply by passing on a deleterious gene. A donor who finds out years later that
he is a genetic carrier of a particular disease is not obliged by current law to report this to
the recipient parents. Vanessa L. Pi, Regulating Sperm Donation: Why Requiring Exposed
Donation Is Not the Answer, 16 DUKE J. GENDER & L. POL. 379, 390 (2009) (“Should a
donor later develop a serious medical condition that may have been genetically passed on
to an ART-conceived child, he is not required to contact either the sperm bank, the
recipient mother, or the child.”). See also Johnson v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (denying relief in parents’ claim against a sperm bank that they
allegedly negligently provided them with material from a donor with a history of kidney
disease). Choosing an egg donor presents its own unique obstacles, as the business of egg
donation is unregulated and consumers are faced with a variety of choices in their quest to
find the perfect egg. Notably, one couple even offered to pay $50,000 for an Ivy League egg
donor with high SAT scores. David Tuller, Payment Offers to Egg Donors Prompt
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2010, at D5.
60. Some couples choose to use the sperm of the non-gestating partner’s relative so as
to allow for some genetic similarity with both parents. While such an arrangement has clear
advantages, particularly when the parents need to immediately contact the donor in cases
of medical emergency, many couples may feel uncomfortable with the ambiguity such
decisions create, such as when the child’s uncle is also her biological father.
61. Some of the information collected by sperm banks is required by Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) regulations. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.55 (2008) (requiring sperm banks
to conduct a physical examination and to collect the medical history of the donor and to
retain these records). The California Cryobank provides web-based information about
potential donors’ ethnic origins, education level, areas of study, and religion, as well as
audio interviews and photos from their early childhood. See CALIFORNIA CRYOBANK,
http://www.cryobank.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2011).
62. In some circumstances, children or their parents may also be able to identify and
contact anonymous donors. See Ethics Comm. of Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Informing
Offspring of their Conception by Gamete Donation, 81 FERTILITY & STERILITY 527, 529
(2004) (explaining that, while most sperm banks maintain non-identifying records about the
donors’ characteristics and medical history, “[a] growing number of sperm banks and
programs make gametes available from donors who agree to be identified now or in the
future”).
63. A further complication with unknown sperm donors is that some children may
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Still, choosing a known donor is not without its disadvantages.
Disputes over parental rights may arise between the couple and the donor,
and the law in this area is not well settled.64 Even when decisions about
parental rights are made collaboratively in advance of childbirth,
disagreements can arise down the road and litigation may ensue. Many
potential LGBTI parents are thus understandably wary about entering into
such agreements for fear that they will later face problems that could strain
their relationship and adversely affect the child.
Couples who want children but cannot carry a child themselves may
rely on a surrogate mother in addition to an egg donor, which can create
additional complications. ART using surrogacy can be quite expensive:
after payment to the surrogate carrier, to a separate egg donor, for the IVF
cycles, for agency and attorney fees, and for medical insurance and medical
care during the pregnancy, the total cost can reach or exceed $120,000.65
Additionally, the use of surrogate contracts may present a variety of legal
hurdles. In some jurisdictions, for example, surrogate parenting
agreements are not enforceable.66 Thus, if a surrogate carrier changes her
eventually wish to find their biological donor fathers. Most sperm banks keep the identity
of the donor anonymous. Gaia Bernstein, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Timing,
Uncertainty, and Donor Anonymity, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1189, 1191 (2010) (noting that donor
anonymity is the prevailing norm). However, there is much debate over this issue, and it is
possible that laws on sperm donation and anonymity may change in the future. See id. at
1205–18 (describing current legal debates regarding donor anonymity in the United States
and abroad). In the United States, potential parents have the option to choose an open
identity donor who voluntarily agrees to be contacted by offspring when they reach
eighteen. See Joanna E. Scheib & Rachel A. Cushing, Open-Identity Donor Insemination
in the United States: Is It on the Rise?, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 231, 231 (2007). In a
relatively recent study on the topic, over eighty percent of participants conceived by an
unknown donor indicated that they were at least moderately likely to request to meet their
parents when they turned eighteen. J. Scheib, M. Riordan & S. Rubin, Adolescents with
Open-Identity Sperm Donors: Reports from 12-17 Year Olds, 20 HUM. R EPROD. 239, 239–
52 (2004). Tracing one’s origins is becoming easier as technology develops. In Britain, a
fifteen-year-old boy succeeded in finding his original donor using a genealogy DNA test.
He tracked the donor from his Y chromosome, which is passed from father to son virtually
unchanged. Alison Motluk, Anonymous Sperm Donor Traced on Internet, NEW SCI., Nov.
5, 2005, at 6.
64. Compare C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) (holding that a
lesbian couple who solicited sperm from one member of a gay male couple could not
extinguish the biological father’s parental rights in part because they had not complied with
Ohio’s statutory requirements for establishing a legal relationship between donor and
mother), with Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So. 2d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that
sperm donor had no parental rights). The seemingly contradictory outcomes in these cases
may be at least partially explained by the fact that in the former case, the parties decided
that the sperm donor would be a “male role model” for the child, while in the latter, the
parties agreed that the man would be simply a sperm donor, without any parental rights.
65. See, e.g., DEBORAH SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS 213 (2006) (estimating costs of
various assisted reproduction techniques).
66. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25–218 (2006) (“No person may enter into, include,
arrange, procure or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract.”);
D.C. CODE § 16–402 (2001) (banning surrogacy agreements).
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mind and decides not to turn over the child to the contracting couple, the
couple may not have any legal recourse. Some couples may also be
concerned about what role, if any, the surrogate mother will play in their
family.67
Thus, while ARTs may provide LGBTI individuals with an appealing
alternative to adoption, the many possible complications related to their
use suggest that they are, at best, an imperfect solution for couples who
wish to have a genetically-related child.

C. Co-Parenting
Some LGBTI individuals and couples choose to build their families
through co-parenting arrangements. Co-parenting arrangements often
begin when an individual or couple wishing to have a child seeks a coparent through their own social networks, in online advertisements, or
through centers that help match future parents.68 For example, a man and a
woman, at least one of whom identifies as LGBTI, may conceive a child
together and then share parenting responsibilities.69 There are a variety of
ways to structure this kind of arrangement. In some cases, the man and the
woman might live together or in close proximity to one another. The child
might live in one parent’s house while still being parented by the other(s),
or might alternate between homes.
The health and safety risks and the prohibitive costs often associated
with adoption and some ARTs are not present in co-parenting
arrangements. Typically, the co-parents use artificial insemination to
conceive (though other options are available) and the child is genetically
related to both parents.70 There are likely fewer surprises as well, as coparenting involves no unknown donor and no hidden costs.
Nevertheless, co-parenting is yet another imperfect solution for
LGBTI couples who want children. Even if the parties know one another
beforehand, raising a child together can lead to disputes and cause serious
rifts in the relationship,71 just as it can in more “traditional” parenting
67. JOHNSON & O’CONNOR, supra note 23, at 101.
68. See Susan Hogben & Justine Coupland, Egg Seeks Sperm. End of Story . . . ?
Articulating Gay Parenting in Small Ads for Reproductive Partners, 11 DISCOURSE &
SOC’Y 457, 478 (2000) (defining co-parenting and describing ads seeking co-parenting
arrangements). See also GAY FAMILY OPTIONS, http://www.gayfamilyoptions.com (last
visited Feb. 19, 2011) (offering assistance in finding co-parents and other partners for the
purpose of creating a family).
69. See Hogben & Coupland, supra note 68, at 478.
70. See, e.g., Deborah Dempsey, Conceiving and Negotiating Reproductive
Relationships: Lesbians and Gay Men Forming Families with Children, 44 SOCIOLOGY
1145, 1152–54 (2010) (describing co-parenting arrangements in Australia).
71. See, e.g., Denise Balkissoon, One Big Gay Family, TORONTO LIFE, Feb. 2009,
http://www.torontolife.com/features/one-big-gay-family/?pageno=1 (“Parenting power
struggles—disagreements over the child’s diet, clothes, activity schedule and so on—can
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situations. Moreover, co-parenting involves its own legal risks. Once the
child is born, one parent may seek more or less involvement than initially
agreed upon. Disputes may arise over money, education, living
arrangements, or any number of other parenting issues.72 If a previously
single parent enters into a relationship, that partner may seek to acquire
guardianship, further complicating the contractual arrangement.

D. Conclusion
While many of the difficulties noted throughout this section are also
faced by infertile opposite-sex couples who want to have children, the
LGBTI community encounters additional problems unknown to most
opposite-sex partners, as these heterosexual couples are much more likely
to find their efforts at building families supported by social and legal (if not
biological) norms. But another option may be on the technological
horizon. Cloning may provide solutions to some of the more common
problems associated with LGBTI adoption, co-parenting, and ARTs. As I
discuss in the following section, cloning is not without its drawbacks.
Nevertheless, it remains a real possibility that this emerging technology, if
properly researched and regulated, could solve many of the most common
problems faced by same-sex and other “nontraditional” couples when
deciding whether and how to become parents.
III.
CLONING OFFERS NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO CREATE GENETICALLYRELATED CHILDREN
The creation of Dolly the sheep in 1996 sparked heated political,
philosophical, legal, cultural, and moral debate.73 Dolly was the first
mammal to be cloned from an adult somatic cell. She was created after 277
attempts74 at using somatic cell nuclear transfer technology (SCNT), a
form of cloning.75 The vast majority of Americans are against the use of
lead moms to demote ‘daddy’ to ‘donor.’ One gay Toronto father, H, has fought a series of
legal disputes with a pair of lesbian co-mothers over their six-year-old daughter.”).
72. See Co-Parenting, THE LESBIAN AND GAY FOUND., http://www.lgf.org.uk/coparenting (last visited Feb. 19, 2011) (“Once you have found a suitable partner, contacting a
legal representative is advisable. It would be a good idea to draw up a ‘parenting
agreement’ covering the important aspects of childcare such as money, living arrangements,
schooling etc.”).
73. See generally BRENT WATERS & RONALD COLE-TURNER, GOD AND THE EMBRYO,
RELIGIOUS VOICES ON STEM CELLS AND CLONING (2003) (surveying religious perspectives
on cloning); ARLENE JUDITH KLOTZKO, THE CLONING SOURCEBOOK (2001) (discussing
ethical and policy issues related to cloning and medical research). See also SILJA VÖNEKY &
RÜDIGER WOLFRUM, HUMAN DIGNITY AND HUMAN CLONING (2004) (discussing
interdisciplinary approaches to the ethics of cloning).
74. WILMUT & HIGHFIELD, supra note 15, at 6.
75. COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, NAT’L RESEARCH CTR., SCIENTIFIC AND
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reproductive cloning.76 The scientific community is more divided on this
issue, and distinguished scholars from a variety of disciplines support its
use. In the following sections, I define cloning and discuss the potential
benefits of reproductive cloning for the population at large, drawing on a
variety of perspectives. After suggesting that cloning holds great promise
for people who experience reproductive difficulties, I turn to examine the
benefits to the LGBTI community in particular.

A. What Is Cloning?
In its most basic form, cloning is reproduction without sex, or asexual
reproduction. In “traditional” sexual reproduction, the merging of egg and
sperm in the uterus results in the birth of a new organism. Through
cloning, an organism is created from a single cell.77 In the process of SCNT,
genetic material from recipient eggs is removed and replaced with the
nucleus of a donor cell.78 SCNT can be used for both reproductive cloning
and therapeutic cloning.79 Therapeutic cloning is a form of nuclear
transplantation used to produce stem cells in a lab.80 The product of this
process is then used to make a stem cell line for further study, without the
MEDICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING 28 (2002). There are two methods
of reproductive cloning: somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), as discussed in this article,
and embryo splitting. See Jacques Cohen & Giles Tomkin, The Science, Fiction, and the
Reality of Embryo Cloning, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN CLONING 11, 14–16 (Michael C.
Brannigan ed. 2001). SCNT requires two cells: a donor and an egg cell. The egg cell is
enucleated and the DNA from the donor is transplanted. Yet some m-DNA from the egg
remains; this m-DNA is responsible for energy metabolism of the cell. Therefore, in SCNT,
the new individual is not an exact copy of either the donor or the recipient because m-DNA
from the egg remains. The use of embryo splitting, however, does produce an exact
genotypic duplicate of the original fertilized ovum. See JOHN CHARLES KUNICH, THE
NAKED CLONE: HOW CLONING BANS THREATEN OUR PERSONAL RIGHTS 6 (2003). Other
methods of cloning technology, which are beyond the scope of this paper, are not currently
being used for reproductive cloning. See, e.g., Anne Lawton, The Frankenstein
Controversy: The Constitutionality of a Federal Ban on Cloning, 87 KY. L.J. 227, 284–89
(1999) (discussing various types of cloning).
76. In 2001, ninety percent of Americans thought that human cloning was a “bad
idea.” Jeffrey M. Jones & Joseph Carroll, Americans Oppose Idea of Human Cloning,
GALLUP.COM (Dec. 6, 2001), http://www.gallup.com/poll/5098/americans-oppose-ideahuman-cloning.aspx. A survey conducted the following year by the Genetics and Public
Policy Center found that seventy-six percent of Americans oppose scientists working on
ways to clone humans. K. Hudson, J. Scott & A. Kalfoglou, Public Awareness and
Attitudes about Reproductive Genetic Technology, G ENETICS & PUB. POL’Y CENTER,
http://www.dnapolicy.org/pub.reports.php?action=detail&report_id=9%20 (last visited
Mar. 31, 2011).
77. AARON D. LEVINE, CLONING: A BEGINNERS GUIDE 2 (2007).
78. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 53, at 247.
79. COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, supra note 75, at 28.
80. Some scientists prefer the term “research cloning” rather than “therapeutic
cloning” because they believe it more accurately describes the present state of research and
reflects the fact that embryos are being cloned not for use in current therapies in humans
but for research on potential future therapeutic uses. See, e.g., LEVINE, supra note 77, at 92.
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intent to transfer the cloned cells and resulting embryo to the uterus for
81
purposes of procreation. In the future, these lines could also potentially
be used for clinical applications, such as repairing damaged or defective
tissues.82 Reproductive cloning, on the other hand, is the deliberate
production of genetically-identical individuals.83 Reproductive cloning
involves implanting a blastocyst (an early-stage human embryo) formed by
a nuclear transplantation procedure in a uterus, where it initiates the
process of forming a fetus.84 Through SCNT for human reproductive
cloning, researchers could use a cell from one individual to create another
genetically-identical person. While therapeutic cloning is fairly well
accepted, particularly within the scientific community, reproductive
cloning is extremely controversial.85 This Article focuses on reproductive
cloning and, unless otherwise noted, I use “cloning” to refer solely to
human reproductive cloning.86
In practice, reproductive cloning looks quite different from its

81. John A. Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, 27 Hofstra L. Rev. 609, 611
(1999) [hereinafter Two Models of Human Cloning] (“[T]herapeutic cloning clones a
person’s cells to the blastocyst stage with no intent to transfer the cloned cells and resulting
embryo to the uterus, as would occur with reproductive cloning. Embryonic stem . . . cells
would then be removed from the embryo in order to obtain cells or tissue for research and
eventually transplantation.”).
82. Id. Stem cells produced by therapeutic cloning could be used to treat disorders
ranging from leukemia to Parkinson’s to Alzheimer’s. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note
53, at 248. Therapeutic cloning could also be used to create embryonic stem cells. An
embryo might be cloned for the purpose of obtaining transplantable organs. This would
allow for the creation of stem cells to repair organs without fear that the person’s immune
system will reject the organ. See, e.g., Arthur Caplan, Monkey Cloning a Reason to Pause,
Not Panic, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 13, 2007 5:51:22 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
21755931/. Put differently, people might one day use their own stem cells to repair
themselves.
83. COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, supra note 75, at 24 (noting that, with SCNT,
the clone will carry almost the same DNA as the cell donor, with the exception of the mDNA).
84. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 53, at 247–48. But see Christine Hauskeller,
Science in Touch: Functions of Biomedical Terminology, 20 BIOLOGY & P HILOSOPHY 815,
826 (2005) (explaining that the only difference between therapeutic and reproductive
cloning is whether the clone is implanted in the uterus, yet this difference is used to create a
binary distinction between good (therapeutic) cloning and bad (reproductive) cloning).
85. Hauskeller, supra note 84, at 826.
86. Reproductive cloning has potential beyond its use for human reproduction. As the
scientists who cloned Dolly explained, “When we created Dolly, we were not thinking
about rooms full of clones . . . We were not thinking about helping lesbians to reproduce
without the help of a sperm bank or about multiplying movie stars. We were certainly not
thinking of duplicating dictators.” WILMUT & HIGHFIELD, supra note 15, at 3. Instead,
reproductive cloning may be useful in other, less obvious areas, such as food production
and medicine. The cells of an animal that produces human proteins that can cure stomach
ailments, for example, could be mass-produced, providing widely available treatments for
stomach pain. LEVINE, supra note 77, at 84–89. Species facing extinction might even one
day be saved by cloning. Id . at 78–82.
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portrayal in films and in the public imagination.87 A cloned human being is
not a photocopy of another.88 Despite their shared genetic identity, clones
will not be identical in physical or behavioral characteristics, because DNA
is not the sole determinant of appearance or personality.89 Like all human
embryos, a cloned embryo must be implanted into the womb of another
human being and gestated for roughly nine months.90 Beginning in utero,
the experience of the cloned person and the donor will diverge.91 While the
recipient’s nuclear DNA will be the same as the donor’s, part of the egg
still remains. A small portion of about sixty genes from the egg will not be
removed; this is mitochondrial DNA (m-DNA), which is responsible for
energy metabolism.92 Dolly, for example, comprised nuclear DNA from a
Finn Dorest sheep and m-DNA from a Scottish Blackface.93 The cloned
individual inherits the DNA in the egg’s mitochondria, which creates
differences in the physiology and functioning of systems that have high
energy demands including the muscles, the heart, and the brain.94 As a
result, scientists predict that a cloned person and her source counterpart
will typically be less similar to one another than identical twins.95
It is worth mentioning that cloning might be combined with a gene
splicing technique, allowing the couple to use cells from both partners,
reduce the number of chromosomes in each cell’s nucleus by one half, and
fuse the two adult cells with an enucleated egg.96 Then, in the regular
process of SCNT, the enucleated egg would be implanted in uterus,
resulting in a cloned child who shares a mix of genes from both parents. I
discuss the possibility of this method further in Part IV(B).
Developments in cloning technology are occurring far more quickly
than changes in the laws regulating cloning research. Important

87. See GREGORY E. PENCE, WHO’S AFRAID OF HUMAN CLONING? 39, 39–43 (1998)
(surveying cloning in science fiction); HWA A. LIM, MULTIPLICITY YOURS: CLONING, STEM
CELL RESEARCH, AND REGENERATIVE MEDICINE 129–30 (2006) (“[T]here have been no
shortages of novels and movies on cloning.”).
88. LIM, supra note 87, at 121 (“There is a critical difference, however, between
photocopying graphic materials and cloning (genetic copying) organisms . . . . [T]he
development of a clone involves not only nature (the genetic makeup), but also nurture
(the effects of environmental factors). Thus an exact duplicate of the original is almost
impossible.”).
89. COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, supra note 75, at 26.
90. Yuriko M. Shikai, Don’t Be Swept Away By Mass Hysteria: The Benefits Of
Human Reproductive Cloning and Its Future, 33 SW. U. L. REV. 259, 273 (2004) (“[A]ny
embryos resulting from cloning must be implanted in a woman’s uterus and carried to term
one at a time.”).
91. COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, supra note 75, at 26.
92. LIM, supra note 87, at 191.
93. WILMUT & HIGHFIELD, supra note 15, at 242.
94. COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, supra note 75, at 26.
95. Id.; LEVINE, supra note 77, at 3.
96. Orentlicher, supra note 56, at 654–56.
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breakthroughs in research have been made in the years following Dolly’s
creation. Following on the heels of Dolly, a bull, piglets, a merino sheep, a
cow, dog, cat, and other mammals were successfully cloned.97 Scientists
suggest that cloning a human being will be easier than cloning other
mammals, since humans do not possess the genes that appear to cause the
growth of dangerously large embryos in the wombs of other cloned
mammals.98 In 2006, a group of researchers attempted to implant a cloned
embryo in a human uterus.99 While unsuccessful, it was the first reliable
report of an attempt at human reproductive cloning, and scientists have
noted that “the possibility of human cloning . . . is now much closer to
becoming a reality.”100
Despite these advances in the science of cloning, safe and usable
reproductive cloning techniques are not yet available, and the science of
reproductive cloning is still in its infancy. Although healthy embryos are
occasionally created, the cloned embryos of mammals are commonly lost
during early stages of development for reasons that remain unknown.101 At
present, we have no way of knowing when cloning will be safe and efficient
enough to be of practical utility.

B. Arguments in Favor of Reproductive Cloning
Reproductive cloning may allow infertile couples to have a geneticallyrelated child with minimal aid from a gamete donor. Infertility is a major
problem in the United States today, and the number of couples who turn
to ART is steadily increasing;102 cloning would be an alternative to ART
for these couples. Single individuals who wish to have children could also

97. LIM, supra note 87, at 175–76; James Kanter, Scientists Produce First Cloned
Fighting Bull, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/30/
business/global/30got.html?_r=1&ref=cloning.
98. J. Keith Killian, Catherine M. Nolan, Andrew A. Wylie, Tao Li, Thanh H. Vu,
Andrew R. Hoffman & Randy L. Jirtle, Divergent Evolution in M6P/IGF2R Imprinting
From the Jurassic to the Quaternary, 10 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS 1721, 1726 (2001).
99. Camporesi & Bortolotti, supra note 21, at 1–2. Prior to this attempt, only
unreliable reports of cloning had been made. See, e.g., Brian Dakss, Eve: First Human
Clone?, CBS NEWS (Dec. 27, 2002), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/12/28/tech/main
534594.shtml.
100. Camporesi & Bortolotti, supra note 21, at 1.
101. Susan M. Rhind, Jane E. Taylor, Paul A. DeSousa, Tim J. King, Michelle
McGarry & Ian Wilmut, Human Cloning: Can it be Made Safe?, 4 NATURE REVS. 855, 855
(2003).
102. See Gulcin Gumus & Jungmin Lee, The ART of Life: IVF or Child Adoption? 2
(Feb. 2010) (Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper No. 4761),
http://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp4761.html (discussing the increase in ART use, and
noting that “over the last several decades, age-related infertility has become increasingly
prevalent as a relatively larger portion of women have deferred childbearing due to
effective birth control methods, safe and legal abortions, better access to college education,
and greater participation in the labor market”).
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benefit from reproductive cloning, as this procedure eliminates the
potential hassle of finding a third-party donor or the anxiety that the
child’s genetic parent might later claim parental rights.103 As discussed
above, the options currently available for “nontraditional” couples to have
a genetically-related child are far from perfect.104 Nevertheless, because the
complexity and expense of cloning, the availability of other options, and
widespread opposition to cloning may discourage many from using the
technology,105 it is likely that cloning would be as a last resort option, used
by couples only after attempting to conceive with other ARTs.106
Cloning might also be used to avoid the transmission of harmful
genetic traits to children.107 Individuals who are aware that they may pass
on harmful genes to their offspring might choose to clone their partner to
ensure that their child will not possess the undesired gene, while still
avoiding the use of a third-party donor.108 Alternately, individuals may

103. See Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, supra note 81, at 636, n.124
(noting that cloning could offer “the convenience of not having to risk having a child with a
genetic father who might later claim rearing rights”).
104. See supra Part II.
105. But see Eric A. Posner & Richard A. Posner, The Demand for Human Cloning,
in CLONES AND CLONES, supra note 12, at 233, 234 (noting that, while the perceived
weirdness of cloning “might be thought to depress demand,” the effect is “probably only
transitional . . . . [I]f it is a source of potential substantial net benefits, its use will spread,
and when some critical mass is reached, the aversion will drop away and a more rapid
diffusion will begin.”).
106. Daar, supra note 4, at 527 (“Because of its complexity and likely expense,
[cloning] would serve as a last resort for most couples who desire to parent a genetically
related child . . . .”). But see Posner & Posner, supra note 105, at 257 (arguing that it is
impossible to determine the demand for human cloning because it depends on many
variables that are not yet known). Robertson, however, argues that Eric and Richard
Posner “reach their conclusion by making two assumptions that appear highly
counterfactual.” First, they assume that one could produce a child more quickly through
cloning than through sexual reproduction. This is incorrect, since nine months of gestation
is required in both sexual and asexual reproduction. Second,
they incorrectly assume that all infertility would lead to a demand for cloning
rather than to a demand for the other treatments and alternatives for dealing
with infertility . . . The Posners also err in thinking that persons with gametic or
nongametic infertility that cannot be treated by conventional methods would
always choose cloning over childlessness, adoption, or gamete donation. Because
of the special meanings and complications raised by cloning, only a (small) subset
of this group of infertile couples is likely to choose cloning as the solution to their
reproductive problem.
Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, supra note 81, at 625–27.
107. Daar, supra note 4, at 527–28.
108. See The PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN
DIGNITY: AN ETHICAL INQUIRY 79 (2002) (“Human cloning could allow couples at risk of
generating children with genetic disease to have healthy children . . . . [I]f both parents
carried one copy of a recessive gene for the same heritable disorder, cloning might allow
them to ensure that their child does not inherit the known genetic disease (without having
to resort to using donor gametes or practicing preimplantation or prenatal genetic diagnosis
and elimination of afflicted embryos or fetuses) .”).
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decide to clone an already existing child (who carries the mix of both
genes) who they know does not carry the harmful gene.

C. Conclusion
The science of cloning is still in its infancy and requires continued,
systematic research to reach its full potential. In the following Part, I argue
that cloning offers hope for those who are unable to bring children into the
world through sexual reproduction. The LGBTI community may be
uniquely poised to benefit from advances in this technology.
IV.
CLONING CAN BENEFIT THE LGBTI COMMUNITY BY ALLOWING LGBTI
PEOPLE TO CONCEIVE GENETICALLY-RELATED CHILDREN
Reproductive cloning offers unique benefits to members of the
LGBTI community by providing additional—or, in some cases, the only—
opportunities to conceive genetically-related children. Some gay rights
activists recognized the potential benefits of reproductive cloning
immediately after the birth of Dolly and were accordingly quick to support
it.109 One group of queer activists in New York, called the Clone Rights
United Front, demonstrated against proposed state legislation that would
ban nuclear transplantation research and human cloning on the grounds
that reproductive cloning offers many opportunities to LGBTI individuals
wishing to become parents.110 In 2003, Clonaid—a group that bills itself as
“Pioneers in Human Cloning”—announced (inaccurately) that a Dutch
lesbian couple had given a birth to a cloned child, and that they had
received many other requests from gay couples looking to clone
children.111
Admittedly, not everyone advocates the use of cloning by the LGBTI
community. Even within the community, people express concerns about
the use and utility of cloning.112 However, these perspectives are in the
109. See Jack Nichols, First Cloning Rights Group Led by Gay Pioneer, GAY TODAY,
Feb. 27, 1997, http://gaytoday.badpuppy.com/garchive/events/022897ev.htm; Jack Nichols,
“Support Cloning” Say Top-Name Lesbian & Gay Activists, GAY TODAY, Mar. 3, 1997,
http://gaytoday.badpuppy.com/garchive/events/030397ev.htm.
110. See Christopher Rapp, Gay Clones, HETERODOXY MAG., April/May 1997,
http://www.clonerights.com/hetrodoxy.htm.
111. Press Release, Clonaid, Clonaid Team Ready for Human Parthenogenesis (May
4, 2004), http://www.clonaid.com/news.php?default.0.2 [hereinafter Clonaid Press Release].
The cloned child announced in 2003 was born by using one mother’s DNA and the other
mother’s womb, rather than through gene splicing. See Gina Kolata, Experts Are
Suspicious of Group’s Claim of Cloned Human’s Birth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2002, at A16
(reporting widespread scientific skepticism about Clonaid’s claim that they had succeeded
in cloning the first human being). Clonaid’s stated mission, however, is to give birth to a
child with the genes of both parents. Clonaid Press Release, supra.
112. See, e.g., CTR. FOR GENETICS & SOC., GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
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minority. Those who support cloning generally point out that LGBTI
individuals have a special interest in reproductive cloning and, therefore,
should have a right to use it.113 The primary debate among cloning
advocates both inside and outside of the community is over whether
cloning can, in fact, benefit the LGBTI community, and whether such
benefits would be equitably distributed.114 In this Part, I argue that cloning
can significantly benefit LGBTI couples and individuals, although the high
cost of the procedure may make it inaccessible to some.

A. Lesbian Couples
Lesbian couples would likely derive significant benefits from advances
in reproductive cloning. Even without gene splicing technology, cloning
would obviate the need for these couples to rely on a sperm donor.115
Furthermore, cloning offers both mothers the opportunity to participate in
the genetic creation of the child: one partner donates the egg, thus
contributing m-DNA to the clone, while the other contributes the nuclear
DNA.116 Either woman could then potentially gestate the fetus.
Additionally, combining cloning with gene splicing would enable lesbian
couples to have a child with equal portions of DNA from each parent.117
LGBTQI COMMUNITY: MYTHS AND FACTS, Apr. 17, 2004, http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/
article.php?id=1963 (“Our resources are far better spent advocating for equal access to
existing means of family building, legal protections for GLBT parents and children, and full
social acceptance of GLBT families.”). See also Jeremy Laurance, Gay Groups Split Over
‘Engineered Babies’, THE INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Sept 26, 2000, at 8,
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-wellbeing/health-news/gay-groups-splitover-engineered-babies-698589.html (discussing reactions from gay rights groups in the
United Kingdom).
113. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Edward Stein, Queer Clones, in CLONES AND
CLONES, supra note 12, at 95, 109 (“Queer cloning can be viewed as the next logical step in
queer people’s formation of families of choice.”); Orentlicher, supra note 56, at 653
(“Despite the value of gay reproduction, laws designed to prevent human cloning could
have the inadvertent effect of preventing genetic reproduction by same-sex couples. Laws
banning cloning or impeding cloning research define cloning in a way that would include
genetic reproduction by same-sex couples, especially male-male couples.”). See also
GREGORY E. PENCE, CLONING AFTER DOLLY: WHO’S STILL AFRAID? 114–15 (2004) (noting
that cloning is “surprisingly easy to justify . . . because it would be just another tool in our
reproductive tool kit for creating families and better humans”).
114. See, e.g., Eskridge & Stein, supra note 113, at 99 (“In the short term, therefore,
queer cloning would only be available to the wealthiest women.”); Theresa Pinto Sherer,
Can Two Men Make a Baby?, SALON (Jan. 31 2001), http://www.salon.com/life/feature/
2001/01/31/eggs (reporting that the author asked a gay friend if he would use cloning if
available and he answered, “Perhaps, if it weren’t prohibitively costly”).
115. See, e.g., Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, supra note 81, at 634 (“For
lesbians, [reproductive cloning] offered the unique advantage of reproduction without the
need of a male, which is an important goal for some lesbians. It also allowed a woman to
reproduce alone, for she herself could provide the m-DNA and cytoplasm, nuclear DNA,
and gestation needed to produce a child.”).
116. Id. at 635.
117. Eskridge & Stein, supra note 113, at 99 (“With cloning. . . if [a lesbian] wants to
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B. Gay Male Couples
Scholars disagree over whether cloning technologies are (or are likely
to be in the near future) advanced enough to be useful for gay male
couples. The main controversy surrounds the availability of gene splicing
techniques. With more research, gene splicing might be used to create a
zygote that contains genetic materials from two men.118 While several
studies suggest that this might soon be a possibility,119 others in the
scientific community claim that viable gene-splicing technology is too far in
the future to be a practical option.120 Some scholars argue that, without
gene splicing, cloning would provide little for gay men that is not already

mix her genes with those of her life partner or a close friend, gene-splicing could do the
trick.”).
118. See, e.g., id. at 118 (“With the advent of gene-splicing, same-sex unions could not
only produce children, but also produce children who are genetic hybrids of the parents,
just like those produced in different-sex unions.”). In 2000, Calum MacKellar, a lecturer in
bioethics and biochemistry at the University of Edinburgh, argued that the genetic
techniques used in the creation of Dolly may one day make it possible for two men to
conceive a child with shared genes. The process would still require a woman’s egg and a
surrogate mother, but a child could be made by combining the DNA of both fathers. See
Calum MacKellar, Children with Two Genetic Fathers, EUR. BIOETHICAL RES.,
http://web.archive.org/web/20080328082126/http://www.bioethics.org.uk/2_fathrs.htm (last
visited Feb. 16, 2011).
119. In a 1999 experiment, scientists used chimeras reconstructed from asexual
reproduction and bovine embryos fertilized in vitro. See generally A. Boediono, T. Suzuki,
L.Y. Li & R.A. Godke, Offspring Born from Chimeras Reconstructed From
Parthenogenesis and in Vitro Fertilized Bovine Embryos, 53 MOLECULAR REPROD. & DEV.
159 (1999). A “chimera” is defined as “[a]n organism, organ, or part consisting of two or
more tissues of different genetic composition, produced as a result of organ transplant,
grafting, or genetic engineering; a bizarre human-animal amalgam or hybrid.” KUNICH,
supra note 75, at 163 (2003). In 2004, Japanese researchers created a mouse that had two
mothers but no father. See Tomohiro Kono, Yayoi Obata, Quiong Wu, Katsutoshi Niwa,
Yukiko Ono, Yuji Yamamoto, Eun Sung Park, Jeong-Sun Seo & Hidehiko Ogawa, Birth of
Parthenogenetic Mice That Can Develop to Adulthood, 428 NATURE 860, 863 (2004). The
investigators fused one mouse egg to another whose DNA was altered to change the
activity of two imprinted genes. In essence, the gene activity in the modified egg resembled
that of sperm. Id. The most relevant breakthrough, however, occurred in January 2008. In
this experiment, human embryos containing DNA from two women and one man were
created by British scientists. Three-Parent Embryo Formed in Lab, BBC NEWS (Feb. 5,
2008 11:13 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7227861.stm. Ten embryos were created from
three DNA donors and started to develop normally, but they were destroyed within six
days. Id. This research suggests that a technique that allows for genetic modification (gene
splicing to create an embryo by mixing the DNA of two males) is likely to be possible
around the same time that reproductive cloning becomes safe and efficient. See Martin H.
Johnson, Reproduction in the Noughties: Will the Scientists Have All the Fun?, 198 J.
ANATOMY 385, 390 (2001) (arguing that a technique to create a child from the mix of the
DNA of two lesbians or gay males, even if not perfect, could become available and would
be safe in the near future).
120. See Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, supra note 81, at 637, n.126 (“A
chimera created with the genes of two different males would make each a genetic father of
the child, but such a procedure is too distant in the future to be a practical option.”).
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offered by other ARTs.121 Because gay men, unlike fertile lesbian couples,
would still have to rely on a third party to gestate the child and donate an
egg, cloning would be no different from other forms of IVF.122
However, I suggest that, even without the benefits of gene-splicing
technology, gay men may have a compelling interest in reproductive
cloning.123 Cloning would allow them to have a child with almost the same
DNA as one father and little third-party DNA (only the m-DNA from the
egg donor).124 Therefore, the “gambling” factor associated with choosing
the right egg would be avoided.125
Importantly, even if gene-splicing technology were perfected, gay men
would still need to rely on egg donation and gestation. Because cloning by
gay men requires a surrogate mother to gestate the child, the procedure
raises ethical questions. Some feminists argue that surrogacy arrangements
exploit female bodies,126 commercialize the birth process,127 and reinforce
121. Id. at 636–37 (noting that gay men have a weaker argument in favor of the use of
reproductive cloning because they will still need to enlist a foreign egg and gestating
mother).
122. Assuming, that is, that incubation technology—an artificial womb that will
replace a woman’s womb—will not be available in the near future. See Frida Simonstein,

Artificial Reproductive Technologies and the Advent of the Artificial Womb, in
REPROGEN-ETHICS AND THE FUTURE OF GENDER 177 (Frida Simonstein ed. 2009)
(suggesting that, while an artificial womb seems a remote possibility, it may be only a
matter of time until someone finds a way to develop one).
123. Eskridge and Stein argue that cloning would also allow gay men to procreate
without worry of transmitting HIV to their children. However, it is not clear that
prevention of HIV transmission is a persuasive reason for gay men to use cloning to have
children, given the other options available to reduce or eliminate the risk of HIV
transmission in the process of reproduction such as sperm washing and IVF. Cf. Eskridge &
Stein, supra note 113, at 96–97 (noting that all individuals, regardless of sexual orientation,
would benefit from the ability to avoid transmitting AIDS to their offspring).
124. Daar, supra note 4, at 529 (arguing that cloning “may alleviate . . . [gay males’]
worries [about potential claims of parental rights by egg donors and genetic surrogates] by
eliminating gamete donors from the procreation equation”); Jessica Lin Lewis, Predicting
the Judicial Response to an Asserted Right to Reproductive Cloning, 29 J. LEGAL MED.
523, 524 (2008) (“In the case of gay males, the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer would
reduce the biological contribution of an ‘outsider’ to enucleated egg donation and
surrogacy.”).
125. As explained above, the egg in the cloning process has minimal effect on the
child’s genetic makeup. In SCNT, the DNA of the egg is removed (with the exception of
the m-DNA) and a cell nucleus from the DNA donor is transferred into the egg. Therefore,
the clone shares the DNA of the DNA donor and not that of the egg donor. See supra Part
II.
126. See generally Rosalie Ber, Ethical Issues in Gestational Surrogacy, 21
THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 153 (2000) (arguing that gestational surrogacy is a form
of slavery and prostitution).
127. See Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile
Women or a Commodification of Women’s Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J.
113, 154 (1997) (“Allowing compensation to a surrogate constitutes the sale of children
thereby making ‘surrogate babies’ commodities and items of manufacture. As a result,
surrogacy violates human dignity by placing a market value on the leasing of a womb and
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the image of women as “reproductive machines.”128 As other feminists
point out, however, when surrogacy arrangements are properly and
sensitively handled, they can serve to support women’s autonomy and
liberation by allowing them to exercise free choice.129 The arguments for
and against surrogacy are voluminous and exceed this Article’s scope, but
it is important to note that surrogacy arrangements already exist and will
likely continue with or without cloning.

C. Transgender and Transsexual Individuals
Transsexualism is defined by the American Heritage Medical
Dictionary as “[t]he desire to change one’s anatomic sexual characteristics
to conform physically with one’s perception of self as a member of the
opposite sex.”130 It is often used to describe someone who is “intending to
undergo, is undergoing or has undergone gender reassignment
treatment.”131 Transgender, on the other hand, is an umbrella term that
includes a wide range of identities, all of which concern “people who live,
or desire to live, a large part of their adult life in the role and dress of that
gender group which would be considered to be in opposition to their sex as
designated at birth.”132 Thus, gender reassignment treatment or the desire
for it does not determine whether a person is transgender or not.133 In this
paper, I use the term “transgender” to refer to individuals who have
undertaken “light” changes to alter their biological sex, such as taking
hormones, while I use the term “transsexuals” to refer to individuals who
have taken more serious medical steps toward changing their biological
sex. Accounting for the particular needs of transgender and transsexual
individuals is not easy. As with any group of people, individual needs vary
widely. For the purposes of this section, however, I will discuss transgender
obtaining a child.”).
128. See Eskridge & Stein, supra note 113, at 102 (“Some gay men, including the
authors of this essay, are feminists and would be ethically concerned about . . . surrogacy as
. . . reinforcing gender stereotypes of women as ‘breeders.’”).
129. Id. (“On the other hand, many feminists powerfully defend surrogacy as freedom
to deploy their bodies; some of the same prochoice arguments that support the right to
abortion also support the right to surrogacy.”); see also Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,
785 (Cal. 1993) (“The argument that a woman cannot knowingly and intelligently agree to
gestate and deliver a baby for intending parents carries overtones of the reasoning that for
centuries prevented women from attaining equal economic rights and professional status
under the law. To resurrect this view is both to foreclose a personal and economic choice on
the part of the surrogate mother.”).
130. Definition of Transsexualism, FREE ONLINE MED. DICTIONARY, http://medicaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/transexual (last visited Feb. 11, 2011) (quoting AMERICAN
HERITAGE MEDICAL DICTIONARY (2007)).
131. See STEPHEN WHITTLE, RESPECT AND EQUALITY, TRANSSEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER RIGHTS xxiii (2002).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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and transsexual individuals in two broad groups based on their gender or
sex transition—female to male (FtM) and male to female (MtF)—and then
briefly describe issues shared by most transgender people.
It is important to emphasize that the sexual orientation of transsexual
and transgender people varies greatly, just as it does with non-transfolk;
some identify as gay, some bisexual, some asexual, and some
heterosexual.134 Some may identify more generally as simply “queer.” For
the purposes of discussing the transgender community in the context of
cloning, I assume that everyone in the community is heterosexual; thus,
when I describe how couples might use cloning, I hypothetically assume
they have opposite-sex partners. This is a problematic but necessary
assumption for the purposes of this section.
Transgender people are faced with a variety of personal, legal,
medical, and social problems if they wish to have children.135 Some
transgender individuals believe that they will not be good parents due to
the difficulties or trauma they have experienced in their own lives,136 or
feel that infertility is the “price” they pay for undergoing transition.137
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some may be concerned that their
transsexuality will be passed on to their offspring.138 Many transgender
people are uninsured139 and do not have the money required to address

134. Nick Neave, HORMONES AND BEHAVIOR: A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 122
(2008).
135. See generally Sheelagh McGuinness & Amel Alghrani, Gender and Parenthood:
The Case for Realignment, 16 MED. L. REV. 261 (2008) (discussing the medical and legal
barriers that currently prevent transgender people from becoming parents).
136. P. De Sutter, K. Kira, A. Verschoor & A. Hotimsky, The Desire to Have
Children and the Preservation of Fertility in Transsexual Women: A Survey, 6 INT’L J.
TRANSGENDERISM (2002) [hereinafter De Sutter, The Desire to Have Children] (“Other
individuals believe they would not be good parents and would therefore choose not to have
children anyway. They believe the psychological trauma they had to go through because of
their gender dysphoria would impair a normal parent-child relationship.”), available at
http://www.iiav.nl/ezines/web/IJT/97-03/numbers/symposion/ijtvo06no03_02.htm.
137. Paul De Sutter, Gender Reassignment and Assisted Reproduction: Present and
Future Reproductive Options for Transsexual People, 16 HUM. REPROD. 612, 612 (2001)
[hereinafter De Sutter, Gender Reassignment].
138. De Sutter, Kira, Verschoor & Hotimsky, The Desire to Have Children, supra
note 136 (“One woman had the opportunity to freeze sperm, but deliberately chose not to
as she was afraid that her transsexualism might be a genetic condition. There were two
other members of the family on her mother’s side who also were transsexual, and she did
not want to risk passing on a genetic condition to her child, and to put a child through what
she had endured in her life, as she put it. This is an interesting remark, because several
respondents expressed this fear.”).
139. See MINTER & DALEY, supra note 39, at 16 (reporting that many transgender
people in San Francisco do not have basic health insurance and that even those who have
insurance encounter difficulties in finding a doctor who is familiar with health care for
transgender people); JESSICA M. XAVIER, THE WASHINGTON TRANSGENDER NEEDS
ASSESSMENT SURVEY 5 (2000) (reporting that forty-seven percent of transgender
individuals in Washington, D.C. had no health insurance).
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reproductive issues.140 For this group, cloning—particularly if it could be
made cost-effective or even government-subsidized—may hold significant
potential.
Many FtM transsexual individuals (“trans men”) often have surgery
not only to shape their bodies, but also to remove their internal female
reproductive organs.141 Additionally, because of concerns about the
increased risk of ovarian cancer in FtM transsexuals, some doctors
recommend that trans men have their ovaries removed a few years after
beginning hormone therapy.142 Surgeries chosen by trans men who want to
remove their female reproductive organs may include hysterectomy (the
removal of the uterus) and Bilateral Salpingo Oophorectomy (the removal
of both ovaries and fallopian tubes).143 FtM transsexuals are infertile after
these sex reassignment surgeries (SRS) due to the resulting lack of
reproductive organs.144 If a trans man has a biologically female partner, the
couple can elect to have her artificially inseminated by a sperm donor. In
such a scenario, the trans man will not have any genetic connection to his
offspring. Cloning, on the other hand, would allow the trans man to have a
genetic child. The female partner could contribute the egg and gestate the
child conceived from the DNA of the trans man.
Some FtM transsexuals may want to have children before they go
through SRS. If they choose this route, they will need to postpone surgery
or opt to have children at a younger age.145 Cloning would obviate the need
140. See De Sutter, Kira, Verschoor & Hotimsky, The Desire to Have Children, supra
note 136 (“One respondent said that she had inquired whether sperm freezing was an
option at the time of her treatment, and that this had seemed to be very difficult and
expensive, so she had regretfully dropped the whole idea.”). NAT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSGENDER EQUITY & NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS:
NATIONAL
TRANSGENDER
DISCRIMINATION
SURVEY
1
(2009),
http://
www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/fact_sheets?transsurvey_prelim_findings.pdf
(finding that fifteen percent of transgender respondents lived on $10,000 or less per year
and that transgender individuals experienced twice the rate of unemployment as the
population as a whole).
141. Katherine Rachlin, Factors Which Influence Individual’s Decisions When
Considering Female-to-Male Genital Reconstructive Surgery, 3 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM
(Sept. 1999), http://www.iiav.nl/ezines/web/IJT/97-03/numbers/symposion/ijt990302.htm
(“Many FTMs will choose to have to have their female reproductive organs removed
(ovaries, uterus, and/or vagina) and may have more masculine genitals constructed.”).
142. R. NICK GORTON, JAMIE BUTH & DEAN SPADE, MEDICAL THERAPY AND HEALTH
MAINTENANCE FOR TRANSGENDER MEN: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 53
(2005), http://www.nickgorton.org/Medical%20Therapy%20and%20HM%20for%20Transgender
%20Men_2005.pdf.
143. See generally Katherine A. O’Hanlan, Suzanne L. Dibble & Mindy Young-Spint,
Total Laparoscopic Hysterectomy for Female-to-Male Transsexuals, 110 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 1096 (2007) (comparing the results of various surgical procedures elected by
trans men).
144. Cf. Guy Trebay, He’s Pregnant. You’re Speechless, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, at
ST1 (discussing a pregnant trans man who elected not to have his ovaries removed).
145. There are many reasons that transsexuals may want to start reassignment early in
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to make these choices. They could undergo SRS whenever it makes the
most sense for them to do so, without worrying about losing the ability to
produce eggs (though they may need to rely on a surrogate if they lose the
ability to gestate themselves). A single trans man may choose to freeze his
eggs before undergoing SRS—a common practice today146—and would
then have the option to clone children using those eggs (avoiding the need
for sperm donation) or to take advantage of other ARTs. It is clear that
FtM transsexuals would benefit from reproductive cloning and have good
reason to support funding for cloning research and regulation.
FtM transgender individuals who undertake “light” changes to alter
their biological sex could also benefit from cloning. If these individuals
take hormones for a prolonged period of time, the hormones may
permanently affect their ovaries, making it difficult or impossible to
produce eggs or become pregnant.147 If a FtM transgender individual has a
female partner, the couple could create a child together through cloning.
In such a scenario, the transgender partner would contribute nuclear DNA
and the female partner would provide an egg (that includes the m-DNA)
and gestate the child. Thus, cloning would allow such a couple to avoid
sperm donation and to have a child who is (at least to some extent)
genetically related to both partners. This method would mirror lesbian
couples’ use of cloning.
For MtF transsexuals and transgender men who become female (trans
women), the long-term use of estrogen is likely to result in infertility.148 A
trans woman may no longer produce sperm and, because she never
acquires female reproductive organs, she is effectively infertile. Trans
their lives. Some wish to start treatments before their secondary sex characteristics begin to
develop to avoid having to reverse them later, some may wish to continue their education
in their preferred gender role, and some prefer to have more time to consider their
reassignment without dealing with the unwanted effects of puberty. WHITTLE, supra note
131, at 173.
146. Id. at 169.
147. See Wylie C. Hembree, Peggy Cohen-Kettenis, Henriette A. Delemarre-van de
Waal, Louis J. Gooren, Walter J. Meyer, III, Norman P. Spack, Vin Tangpricha & Victor
M. Montori, Endocrine Treatment of Transsexual Persons: An Endocrine Society Clinical
Practice Guideline, 94 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 3132, 3144 (2009)
(“Specific to the FTM [transgender] person, testosterone will result in . . . temporary or
permanent decreased fertility . . . .”)
148. Carl W. Bushong, Richard A. Martin & Kimberly L. Westwood, Transgender
Medical Feminizing Program: Typical Results of Male-to-Female Hormone Therapy,
TRANSGENDERCARE,
http://www.transgendercare.com/medical/resources/tmf_program/tmf_
program_6.asp (last visited Nov. 23, 2010); De Sutter, Gender Reassignment, supra note
137, at 613 (“It is well known that feminizing hormonal therapy will induce
hypospermatogenesis in transsexual women, and ultimately will lead to azoospermia. This
azoospermia may be considered irreversible after some time, and furthermore gender
reassignment surgery with removal of the testes obviously leads to irreversible sterility. The
only option, therefore, is to perform sperm preservation by freezing a number of semen
samples, preferably prior to starting hormonal therapy.”)
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women may therefore elect to have a sample of their sperm frozen and
stored prior to beginning hormone therapy.149 While this would be the
most practical solution, trans women sometimes do not discuss their future
fertility options with a physician.150 Further, between twenty-nine and
sixty-three percent of MtF transgender individuals in urban areas engage
in unsupervised hormone therapy.151 Further complicating the problem is
the fact that many transgender people lack access to medical care and are
often discriminated against in medical settings.152
Even if a trans woman freezes sperm before beginning hormone
therapy, if she has a male partner, she will still need to rely on an egg
donor and surrogate mother to reproduce. Thus, trans women in
heterosexual relationships would derive similar benefits from cloning to
those afforded to gay male couples. Since a trans woman loses her ability
to produce sperm, if she has not frozen sperm prior to beginning hormone
therapy, cloning would provide her with the only means for a genetic tie to
her offspring. Trans women therefore have a particularly strong interest in
reproductive cloning, as it may be their only opportunity to have a genetic
child.

D. Intersex Individuals
Intersex is a broad term used to describe individuals who are “born
with . . . reproductive or sexual anatomy that doesn’t seem to fit the typical
definitions of female or male.”153 It is beyond the scope of this paper to
analyze each possible variation of sexual anatomy individually. Intersex
people may be infertile for a variety of reasons,154 and reproductive cloning
149. WHITTLE, supra note 131, at 169.
150. See De Sutter, Kira, Verschoor & Hotimsky, The Desire to Have Children, supra
note 136 (“Although sperm freezing is quite readily available, many transsexual women are
still uninformed about this possibility and are not counseled about the possibility of
preserving their reproductive potential.”).
151. Nelson F. Sanchez, John P. Sanchez & Ann Danoff, Health Care Utilization,

Barriers to Care, and Hormone Usage Among Male-to-Female Transgender Persons in
New York City, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 713, 713 (2009).
152. See Willy Wilkinson, Public Health Gains of the Transgender Community in San
Francisco: Grassroots Organizing and Community-Based Research, in TRANSGENDER
RIGHTS 192, 193–94 (Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang & Shannon Price Minter eds.,
2006).
is
Intersex?,
INTERSEX
SOCIETY
OF
NORTH
AMERICA,
153. What
http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). See also Stephen F.
Kemp, The Role of Genes and Hormones in Sexual Differentiation, in ETHICS AND
INTERSEX 1, 5–6 (Sharon E. Sytsma ed., 2006) (surveying the various different types of
intersexuality, including the lack of sex organs or hormones).
154. Of course, some people born intersex are infertile not because of their biology,
but because of the surgeries performed on them at birth to “normalize” them. See, e.g.,
Nancy Ehrenreich, Intersex Surgery, Female Genital Cutting, and the Selective
Condemnation of “Cultural Practices,” 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 73, 109 n.218, 122
(2005).
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would likely be very useful for many intersex individuals.155 For example,
women with Turner syndrome have XO chromosomal patterns, unlike
most of the population who have either an XX or XY pattern.156 These
individuals can carry a baby because they have a uterus, but they still
require egg donation because they lack ovaries to produce eggs.157 Cloning
could allow women with Turner syndrome to have a child who carries their
DNA. Moreover, since they are capable of carrying the child themselves,
they would not need to rely on a surrogate and could therefore reproduce
without third-party involvement.

E. Does Cloning Contradict Queer Politics or Reproduce the
Privileges of Genetics?
Before delving into the debates over cloning and its relation to LGBTI
families in the next Part, I pause to address the question of whether the
child—and specifically the genetically-related child—offers the best site
from which to understand and promote LGBTI families. Two problems
arise. First, by focusing on cloning technologies’ unique benefits to the
LGBTI community, the analysis I undertake necessarily privileges a
genetically-related family over all other family arrangements. Second, to
the degree that I conclude, however cautiously and critically, by suggesting
that the LGBTI community should challenge bans on cloning and cloning
funding, I inevitably advocate that queer politics should focus squarely on
the (genetically-related) child. These two problems are not unrelated. Both
risk buying into the very heteronormativity that I attempt to expose and
challenge in this article—heteronormativity that drives anti-cloning
rhetoric and, ultimately, forms the basis for contemporary homophobia.
The first problem is unavoidable. Only by writing a fundamentally
different article could I avoid privileging the genetically-related family; an
article about cloning is inherently about genetic relations. Whether we, as
a society, place too much emphasis on these relations is a valid and
important question that is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper.
The second problem, while also largely unavoidable, merits
elaboration here. Prominent queer theorist Lee Edelman has suggested

155. Although therapeutic cloning is not a part of this paper, it is worth noting the
benefits this procedure offers for intersex people. Therapeutic cloning provides a source of
otherwise unavailable transplantable cells. For example, it would greatly improve the
efficacy of genitoplasty surgery by allowing surgeons to use genetically engineered tissues
that closely resemble the tissues or structures a person might have had naturally. See
Justine Schober, Ethics and Futuristic Scientific Developments, in ETHICS AND INTERSEX,
supra note 153, at 311, 313 (noting that such structures and tissues would be less likely to be
rejected by the host tissue).
156. Julia A. Greenberg, The Roads Less Traveled: The Problem with Binary Sex
Categories, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 152, at 51, 58.
157. Id.

EREZ ALONI -MACROD.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

34

N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

5/18/2011 3:41:01 PM

[Vol. 35:1

that the concept of kinship need not and perhaps should not be premised
on children at all.158 By locating queer politics in the all-pervasive figure of
the child, which is first and foremost a heteronormative figure signifying
hope and survival,159 we risk doing nothing more than perpetuating existing
social structures—a result that is decidedly not queer.160 Furthermore,
positioning children at the center of political debates enables all sides to
mobilize rhetoric about the (harmed, saved, corrupted, protected) child to
justify their arguments.161 The innocent child in need of protection, for
example, can be called upon to represent the optimism of the future,
juxtaposed against the specter of the queer—the embodiment of a
relentlessly narcissistic, harmful, and future-negating drive.162 Similarly, in
debates over gay marriage and gay adoption, this image of the innocent
child can be called upon to uphold discrimination against any group
defined in opposition to its innocence.
At the same time, however, it is worth asking which is more
heteronormative: focusing on the figure of the child, or rejecting that focus
out of hand on the basis of its hegemonic meaning. Rather than treating a
queer politics centered on the child as merely reproducing—or literally
cloning—the dominant culture, perhaps a focus on the child provides the
LGBTI community with the opportunity to work within rather than
against society, reshaping it to better accommodate queer desires and
fighting attempts to restrict reproduction to a heterosexual model.
Cloning technologies may be uniquely positioned to offer a new kind
of reproductive “future” for LGBTI people—one that is neither identical
to nor wholly apart from the culture of the past. In the long term, cloning
offers the potential to achieve greater political goals than simply enabling
LGBTI individuals to look and behave more like heterosexuals. It has farreaching implications that fundamentally challenge the binary system of
sexuality. As the LGBTI community mobilizes cloning to undermine the
158. See LEE EDELMAN, NO FUTURE: QUEER THEORY AND THE DEATH DRIVE 11–19
(2004).
159. See id. See also LAUREN BERLANT, THE QUEEN OF AMERICA GOES TO
WASHINGTON CITY: ESSAYS ON SEX AND CITIZENSHIP 1, 4–5 (1997) (arguing that the public
sphere in America has become the “intimate public” sphere, populated with conservative
and “traditionalist” patriotic ideas concerning “pornography, abortion, sexuality, and
reproduction; marriage, personal morality, and family values” and questioning why “the
most hopeful national pictures of ‘life’ circulating in the public sphere are not of adults in
everyday life, in public, or in politics, but rather of the most vulnerable, minor or virtual
citizens—fetuses, children, real and imaginary immigrants—persons that, paradoxically,
cannot yet act as citizens.”).
160. EDELMAN, supra note 158, at 17 (“Queerness can never define an identity; it can
only ever disturb one.”).
161. For example, anti-gay campaigns use the “Save Our Children” rhetoric, while
same-sex marriage advocates emphasize the harm experienced by children when their
parents are treated as second-class citizens. Id. at 18–22.
162. Id. at 27.

EREZ ALONI -MACROD.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

5/18/2011 3:41:01 PM

CLONING AND THE LGBTI FAMILY

35

heterosexual monopoly on kinship, it will not necessarily be forced into the
position of begging for seats at the heterosexual table. To the contrary, the
use of cloning by the LGBTI community might dramatically loosen
heterosexual control of reproduction. In this way, cloning might offer a
more radical politics instead of one that simply reproduces the
heterosexual matrix. Cloning could diminish the dominance of any
particular culture, destabilizing the queer community by leaving it with
nothing more to resist.

F. Conclusion
Since cloning is not yet regulated, it is unclear whether it would be
more accessible to LGBTI people than adoption or ART are currently.
Nevertheless, cloning appears to have significant advantages for LGBTI
people over adoption, ART, and co-parenting arrangements. If cloning
was legal and widely available, it would eliminate the potential hassle of
having to prove parental eligibility to a social worker or biological parent
who might discriminate against LGBTI couples.163 It further offers LGBTI
individuals the opportunity to create a family with minimal third-party
involvement. It allows LGBTI individuals to have the highest level of
autonomy in creating—and, in some cases, even raising—children, and
forecloses the need to make agreements with co-parents or biological
donor parents that may or may not withstand legal scrutiny. If gene
splicing becomes an option, it would provide LGBTI individuals with a
means of giving birth to children with a mixture of genes from both
partners. The option to clone could thus reduce potential legal disputes
with third parties, such as claims for parental rights of known donors and
lawsuits from biological parents wishing to enforce open adoption
provisions.
Unfortunately, cloning is unlikely to be much more financially
attainable than other methods of reproduction currently available to
LGBTI families. In fact, if cloning becomes available, it will likely be very
expensive. Thus, even if the technology were widely available, it would be
inaccessible to many families if it is not covered by insurance. At present,
IVF is covered only by a very limited number of insurance policies;164 it is
likely that insurance policies will also fail to cover cloning as well. It is thus
unlikely that cloning would mitigate the additional financial challenges
163. Of course, this assumption is realistic only if reproductive cloning is less
aggressively regulated than adoption. It seems likely that it would be, given that ART is
currently free of almost any limitations while adoption requires a lengthy and potentially
exhausting process.
164. While several states require private insurance companies to include IVF
treatments in their coverage, only about fourteen percent of large group plans cover IVF
treatments. Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and Options, 22
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1215, 1217 (1997).
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often associated with the creation of LGBTI families, though it certainly
provides many other worthwhile benefits.
VI.
CLONING AND QUEER THEORY
As described above, cloning could potentially benefit couples who
cannot produce through sexual means, particularly LGBTI couples. It is, in
part, precisely because of these benefits that many scholars have argued
against cloning in general, and cloning in the LGBTI community
specifically.
The possibility that cloning will expand family combinations beyond
the traditional nuclear family has alarmed defenders of traditional family
structure.165 Cloning makes it increasingly possible to dissociate
reproduction from physical intimacy, allowing for radical new ways of
thinking about the reproductive process. By providing opportunities for
reproduction without sex—and even without partners—cloning may
appear to threaten the very fabric of our society. Without a sexual
connection uniting them, families might one day look very different. Single
women would be able to have children without men—even without sperm.
Two platonic friends could have a child together without sexual contact.
Cloning threatens to further destabilize the traditional concept of the
nuclear family in which a married heterosexual couple “naturally”
conceive and give birth to related children. Some scholars have thus used
fears about non-normative family arrangements to argue against the use of
cloning.166
But is cloning likely to actually bring about such a sea change? The
many ARTs already in common use allow opposite-sex couples to have
genetically-related children without having sexual intercourse. They allow
single individuals to have genetically-related children without ever having
intercourse or choosing a partner. To the degree that cloning creates more
discomfort than traditional ARTs, it must be about something other than
reproduction without sexual contact.
I suggest, therefore, that the outcry in response to cloning stems from
a fundamental commitment to traditional, heterosexual models of
165. KASS & WILSON, supra note 11, at 72 (“[T]he major threat cloning produces is a
further weakening of the two-parent family.”); Charlene Kalebic, The Constitutional

Question of Cloning Humans: Duplication or Procreation? An Examination of the Human
Right to Procreate, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 229, 266 (1998) (“Cloning undermines the
traditional family, which is a reflection of biological relations, by the state constructing a
‘family’ of biologically unrelated individuals, connected only by contract.”).
166. See, e.g., Daniel R. Heimbach, Cloning Humans: Dangerous, Unjustifiable, and
Genuinely Immoral, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 633, 650–51 (1998) (arguing that “human cloning is
inherently immoral because it violates the moral institution of parenthood” and “violates
the moral institution of marriage”).
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reproduction. While valid concerns about the safety and efficacy of cloning
do exist, as I discuss at length below, they are insufficient to explain a
response of the degree and kind that cloning has provoked. Reproductive
cloning has been vociferously attacked based in large part on its
associations with the LGBTI community.167 While much of the outcry over
cloning remains covertly heterosexist—latent homophobia lingering just
beneath the surface of concerns about “the family”—some scholars
publicly and explicitly promote heterosexist ideas, arguing that the benefits
cloning could provide the LGBTI community should be grounds for
outlawing the practice altogether.168 In this Part, after considering the more
traditional anti-cloning arguments, I examine those arguments that are
based on the need to regulate “moral” or “ethical” behavior and rely on
assumptions about what kinds of behavior are “natural” and beneficial to
society as a whole. In these arguments, the concept of the “natural” is
defined against and in relation to culturally-constructed frameworks and
beliefs about identity, sexuality, gender expression, and family structure.
By shifting the focus to the “artificial” (here, the clone), the concept of the
“natural” remains untheorized and pure, with little or no attention paid to
the fact that what we today think of as natural is itself culturally mediated.
The equation of “natural” with biological is therefore problematic, and
arguments that conflate these concepts must be critically analyzed.
Throughout this Part, I will analyze arguments against cloning by
drawing from queer theory.169 This framework has significant potential to
167. See, e.g., KASS & WILSON, supra note 11, at 68 (“More troubling is the possibility
that a lesbian couple will use cloning to produce a child.”).
168. See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We Should Ban the
Cloning of Humans, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 679, 681–83 (1998) [hereinafter Kass, The Wisdom
of Repugnance] (arguing that the gay rights movement, by treating “male and female [as]
not normatively complementary and generatively significant,” has decreased the moral
repugnance of cloning in the public discourse). Cf. Laurence Tribe, On Not Banning
Cloning for the Wrong Reasons, in CLONES AND CLONES, supra note 12, at 221, 226–27
(asserting that behind Kass’s arguments lies his fear of undermining the traditional family,
and that cloning for Kass is “the technological apotheosis of Murphy Brown and Ellen
DeGeneres, the biomedical nemesis of Dan Quayle, Phyllis Schlafly, and Pat Robertson”).
169. Queer theory developed out of gay and lesbian studies, and the use of the term
queer emphasizes the deconstruction of the essentialist identity categories of gay, lesbian,
and bisexual. ANNAMARIE JAGOSE, QUEER THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 72–77 (1996). The
nominal shift from gay and lesbian studies to queer theory expresses a larger move within
the field to consider more complex and fluid notions of identification and desire. Many
queer theorists consider identity to be a “culturally restricted principle of order and
hierarchy, a regulatory fiction.” JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 33 (Routledge Classics
ed., 2006) (discussing leading queer theorists’ views of identity). Over the past twenty years,
a great deal of academic work has challenged fundamental assumptions about gender roles
and the regulation of sex and sexual orientation. See generally FEMINIST AND QUEER
LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS (Martha
Albertson Fineman, Jack E. Jackson & Adam P. Romero eds., 2009); DONALD E. HALL,
QUEER THEORIES (2003); TAMSIN SPARGO, FOUCAULT AND QUEER THEORY (1999); THE
LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER (Henry Abelove, Michèle Aina Barale & David M.
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shed new light on these debates. Queer theories offer a radical critique of
gender and sexual essentialism and of heteronormativity in general.170
While some of the critiques of cloning that I address in this paper apply
beyond the community of LGBTI individuals and families, queer theory
remains a useful approach because it challenges the very idea of a
“natural” truth or ideal against which new social practices are evaluated.171
I start, therefore by presenting the key arguments against cloning, before I
turn to examine the heterosexist arguments against cloning.

A. Traditional Arguments Against Reproductive Cloning
Critiques of cloning tend to coalesce around four main themes: cloning
is unsafe and inefficient; cloning threatens the well-being of cloned
Halperin eds., 1993). David Halperin, co-founder of GLQ: The Journal of Lesbian and Gay
Studies, explains that while gay identity is rooted in the choice to identify one’s sexuality in
a particular way, “queer identity need not be grounded in any positive truth or in any stable
reality . . . it acquires its meaning from its oppositional relation to the norm.” DAVID M.
HALPERIN, SAINT FOUCAULT: TOWARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY 62 (1995) (noting that the
word “queer” does not name a natural or preexisting thing, but rather a relation to the
norm). Donald E. Hall echoes this argument, noting that queer identity defines itself
against the normal and is a broad concept encompassing multiple identities. HALL, supra, at
5, 14–16 (“[T]he concept ‘queer’ emphasizes the disruptive, the fractured, the tactical and
contingent. . . . Simply put, there is no ‘queer theory’ in the singular, only many different
voices and sometimes overlapping, sometimes divergent perspectives that can be loosely
called ‘queer theories.’”).
This commitment to disidentification and shapelessness makes it difficult to define
what exactly queer theory is, and perhaps that is precisely the point. Some scholars suggest
that “queer” is “a rather amorphous term and still emergent enough as to be vague and illdefined.” Suzanna Danuta Walters, From Here to Queer: Radical Feminism,
Postmodernism, and the Lesbian Menace, in QUEER THEORY 6, 6 (Iain Morland &
Annabelle Willox eds., 2005). They suggest that, from queer theory, queer philosophy will
emerge, along with the recognition that queerness is a universal experience of being.
Randall Halle, What is Queer Philosophy?, in PHILOSOPHY IN MULTIPLE VOICES 81, 81–84
(George Yancy ed., 2007). In keeping with the spirit of indeterminacy, it is important to
note that there is no single queer theory but rather multiple “queer theories,” sometimes
resulting in overlapping and divergent views. HALL, supra, at 5. Traditional theory cannot
be “queered” simply by challenging its dominant premises, as such an approach would
allow queer theory to operate only within the predetermined boundaries already set by
traditional theory. Instead, queer theory attempts to shift “the image of thought . . . to
thought without an image,” a position not “of judgment or critique, but a virtual line of
sense.” See Claire Colebrook, How Queer Can You Go? Theory, Normality and
Normativity, in QUEERING THE NON/HUMAN 17, 22 (Noreen Giffney & Myra J. Hird eds.,
2008). Queer theory offers a critique of substance and subjectivism, identifying its
orientation as “essentially queer,” and challenging the supposed neutrality or
undifferentiated nature of life. Id. at 23.
170. See, e.g., Halle, supra note 169, at 84 (discussing both queer theory and the term
“queer” as an identity category). “Heteronormativity” is a term coined by Michael Warner.
See MICHAEL WARNER, FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY
xxi (1993) (explaining that heteronormative culture “thinks of itself as the elemental form
of human association, the very model of intergender relations, as the indivisible basis of all
community, and as the means of reproduction without which society wouldn’t exist”).
171. See supra note 169.
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children; cloning commodifies children; and cloning will be inappropriately
used to design and improve the human race. While concerns regarding
safety and regulation are valid, claims about other possible threats from
cloning are largely unfounded and have been thoroughly refuted by social
and legal scholars. I discuss each of these claims, and the responses to
them, in turn.

1. Cloning Is Unsafe and Inefficient
National reports from two major U.S. scientific bodies—The National
Bioethics Advisory Commission172 and The National Academy of
Science173—raise questions about the safety of cloning techniques and the
likelihood of physical harm to cloned children, egg donors, and women
who gestate cloned embryos. On this basis, both reports conclude that
attempts to clone human beings are unethical.174 It is nearly impossible for
the scientific community to improve the safety of cloning, however, since
the United States bans the use of federal funding for reproductive cloning
research. Without adequate funding, research needed to make the
procedure safer is stalled.175 So long as this ban remains in effect, it is
unlikely that cloning will become safer—a fact that makes the ban on
funding unlikely to be raised anytime soon.
But perhaps this catch-22 exists because safety concerns are merely a
red herring. Kerry Lynn Macintosh notes that, while promising but
dangerous medical procedures tend to be highly regulated, they are rarely
banned outright.176 Moreover, if safety were truly the primary concern,
governmental committees would have no reason to examine other
172. NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION iii (1997),
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/past_commissions/nbac_cloning.pdf.
173. COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, supra note 75, at 93–94.
174. Id. at 4 (“Because medical and scientific findings indicate that cloning procedures
are currently not safe for humans, cloning of a human through the use of nuclear
transplantation technology is not now appropriate. The panel believes that no responsible
scientists or physicians are likely to undertake to clone a human.”). The President’s Council
on Bioethics has also concluded that reproductive cloning is not safe and recommended
cloning be outlawed. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 108, at 99–105
(“[C]loning-to-produce-children is not now safe . . . concerns revolve around potential
dangers to the cloned child, as well as to the egg donor and the woman who would carry the
cloned child to birth.”). The Committee found that most attempts to clone animals were
not successful, and that the few animals who were born suffered health problems. Id. at 92.
The Committee emphasized that unlike the egg donor and the gestating mother, the clone
did not consent to be born this way yet must endure these life conditions. Id. at 94–95. The
Committee also expressed concern for the gestating mother based on the high probability
that the pregnancy will end in abortion or face serious complications. Id. at 90 (citing
animal studies).
175. See generally LIM, supra note 87, at 317–58.
176. KERRY LYNN MACINTOSH, ILLEGAL BEINGS: HUMAN CLONES AND THE LAW 44–
45 (2005).
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arguments against cloning in such depth;177 lack of safety would close the
discussion, and research would come to a halt.178 It is likely, therefore, that
the concerns unrelated to safety, discussed below, explain a great deal of
the public’s, and even the scientific community’s, reluctance to rigorously
pursue reproductive cloning research.

2. Cloning Is Harmful to Children
Fears that a cloned child will be bereft of individuality are rampant
among opponents of cloning.179 Religious critics claim that it is impossible
for the cloning process to produce a person with a soul.180 Other detractors
fear that a cloned child will perceive herself as “manufactured” or even
“handmade” and therefore less human.181 Lori B. Andrews argues that
cloned children are likely to be exposed to limited experiences and
opportunities, as well as to lack a sense of “independent self,” because
they would be expected to follow the path of the individual from whom
they have been cloned.182
As Anita L. Allen points out, these sorts of fears are unfounded and
even “silly,” as “[t]here is no reason to think that clones would be
inherently soulless or inferior to other human beings.”183 The cloned child
will not be a photocopy of the cell donor, as she will not be completely

177. For example, after concluding that reproductive cloning is not safe and therefore
not ethical, the President’s Council on Bioethics notes that “for some people, the discussion
of ethical objections to cloning-to-produce-children could end here. . . . But there is more to
be said.” PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 108, at 96. The committee then
goes to discuss many of the other ethical concerns that I address later in this article.
178. MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 44–45.
179. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 108, at 101–15 (describing
how cloning children will create “(1) problems of identity and individuality; (2) concerns
regarding manufacture; (3) the prospect of a new eugenics; (4) troubled family relations;
and (5) [negative] effects on society”); George J. Annas, Human Cloning: A Choice or an
Echo?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 247, 273 (1998) (arguing that the cloned child will only be an
echo of the parent, “cursed by its parent never to speak first, but only to be an echo of the
parent’s already-lived life”) .
180. See, e.g., Shahar Ilan, Does a Clone Have a Soul?, HAARETZ, Aug. 4, 2005,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=608432&contrassID=19 (“[T]he
Creator only gives man a soul at the moment when sperm meets ovum.” (quoting Rabbi
Moshe Botschko)).
181. KASS & WILSON, supra note 11, at 38. See also Jeffrey Kluger, Will We Follow the
Sheep?, TIME, Mar. 10, 1997, at 70 (“You’re putting a human into a genetic straitjacket. For
the first time, we’ve taken the principles of industrial design—quality control,
predictability—and applied them to a human being.” (quoting Jeremy Rifkin)).
182. See Lori B. Andrews, Mom, Dad, Clone: Implications for Reproductive Privacy, 7
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTH CARE ETHICS 176, 181–83 (1998) (noting that parents may raise
the child as if its genetic code were its destiny and that thus “cloning could undermine
human dignity by threatening the replicant’s sense of self and sense of autonomy”).
183. ANITA L. ALLEN, THE NEW ETHICS: A TOUR OF THE 21ST CENTURY MORAL
LANDSCAPE 160 (2004).
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genetically identical to the donor, much less have identical life
experiences.184 Indeed, a cloned child will likely be less identical to her
donor than monozygotic (MZ) twins who share the same DNA are to each
other: while clones and their donors might have different m-DNA, twins
always share the same m-DNA, making them far closer “copies” than
Dolly and her mother.185 Additionally, unlike a cloned child and her donor
parent, most twins share the same environment—the same womb, the
same home, at the same time and place. Even conjoined twins, who share
nearly everything, develop very different personalities.186 A cloned child
will be born in a different place and time than her donor. These influences
would, in turn, create a different human being with a different personality,
set of coping mechanisms, and responses to the world. In addition, in the
future it may be possible to safely use genetic modification techniques in
conjunction with cloning to create individuals with unique nuclear DNA.187
If this were an option, most of the concerns regarding the similarity of the
cloned child and parent would be irrelevant, since, as in sexual
reproduction, the cloned child would be born with the mixed genes of both
parents.
In addition to the actual differences that will distinguish a cloned child
from her parent, it is also unlikely that there will be social forces that will
negatively shape the cloned child’s perception of herself. In social practice,
no one treats twins as unnatural. Because there is also no reason to believe
that cloned individuals would be easily identifiable—they would look like
any other human being—there is no reason to believe that they would be
treated differently than other children.

184. The word “photocopy,” which is often used by detractors of cloning to
pejoratively describe the procedure, conjures up images of a machine process whereby an
exact copy of an original is made. See, e.g., COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, supra
note 75, at 26. But a photocopy is a two-dimensional reproduction transferred from one flat
piece of paper to another. By contrast, a mammal created from a clone cell is a highly
complex, three-dimensional organic being that is continually shaped by its environment, life
experiences, and myriad other factors.
185. Ian Wilmut, the leader of the group that cloned Dolly, states that “[s]trictly
speaking, Dolly was not a clone because of this difference in mitochondrial DNA. . . .”
WILMUT & HIGHFIELD, supra note 15, at 242. See also Stephen Jay Gould, Individuality,
Cloning and the Discomfiting Cases of Siamese Twins, in CLONING: RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE
OR TECHNOMADNESS? 98, 101 (Michael Ruse & Aryne Sheppard eds., 2001). See also LIM,
supra note 87, at 326.
186. That was the case, for example, with Eng and Chang, a famous set of conjoined
twins born in Siam (giving rise to the term “Siamese Twins”), who displayed completely
different personalities. Gould, supra note 185, at 102. Gregory E. Pence similarly argues
that research on the behaviors and lives of twins shows that they are certainly not
interchangeable—for instance, the girlfriend of one twin will not necessarily be attracted to
the other twin. See PENCE, CLONING AFTER DOLLY, supra note 113, at 48.
187. Carson M. Strong, Reproductive Cloning Combined with Genetic Modification,
31 J. MED. ETHICS 654, 654 (2005).
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3. Cloning Is Commodification
Opponents of reproductive cloning further argue that the high costs of
this technique will turn children into commodities. Since the process of
cloning comes with such a high price tag, critics worry that cloned children
may become products to be traded in the market.188 However, the similarly
high cost of other ARTs has not caused parents or society to treat children
produced through such procedures as manufactured products.189 In light of
the legal prohibitions and strong cultural taboos against selling humans or
organs, a market for cloned children seems unlikely.
Others argue that cloning is a form of replication rather than
reproduction and that cloned children will thus be treated inhumanely as
merely “product[s] of technological manufacture.”190 However, this is
unlikely to be the case. It is true that society used to judge children by the
conditions under which they were conceived or born—marginalizing, for
example, the children of unmarried mothers.191 Today, however, people in
the United States are evaluated on the basis of their personal
characteristics and accomplishments (or, unfortunately, by their race, class,
gender, and other group characteristics) rather than on how they entered
the world.192

4. Cloning Is Eugenics
Finally, opponents point out that cloning could facilitate eugenics
programs designed to improve the human species.193 But at least one
scholar argues that cloning will not offer any opportunities for engineering

188. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 108, at 106–07 (2002)
(arguing that cloned children “would be products of a designed manufacturing process,
products over whom we might think it proper to exercise ‘quality control’” and that “[o]ne
possible result would be the industrialization and commercialization of human
reproduction”).
189. MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 18–19.
190. Jorge L.A. Garcia, Human Cloning Never and Why Not, in HUMAN CLONING 85,
94–95 (Barbara MacKinnon ed., 2000).
191. See PENCE, WHO’S AFRAID OF HUMAN CLONING?, supra note 87, at 46 (“For
millennia, the cultures of Western civilization would not accept children of unmarried
women as beings with normal rights: they could not enter synagogues, marry, inherit
property, and sometimes, vote. To say that bastards were socially stigmatized is to use a
euphemism.”).
192. See id. at 47 (“Today, we realize that children who were not born to two, married,
heterosexual parents had no control over their origins. Once they arrive into the world,
such children must be accepted as persons with all the normal rights.”).
193. See George J. Annas, Lori B. Andrews & Rosario M. Isasi, Protecting the

Endangered Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable
Alterations, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 151, 153 (2002) (arguing that “cloning and inheritable
genetic alterations . . . are techniques that can alter the essence of humanity itself . . . by
taking human evolution into our own hands . . . .”).
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and improving embryos that are not already available.194 Currently, some
parents use PGD to screen embryos for genetic traits and select their
preferred embryo based on its sex or other genetic traits.195 Moreover,
existing opportunities for “collaborative reproduction” allow parents to
choose which of their genes will combine to produce their child.196 Indeed,
in the current reproductive market of IVF and sperm and egg donors,
many would-be parents are prepared to pay astronomical amounts of
money for the “perfect” combination of genetic traits.197 These attempts to
craft genetically ideal children are misguided and ultimately futile, just as
concerns about cloning and eugenics are both misplaced and unfounded.
Macintosh points out that safe and effective means of genetically
modifying an early embryo (as distinguished from collaborative
reproduction via ART) do not yet exist, and that the discussion of how
genetic engineering will change the nature of humankind is “speculative at
best.”198 Moreover, such efforts ignore the profound influence of childhood
environment on individual development, which will inevitably alter the
expression of the child’s genetic traits.

5. Conclusion
As explained in this section, the primary arguments offered by
opponents of cloning are fundamentally flawed. In the next section, I
discuss the arguments against cloning that either refer specifically to the
LGBTI community or are driven by a simplistic, binary approach to the
nature/nurture debate.

B. Heterosexist Arguments Against Cloning
1. Arguments That the Heterosexual Family Is the Only
“Real” Form of Kinship
Opponents of reproductive cloning often argue that cloning allows for
the expansion of nontraditional families, and that these families are bad
for children and damage the fabric of society.199 James Q. Wilson, a former
194. Daar, supra note 4, at 534.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Tuller, supra note 59. In some other countries, the law does not allow free choice
of egg donors. In Israel, for example, women receive egg donations from anonymous
donors at set prices. Dan Even, Knesset Approves Bill Easing Restrictions on Egg
Donation in Israel, HAARETZ, June 7, 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/knessetapproves-bill-easing-restrictions-on-egg-donation-in-israel-1.294755.
198. MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 42 (discussing THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION & RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW
BIOTECHNOLOGIES, 107–10 (2004)).
199. Cf. 143 CONG. REC. H713-02, H714 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1997) (statement of Rep.

EREZ ALONI -MACROD.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

44

N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

5/18/2011 3:41:01 PM

[Vol. 35:1

member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, suggests that, if cloning
becomes an option, it should be used only by married couples.200 Other
scholars express concerns regarding whether LGB people are “unfit”
parents. For instance, Ian Wilmut, the leader of the group that cloned
Dolly, expressed his concern that if a child is cloned by gay parents, he or
she will not live in an “appropriate environment.”201 Similarly, Leon Kass,
former chair of the President’s Council on Bioethics from 2002–2005 and
one of the most vocal opponents of cloning, has implied that, because
cloning would likely be used most frequently by unmarried individuals or
couples with nontraditional family arrangements, cloning puts the very
well-being of children at risk by perpetuating the “usually sad situation of
the ‘single-parent-child.’”202
The argument that cloning allows for a departure from traditional
heterosexual reproduction and thus harms the child is not based on the
presumption that such nontraditional families cannot exist without cloning.
Clearly, they already do. Even in the absence of reproductive cloning
techniques, nontraditional families, including LGBTI families, are already
very much a reality.203 In the 2000 Census, 27.5 percent of LGB204 couples
Vernon Ehlers) (arguing against cloning and stating that “[t]he good Lord ordained a timehonored method of creating human life, commensurate with substantial responsibility on
the part of the parents, the responsibility to raise a child appropriately”).
200. Wilson, supra note 9, at 4.
201. Ian Wilmut, Dolly’s False Legacy, TIME, Jan. 11, 1999, at 74, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,989990-1,00.html (“Each of us can
imagine hypothetical families created by the introduction of a cloned child—a copy of one
partner in a homosexual relationship or of a single parent, for example. What is missing in
all this is consideration of what’s in the interests of the cloned child. Because there is no
form of infertility that could be overcome only by cloning, I do not find these proposals
acceptable. My concerns are not on religious grounds or on the basis of a perceived intrinsic
ethical principle. Rather, my judgment is that it would be difficult for families created in
this way to provide an appropriate environment for the child.”).
202. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 168, at 696. See also KASS &
WILSON, supra note 11, at 82–83 (“A clone, because asexually reproduced, lacks two
parents; though I have called it a single-parent child, it would be more accurate to say that,
since it is the twin rather than the offspring of its ‘source,’ it has no parents, biologically
speaking . . . . Giving birth to one’s mother does not exactly reproduce a normal motherdaughter relationship.”); Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 168, at 682
(“Thanks to the prominence and the acceptability of divorce and out-of-wedlock births,
stable, monogamous marriage as the ideal home for procreation is no longer the agreedupon cultural norm. For this new dispensation, the clone is the ideal emblem: the ultimate
‘single-parent child.’”).
203. In the United States, there are approximately five million unmarried, cohabiting
couples—the highest number in American history—yet they are entitled to only some of
the legal safeguards available to married couples. See generally Pamela J. Smock & Wendy
D. Manning, Living Together Unmarried in the United States: Demographic Perspectives
and Implications for Family Policy, 26 LAW & POL’Y 87 (2004) (summarizing and
synthesizing research on who cohabits in the United States and with what consequences) .
See also Erik Eckholm, Saying No to “I Do,” with the Economy in Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
28, 2010, at A15 (“Among the total population 18 and older, the share of men and women
who were married fell from 57 percent in 2000 to 52 percent in 2009 . . . the lowest
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identified themselves as parents to a child under the age of eighteen,
indicating that more than a quarter million children are currently being
raised in same-sex couple households.205 These statistics are probably
underinclusive: because census data related to sexual orientation is still not
well measured, this number probably does not include children raised by
single LGB parents.
Rather, arguments that cloning should be limited to married couples
must be based on the presumption that the heterosexual family is the only
appropriate venue for raising children.206 However, there is no evidence
that the heterosexual family provides the only adequate, or even the
superior, venue for childrearing. While scholars historically assumed that
the children of married couples fare better than children who live in
nonmarital or single parent households,207 recent studies suggest that this is
not so clearly the case.208 In fact, it is difficult to isolate the effect of
marriage from other relevant factors like education and financial status
that contribute substantially to a child’s well-being.209 Some married
couples may be better able to provide for their children not because they
are married but because their marriage is recognized, and because any
state benefits they receive as a result of this recognition may be passed on
to their children. In the absence of compelling evidence, there remains
little rational reason for preserving and strengthening the institution of
marriage for the sake of child welfare.210
percentage since the government began collecting data more than 100 years ago.”).
204. I use the term LGB because the census does not ask about transgender identity.
See JAIME GRANT, NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, HOW BIG IS THE LGBT
COMMUNITY? WHY CAN’T I FIND THIS NUMBER? 4, http://www.thetaskforce.org/
downloads/release_materials/tf_lgbt_community.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2011) (“It is
important to note that none of these random samples identify or quantify transgender
people at all. There has been no random sampling of the transgender population in U.S.
history.”).
205. GARY J. GATES & JASON OST, THE GAY AND LESBIAN ATLAS 45 (2004). The
actual number of LGBTI parents is probably larger than the census indicated. Id. Because
the census only asks about the relationship between the people in the household, not about
their sexual orientation, it likely did not capture how many single LGBTI parents live in the
United States. Id. Moreover, some LGBTI parents may have chosen not identify
themselves as LGBTI in the census.
206. See also Amy L. Wax, Traditionalism, Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 59
RUTGERS L. REV. 377, 380 (2007) (“In general, traditionalists believe that the family form
that has been most historically and socially respected and that has stood the test of time—
the biological, heterosexual, ‘nuclear’ family—should occupy a privileged place today.
[They believe that] this form should continue to be regarded, in law and custom, as the
ideal model for our society.”).
207. See Vivian E. Hamilton, Family Structure Children and Law, 24 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 9, 9 (2007) (“The claim that ‘marriage is good for children’ has long helped ground
arguments for the institution’s extraordinary state support.”).
208. Id. at 14–21 (describing research on the effect of marriage on children).
209. See id. at 14.
210. But even if there were compelling evidence, the value of autonomy in choosing
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At the same time, the available data provide absolutely no evidence
that children of same-sex couples fare worse than their heterosexual
counterparts.211 In fact, research has suggested that there is no connection
between the presence of two opposite-sex parents and an optimal childrearing environment. Rather, the factors most likely to affect a child’s
overall welfare include the child’s DNA, socioeconomic status, social
support network, and ability to access social resources.212 Implicit in the
assumption that non-heteronormative environments are harmful to
children is the notion that there is also no benefit to being raised in such an
environment. Yet a recent study examining the welfare of children of
lesbian mothers from conception through adolescence found that children
of lesbian parents rated better than average in social skills, academics, and
general competence, and they registered significantly fewer social
problems on average.213 Being a good parent, it seems, has nothing to do
with the sex of one’s romantic partner.
In arguing that cloning will harm children by creating nontraditional
families, opponents of cloning disregard the reality that “kinship is a social
and not a biological fact, a matter of culture rather than nature.”214 The
traditional family structure as it exists today in the United States has
evolved, just as all human marriage and kinship systems have, to be
considered the exclusive forum for procreation and raising children.215 The
model of the heterosexual nuclear family as the only form of kinship is

one’s own family structure must not be underestimated.
211. Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Marriage, 15 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI. 241, 241 (2006) (reviewing the research and concluding that
“[m]ore than two decades of research has failed to reveal important differences in the
adjustment or development of children or adolescents reared by same-sex couples
compared to those reared by other-sex couples. Results of the research suggest that
qualities of family relationships are more tightly linked with child outcomes than is parental
sexual orientation.”).
212. See, e.g., Michael Rosenfeld, Nontraditional Families and Childhood Progress
Through School, 47 DEMOGRAPHY 755, 770 (2010) (discussing how socioeconomic status
has a greater impact on a child’s success in school than whether a child’s parents are
heterosexual or not); Michael S. Wald, Adults’ Sexual Orientation and State
Determinations Regarding Placement of Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 381, 388–89 (2006)
(finding that there are a large number of factors other than the sexuality of a child’s parents
which affect the welfare of the child, including “the overall quality of parenting as reflected
in parental love, warmth, involvement and consistency; parental socioeconomic resources;
quality of neighborhood and schools; (and) influences of peers and siblings”) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
213. Nanette Gartrell & Henny Bos, U.S. National Longitudinal Lesbian Family
Study: Psychological Adjustment of 17-year-old Adolescents, PEDIATRICS (June 7, 2010),
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/content/abstract/peds.2009-3153v1.
214. Elizabeth Freeman, Queer Belongings, in A COMPANION TO LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND QUEER STUDIES 295, 299 (Haggerty & McGarry eds., 2007)
(discussing JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER (1993)).
215. Id.
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predicated on a binary view of gender and sexuality.216 Beliefs and
expectations about how each gender should behave and to whom they
should be attracted become reinforced and re-entrenched in a community
over time in such a way as to make certain behaviors seem “natural,”
rather than culturally produced.217 Alternative ways of being in the world
and in relation to other people are therefore foreclosed because the
existing forms are so ingrained in custom and culture that they are
believed to be biologically based.218
In light of this evidence, it cannot really be a concern for child welfare
that motivates the majority of cloning opponents. Rather, it is the fear that
reproductive cloning diminishes the heterosexual monopoly on
reproduction.219

2. Arguments That Cloning Threatens the Elementary
Structure of Kinship—Exogamy and Incest Taboo
A second and perhaps more sophisticated argument against cloning
builds on Claude Lévi-Strauss’s theory that exogamy and the incest taboo
are the basic elements of culture.220 Drawing on this theory, psychiatrist
Stephen Levick suggests that the practice of exogamy—in other words,
marrying people from outside the group—and the prohibition on incest are
the basic of foundations of our culture because they promote biological
(genetic) diversity.221 His analysis implies that the practice of exogamy is

216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. This is not to suggest that culture acts entirely independent of biology; in fact,
they are mutually constitutive. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 66–67
(1993) (“It must be possible to concede and affirm an array of ‘materialities’ that pertain to
the body, that which is signified by the domains of biology, anatomy, physiology, hormonal
and chemical composition, illness, weight, age, metabolism, life and death. None of this can
be denied.”).
219. Cf. 144 CONG. REC. S599-05, S603 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Dale Brownback) (“Human cloning distorts the relationship between man and woman by
negating the necessity of either one in the creation of new life and consequently also usurps
the role of God in the creation of new life.”).
220. Lévi-Strauss argued that the practice of exogamy—marrying a woman outside the
group one belongs to—is the “universal feature of all societies.” CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS,
THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURE OF KINSHIP 18–22, 62 (Rodeny Needham ed., James Harle
Bell & John Richard Von Sturmer trans., Beacon Press 1969) (1949). He believed that if
small groups want to flourish, they must require their women to marry outside the clan so
as to build alliances with other groups. These exchanges of women between men function
to ensure peaceable relations between social groups. The incest taboo, Lévi-Strauss argued,
is fundamental to exogamy because it prohibits sexual relations between first kin, thus
necessitating a search for sexual partners elsewhere. Id. at 20, 62.
221. LEVICK, supra note 10, at 229 (“[T]he evolutionary task performed by the merger
of half the genetic material of one individual with that of another may be the most
fundamental basis for the social nexus on which society is built. Only sexual reproduction,
but not cloning, naturally accomplishes this.” (emphasis added)).
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analogous to traditional sexual reproduction: it helps to create a more
diverse gene pool by forcing people from different groups to mix their
genes.222 Levick argues that, just as a group needs to practice exogamy to
ensure its survival, so humankind must practice traditional sexual
reproduction to endure.223
Similarly, Kass utilizes the incest taboo to argue against the use of
cloning. He asserts that “social identity and social ties of relationship and
responsibility are widely connected to, and supported by, biological
kinship. Social taboos on incest (and adultery) everywhere serve to keep
clear who is related to whom . . . .”224 Kass also endorses bioethicist James
Nelson’s argument that a child cloned from a woman’s DNA might
develop a sexual desire for her father, and may desire her mother’s
father—her grandfather.225 For Kass, the objection to incest cannot fully be
explained by concerns about inbreeding—or, indeed, on any rational terms
at all.226 Rather, Kass believes that humans naturally carry a “wisdom” that
allows them to feel disgusted when something is bad for humanity.227
Cloning and incest, as acts that ostensibly cause disgust, should therefore
be illegal.
However, other scholars have argued that any argument against
cloning based on the health of the gene pool “is so questionable that it
raises the question of why otherwise rational people would believe in it.”228
While it is true that the mixing of genes is important to thwarting the
diffusion of disease, this nevertheless does not justify banning reproductive
cloning. The use of cloning as an alternative to biological reproduction
cannot and would not cause any damage to the gene pool. It is likely that
the large majority of people would not use cloning for reproduction and
would instead rely on intimate sexual contact—the “old fashioned” way—
to have children. Cloning will be advantageous only to the minority of
222. Id. See also id. at 297, n.92 (“[T]he exchange of genes in exogamy also provides
social and psychological advantages that might be just as important in preventing incest as
the risk of untoward genetic and evolutionary consequences.”).
223. See id. at 230 (“Cloning puts into conflict the ‘selfish’ genes of the individual with
the need for the survival of community and society absolutely necessary for the survival of
humans as a social species. Reproductive cloning might turn out to be the Achilles’ heel of
shortsighted selfish genes . . . .”).
224. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 168, at 695 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 695 (citing James Lindemann Nelson, Cloning, Families, and the
Reproduction of Persons, BIOLAW, June 1997, at S144). See also LEON KASS, LIFE,
LIBERTY, AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE CHALLENGE FOR BIOETHICS 159 (2002)
(“And what will happen when the adolescent clone of Mommy becomes the spitting image
of the woman with whom Daddy once fell in love?”).
226. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 168, at 687 (“[W]e are suspicious
of those who think that they can rationalize away our horror, say, by trying to explain the
enormity of incest with arguments only about the genetic risks of inbreeding.”).
227. Id.
228. MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 39.

EREZ ALONI -MACROD.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

CLONING AND THE LGBTI FAMILY

5/18/2011 3:41:01 PM

49

people for whom other forms of ART are inadequate and who desire to
have genetic ties to their children. Because cloning may be expensive and
other alternatives will be available, it is likely that people who choose
cloning will do so as a last resort. As such, cloning should not pose any
major threats to the gene pool.229 Moreover, even if cloning were used by a
larger section of the population, which is unlikely to happen, it would take
more than a thousand years to affect the diversity of the gene pool.230
Some scientists even argue that cloning would encourage diversity in the
gene pool “to the extent it results in the descent of genes that otherwise
would be lost owing to infertility or other causes.”231
Both Levick and Kass misuse the notions of exogamy and the incest
taboo by couching the social function of exogamy and incest in
“biological” and “natural” terms. Expressions of disgust at the incest
relationship are far from natural, despite what Kass would have us believe.
In fact, Lévi-Strauss, in his work on the structures of kinship, is skeptical of
the true biological origin and function of the incest taboo.232 For LéviStrauss, the incest taboo, though universal in its existence, is cultural or
social in its content. It is therefore not purely “natural” to avoid incest.233
229. See JOHN HARRIS, ON CLONING 95 (2004) (arguing that if everyone were to use
cloning it would prevent any increase in genetic diversity, but this is extremely unlikely).
See also Camporesi & Bortolotti, supra note 21, at 4 (noting that “[a] realistic approach to
the accessibility of cloning techniques for reproductive purposes leads to the conclusion
that it would not be a mass phenomenon, but an option for a limited number of people
[w]hich means that the risks for biodiversity might not be significant after all,” and
suggesting that the assumption that biodiversity is of moral value may itself be flawed);
Richard A. Epstein, A Rush to Caution: Cloning Human Beings, in CLONES AND CLONES,
supra note 12, at 262, 275 (arguing that cloning will likely only be used by a small number of
people, that it is different than inbreeding, and that it is not clear that cloning could cause
much, if any, of a reduction in biodiversity); Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional
Right to Clone?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 987, 997 (2002) (“[I]t simply defies belief to suggest that
cloning would become so popular as to reduce, in any significant way, the existing level of
genetic diversity.”).
230. Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, supra note 81, at 627 (“Finally, even
if the clones of clones always did asexually reproduce, the species effects are too distant in
the future—fifty-two generations of human reproduction is more than 1000 years—to
function as an acceptable justification for interfering with an infertile couple’s procreative
liberty now.”).
231. MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 39.
232. LÉVI-STRAUSS, supra note 220, at 29 (“Even if the incest prohibition has its roots
in nature it is only in the way it affects us as a social rule that it can be fully grasped. In form
and in field of application it varies greatly from group to group. . . . In this case there is no
need to add that the prohibition is less concerned with true consanguinity, which is often
impossible to establish, if at all, than with the purely social phenomenon by which two
unrelated individuals are classed as ‘brothers’ or ‘sisters,’ ‘parents’ or ‘children.’”).
233. See id. Lévi-Strauss asserts, in fact, that arguments for a “natural” basis for
sanctions against the mating of close kin are clearly undermined when one considers the
practices of Australian aboriginals who are “probably the least concerned with biological
proximity.” Id. at 13. As he puts it, unions are permitted among these groups such as
“grand-uncle with grand-niece, the effects of which cannot be particularly favorable.” Id.
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In Judith Butler’s words, “[K]inship is a kind of doing, one that does not
reflect a prior structure but which can only be understood as an enacted
practice.”234 Cultures reproduce rules about kinship from generation to
generation; while they may be deemed absolute or “natural,” they are, in
fact, simply a social construction. Similarly, Martha Nussbaum points out
that the disgust Kass focuses on is a social construction—a dynamic notion
that evolves between ages and cultures.235
In relying on Lévi-Strauss’s theories, both Levick and Kass are
attempting to preserve a traditional notion of the family founded in
heterosexual reproduction through intercourse. Butler argues that LéviStrauss’s incest taboo functions not only to defend exogamous
reproduction of children, but also to “maintain a unity to be part of the
‘clan’ through compulsory exogamy, as it is articulated through
compulsory heterosexuality. Women from elsewhere secure the
reproduction of cultural identity in this way.”236 Following this logic, LéviStrauss’s kinship model preserves the existing dominant culture; for our
purposes, heterosexual reproduction through intercourse.
Underlying both Levick and Kass’s arguments is thus homophobia and
fear of disrupting the heteronormative status quo. A closer look at Levick’s
analysis reveals that he is less concerned by the problem of biodiversity
and more focused on the belief that, although marriage is not essential for
sexual reproduction, “it still can create what is arguably the best social
context within which to rear children.”237 Levick is thus primarily
concerned with the protection of the family (and marriage) which he
deems “the most fundamental civilizing and regulative unit of society.”238
He goes on to suggest that cloning might decrease “the influence of certain
sexuality repressive forces in society,” which would result in increasing
“the incidence of sexual perversion.”239 This reliance on heterosexual
marriage as the sole basis for ensuring diversity in the gene pool reveals
Levick’s argument to be fundamentally flawed. His commitment to
repression of “perversion” hints at his baser motives. Indeed, in another
place in his book, Levick considers the argument that cloning would be
beneficial to same-sex couples and concludes that cloning should be
permissible only to the extent that gene splicing exists, because only then

234. Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, supra note 1, at 249 (citing
DAVID SCHNEIDER, A CRITIQUE OF THE STUDY OF KINSHIP (1984)) .
235. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY 24–25 (2010). For
example, Nussbaum notes that homosexual sex has not always been found disgusting by
heterosexual males, explaining that in many cultures such as Ancient Greece and
contemporary Western Europe, same-sex acts are not objects of disgust. Id.
236. Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, supra note 1, at 247.
237. LEVICK, supra note 10, at 229.
238. Id. at 230.
239. Id. at 230.
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could same-sex couples be good parents.240 The irrationality of this
argument merits no further discussion.

3. Arguments That LGBTI People Will Purposely Clone
Queer Children
The argument that LGBTI people will clone themselves in order to
perpetuate their own gay “kind”241 is presented by both opponents and
proponents of LGBTI rights. Opponents imagine that cloning may result
in the growth of the LGBTI population.242 Kass mockingly notes that some
gay activists testified to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission that,
“should homosexuality be shown to have a genetic basis, homosexuals
would have an obligation to reproduce through cloning to preserve their
kind!”243 In a similar vein, Eric and Richard Posner express concern about
the spread of infertility by the use of cloning. Their concerns about
infertility include an anxiety about cloning’s potential to increase “gay
genes” in the population:
The spread of infertility through cloning might be even more rapid
if, as realism requires, “reproductive failure” were defined broadly
enough to encompass the situation of a homosexual couple, for
whom cloning might be an attractive alternative to adoption,
artificial insemination (if it is a lesbian couple), or surrogate
motherhood (if it is a male homosexual couple). Assuming that all
or most homosexual orientation is genetic, the fraction of
homosexual genes in the gene pool would be increased if cloning
resulted in a disproportionate increase in reproduction by
homosexuals, who might be thought “functionally” infertile to the
extent that they do not reproduce sexually.244
Even assuming that homosexuality is indeed genetic—a very controversial
and simplistic assumption, as I discuss below—and even if LGBTI people
will indeed choose to use cloning when they could rely on other ARTs,
framing LGBTI individuals as inherently or “functionally” infertile is
simple bigotry. LGBTI people may be or may not be infertile, like
members of the general population. LGBTI people may choose not to

240. Id. at 249–50.
241. KASS & WILSON, supra note 11, at 86.
242. See, e.g., KEN HAM, How Should a Christian Respond to “Gay Marriage”?, in
THE NEW ANSWERS BOOK 2, http://www.answersingenesis.org/articles/nab2/christianrespond-gay-marriage (“The idea is already with us that gay ‘couples’ should be freely able
to donate their sperm to surrogate mothers or to clone their DNA to perpetuate their own
genes. So if there is any genetic basis to homosexuality (i.e., ‘made that way’), then this too
will increase the frequency of homosexuality in future generations.”).
243. KASS & WILSON, supra note 11, at 86.
244. Posner & Posner, supra note 105, at 256 (internal citations omitted).

EREZ ALONI -MACROD.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

52

N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

5/18/2011 3:41:01 PM

[Vol. 35:1

procreate coincidently, but this in no way suggests they are functionally
infertile. They can choose to reproduce in “traditional” ways, to clone, to
co-parent, or to adopt. Some LGBTI people have children from previous
heterosexual marriages, and some are bisexual. No wonder, then, that in
response to Eric and Richard Posners’ argument, Victoria Davion asserts
that “[t]he homophobia involved in objecting to cloning on the basis that it
might produce more homosexual people is obvious.”245 As many scholars
have pointed out, the argument that infertility could be “spread” through
cloning finds no support in reality.246 LGBTI people who would have had
no children before being given the opportunity to use cloning and who
now reproduce would actually extend and strengthen the gene pool.
The argument that LGBTI couples will pass a “gay gene” on to their
cloned children is merely a high-tech version of the traditional claim that
gays need to “recruit” others using immoral measures in order to “pass on
the disease” of homosexuality.247 For years, many courts embraced the
narrative that adult gays were trying to recruit children. In Larry Catá
Backer’s research on narratives of homosexuality in state courts between
1960 and 1996, he discovered that state court judges frequently take the
position (at least implicitly) that “young people become life-long
‘homosexuals’ after being recruited by adults.”248 State court judges are not
alone in this belief: during the oral arguments in Lawrence v. Texas, the
landmark Supreme Court case that struck down anti-sodomy laws, Justice
Scalia indicated “that the state would have an interest in preventing
children from being steered into homosexuality.”249
The recruitment argument relies on the belief that being gay is
245. Victoria Davion, Coming Down to Earth on Cloning: An Ecofeminist Analysis of
the Homophobia in the Current Debate, 21 HYPATIA 58, 67 (2006).
246. See PENCE, CLONING AFTER DOLLY, supra note 113, at 88 (arguing that Eric and
Richard Posner’s claim “has many scale-to-issue problems” and makes “many dubious
assumptions”); Kerry Lynn Macintosh, Brave New Eugenics: Regulating Assisted
Reproductive Technologies in the Name of Better Babies, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 257,
300 (2010) (“[I]nfertility is not always heritable. It has many non-genetic causes, including
scarring from venereal disease and delayed childbearing. Thus, it is scientifically inaccurate
to assume that every man or woman who employs ART is transmitting infertility to the
next generation. Moreover, even though some men and women do harbor genetic defects in
their sperm and eggs, it is highly unlikely that [ARTs] will cause the infertile to outnumber
the fertile and doom the species.”).
247. See, e.g., Eskridge & Stein, supra note 113, at 107 (discussing the fear experienced
by homophobic parents that homosexuals will recruit their children). See generally William
N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the
Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327 (2000) (demonstrating that
while the specific content of anti-gay rhetoric has shifted over time, the underlying bias
driving such rhetoric has remained constant).
248. Larry Catá Backer, Narrative and Jurisprudence in State Courts: The Example of
Constitutional Challenges to Sex Conduct Regulation, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1633, 1640 (1997).
249. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 105–06
(2006).
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unnatural. It implies that no one is born gay and that more LGBTI
individuals “must be created through recruitment and toxic exposure to
the gay lifestyle or its affirmation.”250 As such, cloning provides the LGBTI
community with a means for self-perpetuation through technology that
cannot be achieved in the “natural” way. Yet the internal logic of this
argument is flawed. If it is true that no one is born gay, then no one is
cloned gay, either; gayness, if unnatural, does not reside in DNA. A
genetic basis for homosexuality has not been identified,251 and the question
of whether one’s sexual orientation is the result of nature or nurture (or
both) remains hotly contested both inside and outside the LGBTI
community.252 In any event, cloning does not produce photocopies of
humans, as discussed at length above.
Perhaps surprisingly, the view that cloning would benefit the LGBTI
community by allowing people to preserve gay culture and/or queer their
social environments is also widespread among LGBTI-friendly
commentators.253 Robertson notes that, because gay men who use cloning
250. Phillip A. Bernhardt-House, The Werewolf as Queer, the Queer as Werewolf,
and Queer Werewolves, in QUEERING THE NON/HUMAN 159, 164 (Noreen Giffney & Myra
J. Hird eds., 2008) (invoking the literary figure of the werewolf to illustrate the argument
that the queer community needs to artificially “create” more of its kind).
251. See THOMAS C. CARAMAGNO, IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES?: INTELLECTUAL
STALEMATE IN THE GAY RIGHTS DEBATE, 104–05 (2002).
252. Recent experiments show that it is likely that a hormonal and perhaps genetic
component contributes to the development of sexual identity. See Kemp, supra note 153, at
11–12. Research on twins suggests that while sexual orientation may be influenced by
genetics, genes are by no means its sole determinant. See generally Peter S. Bearman &
Hannah Brückner, Opposite-Sex Twins and Adolescent Same-Sex Attraction, 107 AM . J .
SOC. 1179 (2002) (reviewing studies on the origins of sexual orientation based on social,
genetic and hormonal influences and concluding that genetic or hormonal influences alone
could not explain sexual preferences). The origin of homosexuality and how the community
should represent it for the sake of its political and legal strategy has been a source of debate
within the community itself. See generally Janet Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics
of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN L. REV. 503 (1994)
(describing the debate within the gay community and criticizing both sides). Notably, some
gay rights activists have tried to utilize research showing a biological basis for
homosexuality. Id. at 507–16. By emphasizing the biological aspects of sexuality, they hope
to prove that sexual orientation is immutable and that gays and lesbian should therefore be
a protected class for the purpose of equal protection claims. Id. By contrast, social
constructionists argue, inter alia, that such a move transfers the power to decide who
deserves protection by the law from the political arena back to science, and removes agency
and choice from the equation. Id. at 550–553.
253. Michael Shapiro points out that if sexual orientation is influenced by genes,
cloned offspring may share the sexual orientation of their genetic parent. See Michael H.
Shapiro, I Want a Girl (Boy) Just Like the Girl (Boy) that Married Dear Old Dad (Mom):
Cloning Lives, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 188 (2000). As such, he argues, LGBTI parents
may engage in “shaping behaviors” in order to ensure that any genetic predisposition for
the favored sexual preference is realized. Id. at 189. While he acknowledges that “for those
who believe that departures from the paradigm of nuclear family structure are already
unduly and dangerously stretched when same-sex couples raise children, the addition of
cloning may compound the problem,” he further notes that “it remains unclear just what
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will still need to rely on an egg donor and surrogate, their primary interest
in the technology may be in having a child with a particular genome, rather
than having a genetically-related child; thus, they may choose to clone
their own DNA “perhaps in part to increase the chances that the child will
be gay and thus perpetuate gay culture.”254 One commentator even goes so
far to suggest that “if ‘preserv[ing] the race’ is important to you, cloning
gives you your best odds for getting one. But that’s the only thing cloning
could eventually do for homosexuals . . . .”255
Both the “preserve the race” argument and the recruitment-throughcloning argument rely on a dichotomous conception of sexual orientation:
just as one is biologically either male or female (a disputable assumption in
itself256), so too one is either gay or straight. But gender and sexuality
cannot be neatly summarized or disciplined into categories.257 Queer
theorists point out that regardless of the origin of homosexuality (nature,
nurture, or some combination thereof), sexual orientation is not an
essential phenomenon, and the notion that sexual orientation can be
categorized is itself socially constructed.258 Only after the medicalization of
harms, if any, would be occasioned by this particular departure from the paradigm.” Id.
Eskridge and Stein suggest that while some in the LGBTI community may feel that cloning
offers them the possibility of perpetuating queer culture, the greatest benefit cloning would
provide them is likely the opportunity to have children, and perhaps to perpetuate “queerfriendliness”:
While it would be foolish for them to have children in order to replicate their
sexual orientation, few queer people want children for this reason only, and most
queer people with children find the nurturing, sharing, and other generative
experiences to be among the most rewarding of their lives—just as straight
people do. Moreover, even though queer cloning would not necessarily produce
more queer children, there is good reason to think it will contribute to a more
“queer-friendly” culture in general. Social scientific studies and anecdotal
evidence suggest that the (nonclone) offspring of gay men and lesbians are more
likely than people in general to be queer-friendly.
Eskridge & Stein, supra note 113, at 105.
254. Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, supra note 81, at 637.
255. Chandlur Burr, Cloning for Survival, THE ADVOCATE, Apr. 15, 1997, at 9.
256. See generally Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female are
Not Enough, in SEXUALITY AND GENDER 468 (Christine L. Williams & Arlene Stein, eds.,)
(2002), available at http://frank.mtsu.edu/~phollowa/5sexes.html (arguing that the current
two-sex system is inadequate to encompass the full spectrum of human sex expression, and
proposing a five-sex system in its place).
257. See also EVE SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 8 (1990) (“It is a rather
amazing fact that, of the very many dimensions along which the genital activity of one
person can be differentiated from that of another (dimensions that include preference for
certain acts, certain zones or sensations, certain physical types, a certain frequency, certain
symbolic investment, certain relations of age or power, a certain species, a certain number
of participants, etc. etc. etc.), precisely one, the gender of object choice, emerged from the
turn of the century, and has remained, as the dimension denoted by the now ubiquitous
category of “sexual orientation.”).
258. JAGOSE, supra note 169, at 10–16 (reviewing constructionist positions); DAVID M.
HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 49 (1990) (explaining that even if a
gay gene would be found it cannot adequately explain the categories of sexual orientation).
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homosexuality and the invention of homosexuality as we know it, during
the eighteenth century, did homosexual become an identity category.259
Thus, the compartmentalization of society into “homosexual” and
“heterosexual” is a relatively new phenomenon that serves to regulate
sexual acts and desires, deeming some appropriate and good (and
therefore natural) and others deviant and inferior.260 Advances in cloning
or other biotechnologies, no matter how complex, cannot possibly
perpetuate social constructs. Only the meanings we layer upon bodies,
acts, and desires can do that. The recruitment-through-cloning narrative
therefore stands on shaky ground, and it seems that arguments by LGBTI
proponents are based on an essentialist view of what it means to be gay.261

259. MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 43 (1988) (“[W]e must not forget
that the psychological, psychiatric, medical category of homosexuality was constituted from
the moment it was characterized—[Carl] Westphal’s famous article of 1870 on ‘contrary
sexual sensations’ can stand as its date of birth.”). See also SEDGWICK, supra note 257, at 2–
3, 8–9, 34–35 (1990) (explaining how the homosexual/heterosexual dichotomy emerged in
the West, and noting that “the word ‘homosexual’ entered Euro-American discourse during
the last third of the nineteenth century”).
260. Cf., JAGOSE, supra note 169, at 16 (“To foreground only those processes that
resulted historically in the formation of homosexuality is to imply that heterosexuality—
that frequently unmarked but no less historically contingent category—is somehow the
more self-evident, natural or stable construction. This assumption is naturalized in a culture
that commonly understands homosexuality to be a derivative or less evolved form of
heterosexuality.”).
261. Another relevant issue is the inverse of the former point. If cloning technologies
enable us to pinpoint a “gay gene,” would more people abort their children? Indeed, law
professor Radhika Rao argues that one reason to ban cloning is that instead of enhancing
the rights of LGB people, it will be widely used to “to screen them out of the population.”
Radhika Rao, What’s So Strange About Human Cloning?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1007, 1016
(2002). See also Eskridge & Stein, supra note 113, at 108–09 (“Some heterosexuals might
use cloning or gene splicing to try to ensure that their children would be heterosexual.”). By
and large, these concerns are unfounded, as cloning technology is unlikely to bring about
any significant changes. First, even if a genetic connection between sexual identity and
genes exists, because of the significant role that other factors play in the development of
sexual identity, it is very unlikely that it will ever be possible to screen out LGBT people,
much less that cloning technology would enable this. Id. at 104–05, 109. Second, screening
techniques are already accessible through IVF and PGD, and yet the law does not prohibit
the use of IVF. Moreover, genetic tests for some forms of intersexuality (namely Turner
and Klinefelter syndromes) are currently available even for those experiencing non-IVF
pregnancy, and there have been a large number of terminations. See generally Caroline
Mansfield, Suellen Hopfer & Theresa M. Marteau, Termination Rates After Prenatal

Diagnosis of Down Syndrome, Spina Bifida, Anencephaly, and Turner and Klinefelter
Syndromes: A Systematic Literature Review, 19 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 808 (1999)
(reviewing studies from several different countries on the percentage of pregnancy
terminations after prenatal diagnosis of Turner and Klinefelter syndromes, and finding a
seventy-two percent average termination rate with diagnoses of Turner syndrome and fiftyeight percent with diagnoses of Klinefelter syndrome).
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4. Arguments That Cloning Is Not a Natural Form of
Reproduction
A fourth argument commonly used against reproductive cloning is that
it is an attempt to “play God” and is thus immoral on religious grounds.262
Perhaps the argument that cloning, in particular, is akin to playing God
stems from a concern not about human intervention in general, but about
the limits that society should impose on the use of science in the creation
of humanity. While IVF more closely imitates the “natural” reproductive
process,263 cloning is considered a form of “artificial interference,”264
creating a product that we can anticipate and manipulate in advance. Thus,
arguments that scientists should not play God are better understood as
warnings against hubris.265 The secular version of this argument is that
cloning allows for “unnatural” intervention in the natural world:
procreation through “human design and manipulation.”266
Like so many of the arguments against cloning, the idea of cloning as
playing God relies on a strict, binary understanding of the natural world,
where everything that is not biologically “natural” is ipso facto immoral. In
that, it is similar to social regulation and control of sexuality more broadly,
which is established largely through this natural-unnatural, moral-immoral
dichotomous reasoning.267
The framing of cloning as unnatural is not only problematic: it is
inaccurate. Cloning has clear precedents in nature.268 For example,
262. See Bonnie Steinbock, Cloning Human Beings: Sorting Through the Ethical
Issues, in HUMAN CLONING: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 68, 69–70 (Barbara
MacKinnon ed.) (2000) (“In his charge to [the National Bioethics Advisory Commission],
President Clinton warned against the temptation to ‘play God.’”). See also GARETH JONES,
CLONES, THE CLOWNS OF TECHNOLOGY? 77–78 (2001) (“Cloning can be condemned
because it exceeds the limits of the delegated dominion given to the human race by God.”);
NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 172, at 45 (“The warning against ‘playing
God’ serves to remind human beings of their finiteness and fallibility. By not recognizing
appropriate limits and constraints on scientific aspirations, humans reenact the Promethean
assertion of pride or hubris.”).
263. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 168, at 695–96 (“[A]rtificial
insemination and IVF with donor sperm, or whole embryo donation . . . [is] a not altogether
unproblematic practice . . . . [T]here is in each case (as in all sexual reproduction) a known
male source of sperm and a known female source of egg.”).
264. Richard Dawkins, What’s Wrong with Cloning?, in CLONES AND CLONES, supra
note 12, at 54, 63 (telling a story about a panel in which he participated where participants
expressed concerns about the “unnaturalness” of cloning).
265. Steinbock, supra note 262, at 70.
266. See, e.g., KASS & WILSON, supra note 11, at 26.
267. Anal sex, for example, is considered “unnatural” because it does not lead to
procreation. ALAN SOBLE, SEXUAL INVESTIGATIONS 10, 28 (1996) (explaining that natural
law philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas have seen anal coitus as against nature because
it does not lead to procreation).
268. Parthenogenesis is an asexual form of reproduction by the females of some
species whereby embryos or seeds grow and develop without fertilization from a male of
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“twinning,” or the creation of identical (monozygotic) twins, occurs when
the fertilized egg spontaneously divides, creating two cells that continue
dividing on their own, and eventually resulting in two separate embryos in
the womb.269 These two embryos are thus identical because they come
from the same fertilized egg. In some mammals, twinning is the default; in
humans, roughly one in every three hundred births is a result of
twinning.270 Human clones (of each other, not of their parents) have thus
always existed, and no one claims that they are unnatural. Indeed,
Christine Hauskeller argues “[t]hat the artificial character is important for
the meaning of ‘cloning’ is shown by the fact that the term is never used for
the natural division of a zygote resulting in identical human twins.”271
At the same time, the claim that cloning is playing God disregards the
widespread use of other accepted technologies that ostensibly “interfere”
with “natural” reproduction, such as the morning-after pill, IVF,
surrogacy, postmortem reproduction, sex selection, genetic engineering,
and even the transplantation of artificial organs. As their use becomes
more common, they are accepted as more natural. What purpose is served
by categorizing some technologies as natural while framing other,
marginally different technologies as unnatural?
A deeper examination reveals that underlying this concern about
playing God is a heteronormative conception of the “natural”—and thus
the “correct”—way to conceive a child. For Kass, for example, there is
something of profound value in the “natural” process of heterosexual
reproduction. He claims that the process of having children by “one
female, one male, (usually) through coitus—is established . . . not by
human decision, culture or tradition, but by nature.”272 Even in IVF and
other forms of ART—which Kass treats as a evil—there is “a known male
source of sperm and a known single female source of egg—a genetic father
and a genetic mother—should anyone care to know (as adopted children
the species. Parthenogenesis, THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2000), available at
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-partheno.html. Parthenogenesis is common among
social insects like the honeybee and the ant and has also been observed in some snakes,
fish, and monitor lizards. Id. Some research even suggests that human reproduction through
parthenogenesis might be more “natural” than what we think of as traditional sexual
reproduction today. Judith Longstaff Mackay explains:
The most intriguing aspect of my research was why we have sex at all. After all,
sexual reproduction in animals started only 300 million years ago. Life on earth
got on pretty well for 3000 million [sic] years before that with asexual
reproduction. . . . [S]exual reproduction . . . takes more time, it uses more energy,
and mates may be scarce or uncooperative.
Judith Longstaff Mackay, Why Have Sex?, 332 BRIT. MED. J. 623, 623 (2001).
269. LIM, supra note 87, at 180–82.
270. MICHAEL D. WEST, THE IMMORTAL CELL: ONE SCIENTIST’S QUEST TO SOLVE THE
MYSTERY OF HUMAN AGING 214 (2003).
271. Hauskeller, supra note 84, at 826.
272. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 168, at 689.
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often do) who is genetically related to whom.”273 He argues that a child
made through cloning, rather than begotten through this natural process,
will be morally and socially disadvantaged by having only a single genetic
ancestor.274 He thus implies that having a child by heterosexual
intercourse—or even by a process that imitates it—is the sole natural and
moral way to reproduce. As Victoria Davion points out, this is one of the
most homophobic and heterosexist assumptions about cloning because it
clearly posits reproduction by a male and female via intercourse as
superior to other forms.275
Asexual and sexual reproduction both result in the birth of a child; the
only difference is in the lack of unification between sperm and egg in the
former. To describe cloning as unnatural is to glorify heterosexual
reproduction. In the words of Dion Farquhar,
The ontology of “natural” biogenetic married heterosexual
reproduction depended on its binary other of “unnatural”
sterility—the “case” of physiological or social pathology
(homosexuals, unmarried people and so on). Now, a new
“other” to “natural” reproduction has been introduced by
biotechnology—“artificial”
donor-assisted
asexual
reproduction—and it must quickly work to erase its
otherness . . . .276
Cloning technology calls into question the seemingly bright line between
“natural” and “unnatural” forms of reproduction. In doing so, it has the
potential to dismantle the nature-culture binary that is fundamental to
some of the most common (and most discriminatory) arguments against
cloning and against “alternative” sexual orientations.

C. Conclusion
A review of the key arguments against cloning demonstrates that the
majority are either largely unfounded or have been adequately addressed
and refuted in the scientific and theoretical literature. Some of the
traditional arguments discussed most extensively in cloning literature do
raise serious questions about the risks of a reproductive technology that is
not yet fully understood. Concerns about the procedure itself should be
taken seriously, and further research should be conducted to ensure that
cloning technology is safe and efficient. Those arguments that are
motivated by homophobic and heterosexist concerns, however, must be
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id. at 695–96.
See id.
Davion, supra note 245, at 64.
Dion Farquhar, Gamete Traffic/Pedestrian Crossings, in PLAYING DOLLY:

TECHNOCULTURAL FORMATIONS, FANTASIES, & FICTIONS OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 17,
21 (E. Ann Kaplan & Susan Squier eds., 1999).
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distinguished from more legitimate arguments against cloning with which
they are frequently bound up. As a result, their heterosexist and
homophobic motivations are disguised by neutral language and appeals to
scientific reasoning. Yet, upon further examination, these arguments
appear to be motivated largely by fears over the potential use of cloning by
non-traditional families and the advantages it will provide for them,
including the possible expansion of LGTBI families in the population. My
intent in this Part has been to shift the focus from the natural and scientific
to a consideration of the way in which legal, social, and scientific
discourses shape the meaning of what we think of as moral, natural, and
biological. In the final Part, I show how a binary view of nature, nurture
and sexual orientation has been collapsed into the current legal regime,
and try, using legal tools, to challenge the existing, discriminatory law.
VI.
A RIGHT TO CLONE?: CLONING AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OR AN
EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUE
At present, the federal government prohibits federal funds from being
used for reproductive cloning research, and several states prohibit research
on reproductive cloning and attempts to clone human beings.277 These
restrictions arguably implicate the constitutional rights of LGBTI couples
and individuals, including the right to equal protection under the law. This
is a normative argument that sometimes stretches the current American
constitutional law by looking at how this regime could look, and not what
it currently looks like. I adopt a broader notion of equality than currently
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court because my aim is to provide a
forward-thinking vision of the way the regulation of cloning could and
should be interpreted, not just by the Court, but by the legislature and the
public.

A. The Current Ban on Funding Research Cloning and Potential
Future Bans
Currently, in the United States, there is no federal law prohibiting the
use of, or research on, reproductive cloning.278 Even in the absence of
federal legislation, however, the U.S. government has found many ways to
block research on reproductive cloning. Immediately after the
announcement of the creation of Dolly the sheep, then-President Clinton
issued a presidential directive prohibiting the use of federal funds for

277. See infra Part VI(A).
278. Payne, supra note 6, at 956–57.
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cloning humans.279 He also instructed the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission to issue a report on the ethical implications of human
cloning.280 Several months later, that Commission called for a prohibition
on human cloning, finding cloning to be unsafe for the cloned fetus and,
therefore, unethical.281 It also acknowledged that human cloning raises
ethical concerns and that these concerns should be addressed and debated
before cloning is allowed.282 Following the issuance of the Committee’s
recommendations, President Clinton urged the private sector to adopt a
voluntary ban on cloning human beings.283
In 2001, the Bush Administration issued a decision on stem cell
research, stating that federal funds could not be used for the research of
human embryonic stem cells, except for research on a limited number of
cell lines that had already been created.284 This decision made it almost
impossible for scientists to receive funding for human embryonic stem cell
research.285 In 2002, the National Academy of Science recommended that
the ban be extended for an additional five years.286
Most recently in 2009, President Obama’s administration lifted the
strict limitations on human embryonic stem cell research.287 At the same
time, however, President Obama declared that his administration would
never allow human reproductive cloning because “it is dangerous,
profoundly wrong and has no place in our society or any society.”288
Recently, a federal district court judge struck down Obama’s stem cell
279. Memorandum on the Prohibition on Federal Funding for Cloning of Human
Beings, 1 PUB. PAPERS 233 (Mar. 4, 1997).
280. NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 172 (recopying letter from the
President sent on Feb. 24, 1997, requesting review of ethical issues associated with cloning).
281. Id. at 108 (“The Commission concludes that at this time it is morally unacceptable
for anyone in the public or private sector, whether in a research or clinical setting, to
attempt to create a child using somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning. The Commission
reached a consensus on this point because current scientific information indicates that this
technique is not safe to use in humans at this time.”).
282. Id. (“Moreover, in addition to safety concerns, many other serious ethical
concerns have been identified, which require much more widespread and careful public
deliberation before this technology may be used.”).
283. Judith A. Johnson, Human Cloning, in CLONING: CHRONOLOGY, ABSTRACTS AND
GUIDE TO BOOKS 19, 25 (Stephen D. Fairbanks ed., 2004) [hereinafter Johnson, Human
Cloning].
284. Id. at 25–26.
285. See, e.g., LIM, supra note 87, at 345 (“It is incredibly difficult to raise private
money to sustain a reasonable research program.”).
286. Johnson, Human Cloning, supra note 283, at 27 (“The panel stated that the ban
should be reconsidered within 5 years, but only if compelling new data on safety and
efficacy are presented and a national dialogue on the social and ethical issues suggests that
a review is warranted.”).
287. Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 9, 2009).
288. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Lifts Bush’s Strict Limits on Stem Cell Research,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/us/politics/10stem.
html?_r=1.
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research order as violating the Dickey-Wicker Amendment,289 which
prohibits the use of federal funds for research involving the destruction,
endangerment, or creation (for research purposes) of human embryos.290
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has issued a stay,
pending appeal.291
In addition, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has declared
that the use of cloning is subject to its approval.292 The FDA is generally
authorized to regulate biologic products, drugs, and medical devices.293 The
agency has asserted that anyone involved in cloning research must submit
an investigational new drug application.294 However, no such applications
have been submitted, perhaps because the FDA has made it clear that it
will reject these applications.295 The FDA’s jurisdiction over cloning has
never really been explained296 and has been criticized and challenged by a
few scholars who argue that the FDA does not have authority in this
instance.297 In any event, it is clear that research on reproductive cloning in
the United States currently has no chance of being funded and may never
289. Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, §128, 110 Stat. 26, 34
(1996).
290. Sherley v. Sebelius, 704 F. Supp. 2d 63, 73 (D.D.C. Aug 23, 2010) (“[T]he will of
Congress, as expressed in the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, is to prohibit federal funding of
research in which human embryos are destroyed. Accordingly, it is in the public interest to
enjoin defendants from implementing the Guidelines.”).
291. Id.
292. See Richard A. Merrill & Bryan J. Rose, FDA Regulation of Human Cloning:
Usurpation or Statesmanship?, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 85, 99–100 (2001) (discussing and
quoting statements from key FDA staff members asserting FDA jurisdiction over cloning).
293. What
Does FDA Regulate?, FED. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194879.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2011).
294. See Letter from Stuart L. Nightingale, M.D., FDA Assoc. Comm’r for Med.
Affairs (Oct. 26, 1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/
RunningClinicalTrials/ucm150508.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (“[T]he appropriate
mechanism to pursue a clinical investigation using cloning technology is the submission of
an investigational new drug application (IND) to FDA.”).
295. MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 84.
296. Merrill & Rose, supra note 292, at 97 (“No ‘inside’ account of the FDA’s decision
to assert jurisdiction over cloning has yet appeared. We may never know whether the
Clinton White House pressured the Agency to act in order to forestall restrictive legislation
or whether the Agency took the initiative despite administration reluctance. Nor has the
FDA offered a full-blown defense of its legal reasoning, complete with consideration of
alternatives and explanation of its rejection of plausible objections, as it would have been
obliged to do if it had thought it necessary to comply with the rulemaking requirements of
the APA.”).
297. See, e.g., MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 84–85; Merrill & Rose, supra note 292, at
101 (“None [of the FDA’s statements] said, for example, what applications of cloning
technology the FDA believes it has the authority to regulate.”). But see generally Gail H.
Javitt & Kathy Hudson, Regulating (for the Benefit of) Future Persons: A Different
Perspective on the FDA’s Jurisdiction to Regulate Human Reproductive Cloning, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 1201 (2003) (arguing that the FDA does possess jurisdiction to regulate
cloning).
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be authorized by the FDA.
In the background of these debates over government funding for
cloning research lurks the spectre of an outright ban on reproductive
cloning. The House of Representatives voted twice to ban human
cloning,298 but the proposed law did not pass in the Senate.299 Several states,
however, have enacted statutes governing cloning.300 These statutes vary in
substance and in scope. Some prohibit only human cloning but allow
therapeutic cloning, and some call for a complete ban on cloning of any
kind.301

B. LGBTI People Are Disparately Impacted by the Current
Limitations and Would Be Similarly Harmed by a Total Ban on
Reproductive Cloning
1. Federal Funding Ban
The ban on funding research cloning puts LGBTI couples at a
disadvantage relative to opposite-sex couples who can reproduce without
the involvement of a third party. This disadvantage is not merely a result
of biological factors: the government has refused to fund the most
promising method that would allow LGBTI couples to have geneticallyrelated children with minimum involvement of third parties. This
inequality is therefore rooted not only in biology but in government action.
Because the federal government funds research that enables opposite-sex
298. H.R. 534, 108th Cong. § 302 (2003) (“It shall be unlawful for any person or entity,
public or private, in or affecting interstate commerce, knowingly (1) to perform or attempt
to perform human cloning; (2) to participate in an attempt to perform human cloning; or
(3) to ship or receive for any purpose an embryo produced by human cloning or any
product derived from such embryo.”); H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. § 302 (2001) (same). See also
Human Cloning Ban and Stem Cell Research Protection Act of 2007, S. 812, 110th
Congress (2007); Human Cloning Ban and Stem Cell Research Protection Act of 2005, S.
876, H.R. 1822, 109th Cong. (2005). See also Jeffrey Brainard, After Heated Debate, U.S.
House Votes Again to Ban Cloning, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (D.C.), Mar. 14, 2003, at A24
(noting that the ban passed in the House, 241 to 155, and that House lawmakers “had
approved a complete ban on cloning in 2001 by a comparable tally, 265 to 162”).
299. MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 77 (noting that while the ban did not pass in the
Senate, “this failure did not reflect support for reproductive cloning; rather, some senators
wanted to preserve the right of scientists to engage in research cloning.”) (emphasis added).
300. For a comprehensive overview of therapeutic and reproductive cloning laws by
state, see Human Cloning Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health/HumanCloningLaws/tabid/14284/Default.aspx
(last visited Nov. 29, 2010).
301. In some states, cloning human beings for purposes of reproductive cloning is a
criminal act. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1002 (2006) (performing or participating in
human cloning is a Class C felony); IND. CODE § 35-46-5-2 (Supp. 2010) (engaging in human
cloning is a Class D felony). In others, only a civil fine is imposed. See, e.g., MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 333.16275 (2006) (engaging in or attempting to engage in human cloning can result
in a $10,000,000 fine).
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couples to have genetically-related children, banning funding to research
that would similarly benefit LGBTI couples denies these couples equal
protection of the laws. The ban on federally funding cloning research
should thus be challenged as a form of unconstitutional discrimination.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees equal treatment under the law among similarly situated
classes.302 At present, the ban on funding research on reproductive cloning
places those couples who wish to reproduce asexually at a disadvantage
compared to those who are not affected by the ban.303 I define the classes
based on their ability to produce children who are genetically related to at
least one partner with minimal third-party involvement. The unaffected
class consists of opposite-sex couples who have the option to produce
genetically-related children by coitus or through the use of currently
available ARTs. The disadvantaged class includes all those couples who
cannot produce children genetically related to at least one parent without
significant reliance on third parties but-for the use of cloning. De facto,
LGBTI couples would be prominent in the second class.304
If the inability of an LGBTI couple to conceive a genetically-related
child together with minimal reliance on third parties were simply a
biological fact, it would not raise any equal protection or other
constitutional issues. However, because emerging technologies in the field
of reproductive cloning may offer the LGBTI community the chance to
have genetically-related children (possibly even with a mix of both
partners’ genes), bans on federal funding of research that would help to
refine and ensure the safety and efficacy of these procedures
unconstitutionally denies LGBTI people a right that is not similarly denied
302. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
303. This is not to say that only couples are affected by the ban. Clearly, single
individuals who wish to reproduce asexually are also disadvantaged by it. However, for the
purposes of an equal protection challenge, it is most strategic to identify two groups who
are similarly situated in nearly every way in order to demonstrate that a law discriminately
targets or impacts one group relative to the other. If a challenge to a funding ban is
successful, this will benefit single individuals as well.
304. This class also obviously includes some infertile opposite-sex couples. However,
the fact that this class includes some opposite sex couples does not diminish the legal
implications of the disparate impact felt by same-sex couples. For example, miscegenation
laws discriminated not only against black people but also against white people and other
minorities, and yet the court found that bans on interracial marriage violated the Equal
Protection Clause and Due Process. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (rejecting
Virginia’s argument that because “miscegenation statutes punish equally both the white
and the Negro participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance
on racial classifications do not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon race”).
Similarly, in the employment context, courts have found that while the claimed
discrimination in hiring examinations did not apply only to members of a racial minority,
the hiring practices indeed discriminated on the basis of race. See, e.g., Castro v. Beecher,
459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
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to opposite-sex couples.
One may argue that the government does not treat these two groups
differently. The members of the unaffected class reproduce via coitus
without the aid of funding or research from the state, while the affected
class is simply biologically different. Thus, the affected class is asking not
for equal treatment, but for positive rights: affirmative assistance in
conceiving genetically-related children. Furthermore, LGBTI people enjoy
access to the same benefits that are provided to opposite-sex couples: they
are free to use ARTs and other medical interventions that improve
fertility.
Yet such a reading not only falls prey to the fallacious nature/culture
dichotomy discussed above, it also ignores the current landscape of
reproductive health research. In fact, the state already provides funding
and research that benefits the unaffected class. The government has
invested a great deal funding and research in enabling fertile and
infertile305 opposite-sex couples to procreate in safe and healthy ways with
minimum involvement of third parties. According to the data provided by
the National Institutes of Health, since 2006, the United States has directly
invested $300 million in research on infertility, and more than $1.8 billion
on women’s health,306 a category that includes research on reproductive
health.307 Such funding is no doubt dedicated, inter alia, to research on
drugs that promote ovulation (clomiphene and gonadotropins) and allow
couples to conceive genetically-related child without a third party’s organs.
Opposite-sex couples who employ ARTs enjoy the fruits of research that
enables them to procreate in safe and efficient ways, often without the
involvement of third parties.308 Even those couples who do not use ARTs
305. Infertility, according to the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, is
defined as engaging in coital unprotected sex for one year without conception occurring.
Infertility, AM. SOC. REPROD. MED., http://asrm.org/topics/detail.aspx?id=36 (last visited
Mar. 31, 2011).
306. Estimates of Funding for Various Research, Condition and Disease Categories,
NIH RESEARCH PORTFOLIO ONLINE, http://report.nih.gov/rcdc/categories/#bpopup
(estimated budget for FY 2010 and FY 2011 not included in calculation).
307. See AGENDA FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN’S HEALTH FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, A
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE NIH WOMEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH AGENDA FOR THE
21 CENTURY 63–65 (1999), http://orwh.od.nih.gov/research/report.pdf (describing current
NIH research on reproductive health and offering recommendations for a future research
agenda).
308. For example, the government encourages research on PGD. See, e.g., Study of
the Efficacy of 24 Chromosome Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD),
CLINICALTRIALS.GOV (Dec. 12, 2010), http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT01219283
(announcing PGD clinical trials advertised by the National Institutes of Health). As noted
above, supra note 54, PGD is a technique that can identify genetic defects in pre-embryos.
The purpose of this procedure is to allow couples who have difficulty reproducing because
of genetic problems to have a healthy baby with their own genes. Of course, such couples
could instead simply rely on third-party organs. Thus, the main purpose of the technique is
to allow a couple to have a genetically-related child without the involvement of third
ST

EREZ ALONI -MACROD.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

CLONING AND THE LGBTI FAMILY

5/18/2011 3:41:01 PM

65

rely on a variety of other medical tools and technologies over the course of
their pregnancy, including ultrasounds, alpha-fetoprotein screening,
amniocentesis, and chorionic and villus sampling, all of which have been
supported by years of technological development and financial investment
by the government. The American health system is thus deeply invested in
supporting opposite-sex couples to reproduce without the involvement of a
third party, while no funding is similarly devoted to the LGBTI community
for these purposes.309 In challenging the ban on funding for cloning
research, the LGBTI community would not be asking for an affirmative
right; rather, it would merely be asking that the government not deny
federal funding to research that would equally enable them to have
genetically-related children.
One also may argue that these classes are biologically different in a
way that justifies the different distribution of funding. When the
government funds research on breast cancer, a disease that affects mainly
women, it does not discriminate against men. Indeed, sex discrimination
jurisprudence recognizes some physical and inherent differences between
men and women and uses them to justify different treatment on the basis
of sex.310 However (and this is precisely the point), what society treats as
inherent or natural physical or biological differences are in reality the
result of social practices that collapse actual variations in favor of binary
differences, becoming entrenched over time through medical and legal
discourse. The notion of “biological difference” is in fact little more than
misguided prejudice pressed into service as legal justification for outright
sex discrimination.311 I am not arguing that biology is meaningless, but
rather that the ban on cloning research shapes our understanding of what
is biologically possible. It may be possible, biologically, for LGBTI couples
to have genetically-related children with minimal involvement of third
parties. It is the law, not biology, that impedes this opportunity; it is the
law that shapes biology more than biology shapes the law.
Finally, some might argue that the federal government’s decision to

parties.
309. To be sure, LGBTI individuals and couples benefit from government funding of
reproductive technologies: they use ART and other reproductive medicines, and give birth
in hospitals the same way that others do. Yet providing funding for research that allows
opposite-sex couples to have genetically-related children without relying on third parties,
and denying funding for the same exact purpose for other groups, is per se discrimination.
310. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, A Postscript on VMI, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L.
59, 62 (1997) (discussing the role of “inherent [sex] differences” in the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).
311. See, e.g., Martha T. McCluskey, Rethinking Equality and Difference: Disability
Discrimination in Public Transportation, 97 YALE L.J. 863, 871 (1988) (“Instead of
attempting to distinguish real from stereotypical differences, [some feminists argue that]
equality doctrine should challenge the male-biased norms that make difference, including
physical differences, a problem for women.”).

EREZ ALONI -MACROD.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

66

N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

5/18/2011 3:41:01 PM

[Vol. 35:1

ban federal funding of reproductive cloning is not amenable to an equal
protection analysis.312 The Supreme Court has held that the “legislature’s
decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not
infringe the right.”313 Thus, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld a
statute that prohibited the use of federal funds for informing women about
the availability of abortion services.314 The majority quoted a previous
decision in which it held that “the government may ‘make a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that
judgment by the allocation of public funds.’”315
I suggest, however, that the ban on funding research on reproductive
cloning differs from these cases. When the government funds research on
sexual reproduction but implements a ban on research on asexual
reproduction (a ban that harms a specific group), it unequally distributes
money for the same purpose. In another context, where the government
directs funding toward one group but denies it to another, the Supreme
Court has held that the government cannot discriminate in providing
funding for the same purpose to different groups.316 Thus, the Supreme
Court found that a Texas statute denying schools state funds for the
education of children who were not “legally admitted” to the United States
while simultaneously funding the education of citizens and documented
immigrants violated the Equal Protection Clause.317 Similarly, the federal

312. The question is not whether the state should positively support research on
certain issues. The right to procreate is a negative right, assuring that the state does not
interfere in people’s private decisions to have or not have children. JOHN ROBERTSON,
CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 23 (1994).
This right does not include the obligation to assist in having children. See id. (arguing that
there is no constitutional right to provide services or resources to assist in conception). My
argument therefore focuses on the inequity in distributing valuable resources to only one
group and thereby denying them to another.
313. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983).
314. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). But see Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531
U.S. 533 (2001) (limiting Rust to cases involving governmental speech).
315. Rust, 500 U.S. at 192–93 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
316. See Burt, supra note 6, at 501 (“[T]he use of federal funds for reproductive or
research cloning outside specific circumstances remains forbidden. If government funding
were equated with private philanthropy, it would be difficult to imagine a basis for
challenging the government’s decision to spend its funds for some purposes but not for
others, as it saw fit. In our constitutional scheme, however, the government has obligations
that private philanthropists do not; the government is obliged to honor public norms of
behavior that private parties are free to avoid.”).
317. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Similarly, in the context of the Establishment
Clause, the Court found that the “government should not prefer one religion to another, or
religion to irreligion,” when it allocates funding to schools. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) (holding that passage of a schoolredistricting law resulting in the creation of a special school district for practitioners of a
“strict” form of Judaism violated the Establishment Clause of First Amendment). See also
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that Pennsylvania’s Nonpublic
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which allowed the state to reimburse nonpublic
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ban on reproductive cloning arguably violates the Equal Protection Clause
by conferring a benefit—reproductive health research leading to the ability
to conceive without third-party involvement—on heterosexual couples that
it does not confer on LGBTI couples.

2. Total Ban on Cloning
A ban on practicing reproductive cloning similarly discriminates
against LGBTI couples relative to their heterosexual counterparts. The
government does not interfere with opposite-sex couples’ right to use ART
in order to have a genetic child. Fertile, opposite-sex couples are able to
use the gametes of both partners in artificial insemination and IVF or even
to use other people’s organs. If the choice of LGBTI couples to enjoy the
exact same act with a different technique is denied, then the government
treats these two groups differently. Furthermore, much of the cloning
rhetoric discussed in this article—some of which comes from governmental
bodies—suggests that bans on reproductive cloning may be motivated by
discriminatory intent.318 While discriminatory intent can be difficult to
prove (and may be exceptionally so in the context of a still unrefined
technology), disproportionate impact may be easier to demonstrate. While
current, facially-neutral state bans on cloning do not single out LGBTI
people in particular, a compelling argument may be made that they
disparately impact this group.319 There is no question that a ban on
reproductive cloning would disproportionately impact LGBTI couples,
perhaps more than any other group. Indeed, as Eric and Richard Posner
have argued, this is one of the main groups that would benefit from cloning
technology.320 By contrast, the ban has little or no effect on fertile (and
schools for the salaries of teachers who taught secular material, violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment because the primary beneficiaries of the Act were “church
schools”). While Grumet is an Establishment Clause case, the court did not invalidate the
law solely because the state endorsed one religion, but rather because one group that was
similarly situated was treated more favorably than others. Id. at 703 (“Because the religious
community of Kiryas Joel did not receive its new governmental authority simply as one of
many communities eligible for equal treatment under a general law, we have no assurance
that the next similarly situated group seeking a school district of its own will receive one.”).
Implicitly, the Court relied on reasoning based on equality as well as traditional
Establishment Clause considerations.
318. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that a government act
would not be unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact, but a
purpose to discriminate must be present.).
319. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (“Though the law
itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the
denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.”).
320. See Posner & Posner, supra note 105, at 256 (noting that “cloning might be an
attractive alternative to adoption” for homosexual couples). See also Daar, supra note 4, at
528 (“A third possible benefit of cloning would be to assist single individuals and same sex
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many infertile) opposite-sex couples.
In any event, whether a ban on reproductive cloning violates equal
protection or not, it is easier to establish that a total ban infringes upon a
fundamental right, an argument I will explore in the following section.

C. The Current Funding Limitations and Any Future Ban on Cloning
Human Beings Infringes on LGBTI Individual’s Fundamental
Right to Reproduce
Arguably, a ban on using reproductive cloning, if safe, infringes on the
private decision to have a child via cloning. While the right to procreate
without government interference has been recognized by the Court as a
fundamental right,321 it is not clear that this would be interpreted to apply
to cloning. Some scholars have argued that the use of cloning is covered by
the right to procreation, because its purpose is no different from that of
sexual reproduction, and it resembles other forms of sexual reproduction,
such as ART, which use a third party’s gamete.322 Conversely, others have
suggested that such a right does not exist because the differences between
sexual reproduction and cloning are too great to warrant the expansion of
reproductive rights to cloning.323 Scholars on this side of the debate largely
couples in their efforts to reproduce.”).
321. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920 (2000) (“[T]his Court, in the course of a
generation, has determined and then redetermined that the Constitution offers basic
protection to the woman's right to choose.”); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (“Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far reaching and devastating
effects.”); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (“The decision whether
or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally
protected choices. . . .”); Angela Campbell, Ethos and Economics: Examining the Rationale

Underlying Stem Cell and Cloning Research Policies in the United States, Germany, and
Japan, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 47, 70 (2005) (“The constitutional right to procreative and
reproductive freedom has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court in a
number of cases.”). See also ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 312, at 22–42
(arguing that there is a constitutional right to procreate using ART).
322. See Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional Implications of Human Cloning, 42
ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 695 (2000) (“Because cloning is merely an asexual form of procreation,
it is arguably as much a fundamental constitutional right as our right to procreate by either
passion or the petri dish.”); John A. Robertson, Human Cloning and the Challenge of
Regulation, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 119, 120 (1998) (“Whether described as “replication” or
as “reproduction,” the resort to cloning is similar enough in purpose and effects to other
reproduction and genetic-selection practices that it should be treated similarly.”); Pratheep
Sevanthinathan, Heavy Regulation of Human Cloning as an Alternative to a Complete
Ban, 10 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 219, 242 (2007) (“[I]n light of Skinner, Lifchez, and the
abortion cases, there seems to be a constitutionally protected right to procreate and
therefore there may be a right to reproductive cloning.”).
323. Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans
on Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 666–67 (1998) (“[C]loning is too
qualitatively different from normal reproduction and from the types of assisted
reproduction protected by the Lifchez case to simply assume the same Constitutional
protections apply.”); Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, supra note 168, at 699 (“The
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rely on the arguments I addressed earlier in this paper, which, as I have
explained, are founded on false assumptions.324
However, even among scholars who support recognition of the right to
clone as a fundamental right, there are disagreements regarding which uses
of cloning should be more valued. John A. Robertson suggests that
individuals are interested in cloning for two reasons: infertility and genetic
selection/design.325 The first group includes those who are infertile or suffer
from reproductive failure; for them, cloning is the only way to have a
genetically-related child. Robertson places lesbian couples in this group
because, while they might not be infertile as that term is traditionally
understood, their right to choose a relationship that does not involve male
reproductive organs should be protected if possible.326 Applying this
rationale, many transgender and intersex individuals would also fall into
this category, as cloning may offer their only opportunity to have a
genetically-related child with minimum third party involvement.
The second group Robertson identifies includes individuals who seek
to use cloning solely for purposes of selecting the child’s genome.327 He
argues that the people in this category have a weaker claim to
constitutional protection, and that policymakers are entitled to prohibit
them from cloning or at least to give priority to the first group. This camp
includes fertile people who choose to clone their child, whether alive or
dead, in order to have a twin of that child. Robertson includes gay men in
this camp as well.328 He argues that because gene-splicing techniques are
not likely to be available in the near future, gay men acquire no clear
advantage by using cloning, since they will still require of the assistance of
a surrogate mother and egg donor.329
While I agree that good public policy will take into consideration the
purposes of using cloning, I think Robertson places too much emphasis on
reproductive failure as the basis for using cloning and focuses too much on
genetics as the factor that determines one’s right to use cloning. Without
gene splicing, cloning does not assist LGBTI people in having geneticallyrelated children any more than current ARTs. Cloning does, however,
assertion of a negative ‘right to reproduce’ certainly makes sense when it claims protection
against state interference with procreative liberty, say, through a program of compulsory
sterilization. But surely it cannot be the basis of a tort claim against nature, to be made
good by technology, should free efforts at natural procreation fail . . . . When the exercise of
a previously innocuous freedom now involves or impinges on troublesome practices that
the original freedom never was intended to reach, the general presumption of liberty needs
to be reconsidered.”).
324. See supra Part V.
325. Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, supra note 81, at 617–18.
326. Id. at 635–36.
327. Id. at 627–31.
328. Id. at 636–37.
329. Id.
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reduce third-party involvement in the process. With regard to the
fundamental right to procreate free from government intervention, I
would suggest that the dividing principle should be the harm principle,
rather than the question of who has a “right” to have genetically-related
child. The harm principle suggests that the entire LGBTI community is
disadvantaged by their limited options, and that they therefore have a
compelling interest in cloning that should be recognized even if they are
not “infertile” for the purposes of other ARTs. Accordingly, as long as the
use of cloning does not harm anyone, there is no reason to interfere with
the private decision to use cloning as a method for having children. The
law does not prohibit the use of surrogacy arrangements and organ
donation, both of which have the potential to result in exploitation.330
Cloning, by contrast, may actually reduce the involvement of third parties,
thereby reducing the chance of exploitation. If surrogacy is not banned in
the United States, there is no reason to ban other technologies that might
serve to reduce any harm that may be caused by surrogacy and similar
arrangements. Denying LGBTI people the use of cloning infringes upon
their right to be free from state interference in reproductive and relational
decision-making.
More to the point, the right to procreate without the state intervention
is not based solely on a right to make private choices. One of the rationales
the Supreme Court relied on in Roe v. Wade331 is that the proper basis for
women’s right to private sexual choices “is not privacy but equal social
standing.” 332 Restrictions on abortions contributed to women’s inequality
as a class. Thus, as at least one scholar has suggested, “The equality
interpretation of Roe—and particularly the notion that limits on abortion
are a form of class legislation—will be increasingly important as we
encounter new reproductive technologies like cloning . . . .” 333 Under this
330. See, e.g., supra Part II(B).
331. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
332. See Balkin, supra note 12, at 844–6 (“Roe v. Wade was premised on three ideas:
First, a fertilized ovum does not obtain constitutional rights from the moment of
conception. Second, the state nevertheless has legitimate and powerful interests in the life
and potential personhood of the developing embryo or fetus. Third, those interests,
although quite important, must yield, at least in the earlier stages of the pregnancy, to
preserve the rights of women.”).
333. Id. at 855. Balkin, however, speculates that “[c]loning and other genetic
technologies are not necessary to ameliorate women's inequalities with men, and indeed
one can easily imagine how these technologies might someday be used to undermine
women's equality.” Id. at 856. Balkin concludes that cloning may pose some risks for
women and will not serve as an equalizer for women because it will increase demand for
eggs and wombs, creating pressure for women—especially poor women—to serve as egg
donors and gestation mothers, possibly with some risk to their health. Balkin does not
consider the great advantage that cloning offers to LGBTI people, and also does not
acknowledge how cloning may offer great advantages to women by releasing them from the
need for sperm donors, or by allowing them to get pregnant at an older age. See, e.g., Marie
Aline Seabra Ferreira, The Sexual Politics of Human Cloning: Mothering and Its
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framework, a ban on cloning, which directly disadvantages the LGBTI
community and further perpetuates existing inequalities, should be
invalidated.

D. Laws That Discriminate Against LGBTI People Merit Heightened
Scrutiny
1. Federal Funding Ban
The mere fact that a group is treated differently than other groups
does not immediately suggest that the Equal Protection Clause has been
violated. By their very nature, laws categorize people into groups,
benefiting some at the expense of others.334 The Supreme Court uses a
three-tiered approach to determine whether a law that disadvantages a
class of people violates the Equal Protection Clause. In general, a law will
be upheld so long as it is “rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.”335 However, if the law is alleged to disadvantage a “protected”
class (classes delineated by race or national origin being the key example)
or to obstruct a fundamental right, the Court will typically apply a higher
level of scrutiny.336 A law that disadvantages all African-Americans vis-àvis other Americans, for example, will only be upheld if the law is
“narrowly tailored” to a “compelling governmental interest.”337 In the
middle tier, a law disadvantaging a group that receives intermediate
scrutiny—women, for example—will be upheld only if it is substantially
related to an important government interest.338

Vicissitudes, 4 J. ASSOC. RESEARCH MOTHERING 113 (2002) (arguing that cloning can be
the signifier of a real equality for women and bring about real change in sex roles, as
women will no longer need to be immediately connected to motherhood because men can
have children independently; because of this, women will no longer be seen as automatic
care providers and will not be enlisted into procreative projects by virtue of their anatomy).
See also supra note 12.
334. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 539–40 (1942) (“Under our
constitutional system the States in determining the reach and scope of particular legislation
need not provide ‘abstract symmetry.’”); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914)
(“They may mark and set apart the classes and types of problems according to the needs
and as dictated or suggested by experience.”) (internal citations omitted).
335. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
336. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 457–58 (“Unless a
statute provokes ‘strict judicial scrutiny’ because it interferes with a ‘fundamental right’ or
discriminates against a ‘suspect class,’ it will ordinarily survive an equal protection attack so
long as the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose.”).
337. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1985).
338. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional
challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.”).
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It is not clear what level of scrutiny would be accorded LGBTI
individuals under an equal protection analysis. At present, gays and
lesbians are not recognized as a protected class, and laws alleged to
discriminate against them receive only rational basis review.339 However,
two federal courts recently suggested in dicta that classifications based
upon sexual orientation should be reviewed using a standard more
searching than rational basis.340
Significantly, the U.S. Attorney General recently announced that
“classifications based on sexual orientation should be subject to a more
heightened standard of scrutiny.”341 While the Supreme Court, not the
Department of Justice, ultimately decides what level of scrutiny to apply in
challenges to laws that discriminate against a particular class, this
announcement nevertheless provides valuable support for future claims
that discrimination against LGB people merits a heightened level of
review.
Even if courts will not apply heightened scrutiny to the federal ban on
funding for reproductive cloning research, a court may decide to apply

339. See also Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 756
(2010). Yoshino also notes that it is possible that the Supreme Court will give formal
heightened scrutiny to gays and lesbians, but suggests that the Court has “every incentive”
to apply the “rational basis with bite” standard instead of introducing a new class of
individuals who benefit from strict scrutiny. Id. at 761–62.
340. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(“Although Proposition 8 fails to possess even a rational basis, the evidence presented at
trial shows that gays and lesbians are the type of minority strict scrutiny was designed to
protect.”); Collins v. Brewer, 727 F.Supp.2d 797, 804 (D. Ariz. July 23, 2010) (“Some form
of heightened scrutiny might apply to plaintiffs’ claims, but it is unnecessary to decide
whether or which type of heightened scrutiny might apply to plaintiffs’ claims. . . .
Moreover, the court applies a ‘more searching form of rational basis review’ when a
classification harms politically unpopular groups or personal relationships.”). Furthermore,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently applied a heightened standard of review in a
challenge to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the government policy that banned openly gay
soldiers from serving in the military. Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 807–09
(9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Act constitutes an intrusion “upon
the personal and private lives of homosexuals, in a manner that implicates [substantive due
process rights], and is subject to heightened scrutiny.”). While the Ninth Circuit applied
heightened scrutiny only to the plaintiff’s substantive due process claim and not her equal
protection claim, the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, especially in the field of
reproduction, shows that “equal protection and substantive due process . . . [are] regularly
interlocking and powerfully complementary sources of protection.” Laurence H. Tribe,
Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 1893, 1902 n.32 (2004). Tribe thus argues that “due process and equal protection,
far from having separate missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly
interlocked in a legal double helix.” Id. at 1989. Thus, an argument might be made for
extending strict scrutiny to equal protection claims brought by gay and lesbian plaintiffs.
341. Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation Involving the Defense of
Marriage Act, Feb 23. 2011, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag222.html.
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“rational basis with bite.”342 Under this framework, the court may
invalidate legislation under rational basis review when the legislation is
motivated by animus toward a specific group.343 Unfortunately, such
animosity will be hard to establish in the cloning context because
restrictions on cloning are likely to appear neutral on their face, as they
prohibit the use of cloning by all individuals, not just gays and lesbians.344
Because it is not clear what level of scrutiny a court would apply, when
I analyze equal protection claims in the following section I consider the
likely outcome under both rational basis and heightened scrutiny.

2. Total Ban on Cloning
Although it cannot be predicted with any certainty, it is not impossible
that a challenge to a total ban on cloning would be examined under some
form of heightened scrutiny, based either on the infringement of a
fundamental right or its disproportionate impact on the group most
affected by the prohibition to clone (the LGBTI population). First, as
stated before, if the ban on human cloning disproportionately affects
LGBTI couples, it may receive a higher standard of review for the reasons
given above. Second, as stated above, the right to be free from government
interference has long been recognized as a fundamental right that triggers
heightened scrutiny. Based on this theory, a future ban on reproductive
cloning constitutes a restriction on exercising a fundamental right and will
be evaluated by a court using strict scrutiny. If the use of ART by
opposite-sex couples, especially when using a third party’s gamete, is a
fundamental right, cloning should be likewise. Therefore, when I analyze
the ban on cloning, I will use heightened scrutiny.

E. There Is No Legitimate State Interest to Support the Current
Funding Ban or Any Future Cloning Ban
1. Federal Funding Ban
Having addressed the level of review the Supreme Court is likely to

342. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 339, at 759–63.
343. Id. The Supreme Court has applied a heightened version of rational basis review
in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating an amendment to the Colorado state
constitution that would have prevented cities, towns, and counties in Colorado from
recognizing gays and lesbians as a protected class), and Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (overturning the City of Cleburne’s denial of a special use
permit to a group home for “13 retarded men and women”).
344. See Foley, supra note 322, at 709 (“The possible discriminatory impact of a
cloning ban on homosexuals and women would not be enough, ipso facto, to warrant
invalidation under the Equal Protection Clause; a discriminatory purpose would have to be
demonstrated.”).
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apply to a constitutional challenge to the law banning the funding of
cloning research and to a total ban on cloning itself, I turn now to the
question of whether the ban on funding cloning research serves a
legitimate state interest (as required under rational basis review) or is
narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest (as required under
heightened scrutiny). The two government committees commissioned to
investigate cloning concluded that cloning is unethical because it is risky.
While both found that cloning implicates other ethical issues, their
conclusions were primarily based on concerns about safety.345 The
government would thus likely argue that the ban is meant to prevent the
harm that would occur in the process of cloning research—for example,
harm to cloned human fetuses that are not yet viable and that may die as
part of the ordinary course of research, or to eventual human subjects who
agree to participate in the gestation of cloned children. However, the risks
involved in cloning research are not fundamentally different from those
implicated in research on other reproductive technologies.346 While cloning
research may raise some unique issues of safety, in other ways it may be
safer than coital reproduction because DNA with known abnormalities is
less likely to be cloned.347 Because several U.S. agencies carefully regulate
such research to ensure its safety, concerns about physical safety will rarely
provide a sound basis for prohibiting cloning by couples seeking to have
biologically-related children for rearing.348
Even if a court finds that this safety rationale is legitimate or even
compelling, the federal ban on funding for reproductive cloning is arguably
not related—much less narrowly tailored—to that interest. To the
contrary, it may even be counter to such an interest. The ban on research
funding will not prevent the technology from being developed. Rather, it
will negatively impact the way in which the technology develops.349 Cloning
is currently researched in other countries and in private laboratories in the
United States.350 Due to the lack of support by federal funding, the ban in
345. NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 172, at ii (“At present, the use
of this technique to create a child would be a premature experiment that would expose the
fetus and the developing child to unacceptable risks. This in itself might be sufficient to
justify a prohibition on cloning human beings at this time . . . .”); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, supra note 108, at 99–105 (“[C]loning-to-produce-children is not now safe . . . .
[C]oncerns revolve around potential dangers to the cloned child, as well as to the egg donor
and the woman who would carry the cloned child to birth.”).
346. See, e.g., MACINTOSH, supra note 176, at 64–69.
347. John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1371,
1411 (1998).
348. Id.
349. Daar, supra note 4, at 569.
350. See Annas, Andrews & Isasi, supra note 193, at 165 (stating that the ban on the
use of federal funds for cloning has had little effect on private fertility research and clinics).
See generally Camporesi & Bortolotti, supra note 21, at 1–2 (discussing American
researchers who transferred a cloned human embryo in Cyprus because the law in the
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particular states, and the FDA’s possible prohibitions on use, “[a] ban in
any particular U.S. state will merely move operations across state lines,”351
or to private laboratories within the United States with no government
supervision at all.352 As a result, the much-discussed risks to the cloned
child may, in fact, be intensified by potentially irresponsible, unregulated
studies.353 Furthermore, while government-funded research must comply
with the Common Rule, which provides guidelines for the protection of
research subjects, private researchers are not bound by these rules.354 The
ban on using federal funding for cloning research has therefore simply
shifted the development of knowledge to other places and lessened the
government’s control over the quality and safety of cloning technology. It
seems clear, therefore, that the ban on funding research cloning does not
further any legitimate government concern and may, in fact, be
counterproductive. As such, the federal ban may not survive even rational
basis scrutiny.355 A less harmful means of addressing this issue would be to
United States possibly prohibited human cloning and noting that the company stated they
did not conduct the research in Cyprus or the United States); Nell Boyce & David E.
Kaplan, The God Game No More: The Feds Crack Down on a Human Cloning Lab, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., July 9, 2001, at 20 (reporting on attempts to clone human beings in
New York, which were stopped after the intervention of the FDA, and noting that the
laboratory subsequently moved overseas).
351. Id. at 569.
352. Id. at 569–70 (“But we are also aware of hints at secret research being conducted
on reproductive cloning. Those hints are coming from places outside the United States, but
we are not immune from clandestine efforts at human cloning within our borders. Last
summer at a symposium sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences, Dr. Brigitte
Boisselier, a chemist with Clonaid, announced that she had made progress toward human
cloning. Though Dr. Boisselier did not discuss the location of her research efforts, later
reports revealed that she had been operating in a laboratory in Nitro, West Virginia. The
‘laboratory,’ as it turns out, was a single classroom in the Nitro Community Center, a
facility that also houses a day care center and the Nitro Police Department.”).
353. LIM, supra note 87, at 321–22 (“Unreasonable government restrictions may lead
undesirably to clandestine activities in some offshore laboratory . . . .”).
354. See ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, CRAFTING A CLONING POLICY 120–22 (2002)
(explaining that all public agencies are required to comply with the Federal Policy for the
Protection of Human Subjects, known as the Common Rule, a uniform requirement in
cases involving the participation of human subjects). While the FDA requires research on
cloning to comply with these rules, its jurisdiction to do so is doubtful, as discussed supra
Part VI(A). See also REBECCA DRESSER, HUMAN CLONING AND THE FDA: THE HASTING
CENTER REPORT (2003), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_go2103/is_3_33/ai_n9103292/
?tag=content;col1 (“Human cloning fits awkwardly, if at all, into the regulatory
definitions.”).
355. Further, the ban on research cloning harms LGBTI individuals in particular,
because the absence of government regulation also means no one ensures that research
relevant to LGBTI people is being conducted. One way to divide research funding and to
supervise the direction of the research would be to distribute funding by categories. See
BONNICKSEN, supra note 354, at 132 (suggesting that the federal government could open
categories of funding for cloning research). This division of funding would ensure that the
specific and practical needs of the beneficiaries of cloning technologies, including the
LGBTI community, are met. For example, if the government provided funding, it could
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heavily regulate cloning research, directing funding to responsible and
supervised studies.

2. Total Ban on Cloning
Because a total ban on human reproductive cloning would not simply
displace research to other states or private entities, the state interest in
banning reproductive cloning may be greater than its interest in banning
only funding for cloning research. Moreover, the government may be more
easily able to articulate a state interest in banning reproductive cloning
that does not apply to research funding, such as the effect that cloning will
have on the adoption market. Under rational basis review, an equal
protection challenge to a ban on cloning—at least given the current state
of the technology—is thus not likely to succeed. If a court applied
heightened scrutiny, however, the scope of the ban on cloning would be
relevant to the determination of whether a statute is narrowly tailored: a
general ban may be too broad, while ban on specific uses of cloning may be
constitutional.
Assuming that cloning eventually becomes safe and efficient enough
for use in human reproduction, the government may likely nevertheless
justify a ban by relying on at least some of the arguments discussed
throughout this paper. As I have offered responses to those arguments
already, I focus now on an argument the government may put forth that is
less easily countered: that the effect of cloning on adoption provides a
compelling state interest for banning the use of reproductive cloning.
Some scholars have expressed concern that efficient reproductive
cloning might adversely affect the adoption market.356 Currently, in the
United States, three quarters of women seeking to adopt are sterile or
have some kind of infertility problem, and most individuals try fertility
treatments before adopting.357 The opportunity to have a geneticallyrelated child might cause some to choose cloning if it were available. Anita
L. Allen suggests that the high demand for, and low availability of, white
ensure that one category included research on gene-splicing technology and its combination
with cloning. The LGBTI community might also benefit from the creation of a category
dedicating research funds to the exploration of different methods of cloning, such as SCNT
and parthenogenesis. As long as such supervision is denied by the ban, the harm to those
who make use of asexual reproduction continues to grow. While it is an open question
whether the government has a constitutional obligation to direct money to research specific
issues, it is definitely an appropriate aim of fair legislation.
356. See Neil Levy & Mianna Lotz, Reproductive Cloning and a (Kind of) Genetic
Fallacy, 19 BIOETHICS 232, 247 (2005) (“If cloning were to become widely available, the
primary motive for adoption would be removed.”). See also Allen, supra note 18, at 57.
357. U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SERIES 23 NO. 27: ADOPTION
EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN AND MEN AND DEMAND FOR CHILDREN TO ADOPT BY WOMEN
18-44 YEARS OF AGE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2002 2, 11 (2008), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_027.pdf.
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children in the United States available for adoption in the United States
will cause some potential parents to choose cloning over adoption.358 In
addition, LGBTI people currently make up a substantial portion of the
adoption market.359 Thus, if a large portion of the LGBTI community
chooses cloning rather than adoption, a significant number of children
waiting to be adopted could be left without adoptive parents.360 Of course,
any effect that cloning may have on the adoption market remains
speculative. We do not know how expensive cloning might be, how
successful and appealing the technology will be, or any of the numerous
other factors that could influence the popularity of cloning compared to
adoption.361
Will a possible reduction in adoption rates provide the government
with a legitimate or even compelling reason to justify a prohibition on use
of cloning? The government has an interest in adoption based on the need
to ensure that every citizen has a home and every child a legal guardian.
But if cloning could be banned on the basis of an expected reduction in
adoption rates, IVF could be banned as well. If the government wishes to
make adoption more attractive, there exist many more moderate and less
harmful ways to do so. First and foremost, states that prohibit LGBTI
parents from adopting could lift their bans. Additionally, the bureaucracy
accompanying the adoption process could be decreased and practices that
may deter some prospective parents, such as open adoption, could be
reduced or eliminated. Finally, the government could offer additional
financial incentives for people who adopt, or at least subsidize adoption

358. Allen, supra note 18, at 57.
359. GATES, BADGETT, MACOMBER & CHAMBERS, supra note 14, at 6.
360. Some experience with other ARTs supports this assumption. Data suggests that
the number of adoptions decreased after ART became an option See, e.g., Raquel Bernal,
Luojia Hu, Chiaki Moriguchi & Eva Nagypal, Child Adoption in the United States:
Historical Trends and the Determinants of Adoption Demand and Supply, 1951-2002, at 11
(Dec. 26, 2007) (unpublished report on file at Northwestern University Dep’t. of
Economics), available at http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~cmo938/adoptAEA.pdf
(“The ratio of women who delivered biological children with ART to the number of
women who adopted unrelated children domestically has increased from 15% in 1992, 34%
in 1996 and to 60% in 2002 . . . in other words, ART likely had a sizeable impact on the
demand for domestic infants in recent years.”). A recent study suggests that public policy
has a significant influence on whether individuals choose adoption over IVF. For example,
increase in the adoption subsidies correlates with a raise in the number of adoptions. See
generally Gumus & Lee, supra note 102, at 21, 24–25. Conversely, Glenn Cohen and Daniel
L. Chen found no empirical support to the assumption that states that mandate covering
IVF in health insurance experience decreases in the number of adoptions. Cohen & Chen,

Trading-Off Reproductive Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease
Adoption Rates and Should It Matter?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 485, 554 (2010).
361. In addition, there are reasons that people choose to adopt that might safeguard
the adoption market from the effects of cloning. For example, some people adopt for
humanitarian and religious reasons while others adopt for more pragmatic reasons like age
or the desire to avoid pregnancy and childbirth.
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fees.

F. Conclusion
Almost certainly, my legal arguments would not be accepted by the
Supreme Court in its current incarnation. This is not to say, however, that
the analysis is incorrect. By the time that cloning is safe and ready for use,
the Court may offer greater protection for LGB (or LGBTI) individuals,
or may look more favorably upon reproductive technologies. Just as with
IVF, cloning may slowly come to be more accepted over time. The
composition of the Court will continue to change, and the jurisprudence on
reproductive rights and assisted reproductive technologies may shift as
well. It is inevitable that some courts will have to adjudicate cases
regarding ART, perhaps resulting in the creation of rights that do not now
exist. Finally, I have attempted to offer an argument that may be useful not
only in litigation, but also before Congress or state legislatures. Biology as
it is currently understood should not be allowed to control our
understanding of what is scientifically and legally possible.
IX.
CONCLUSION
Prospective parents in the LGBTI community face a number of
obstacles. Cloning—to the extent that is safe and available—could present
a better alternative than the options currently available to those who
prefer a genetically-related child. It could provide an easier way to have
such a child with minimal involvement of third parties. Combined with
gene splicing, it might allow for LGBTI couples, or even close friends, to
have a child who carries the mixed genes of both parties. In order for such
possibilities to become a reality, however, we need further research.
Members of the LGBTI community should express their interest in this
research to ensure that they are not ultimately excluded from the
opportunity to use it.
At the same time, cloning should not be treated as the key to LGBTI
equality. In the midst of recent debates over same-sex marriage, some
commentators have suggested that reproductive cloning would work to
undermine arguments against same-sex marriage.362 Some gay-rights
362. Marcy Darnovsky, Female Sperm and Gay Guinea Pigs, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 12,
2008, at C9, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/03/12/
EDBNVHRRR.DTL. (“[A] few researchers and pundits are proposing that same-sex
procreation with bio-engineered gametes will undermine one of the key arguments of
same-sex marriage opponents.”); LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN, CLONING AND BEYOND
IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD 188 (1997) (“[I]t is interesting to note that a major argument used
by the Religious Right in its opposition to same-sex unions is based on the notion that
marriage is supposed to serve the purpose of procreation. According to this line of
reasoning, gay unions should not be sanctioned because they are biologically barren. If we
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advocates argue that allowing LGBTI individuals to give birth through
cloning with a same-sex partner would actually help the fight for marriage
equality by making them part of the group that is able to reproduce genetic
children not unlike heterosexual couples who use ARTs.363 Professor
David Orentlicher goes so far as to suggest that the use of gene splicing
could make “the gay family . . . look more like the heterosexual family, and
this could help diminish societal stigmatization of gays. Prejudice is rooted
in large part in perceived differences. Lessening the differences between
gays and heterosexuals might therefore help combat discrimination by
heterosexuals against gay persons.”364
Cloning should not be used as a means to promote same-sex marriage
by making queer families more closely resemble traditional families.
Ending discrimination against the LGBTI community should not depend
on establishing a similarity to heterosexuals but should instead be based on
the recognition of each individual’s autonomy and freedom to practice
whatever form of gender or sexual orientation they desire. As stated by
Marcy Darnovsky, Associate Executive Director at the Center for
Genetics and Society:
Anti-gay sentiment is not caused by the inability of same-sex
couples to have biologically related children, but by fear and
intolerance. The solutions to homophobia will not be found in test
tubes and Petri dishes, but in challenging and changing our laws,
policies and culture.365
If cloning were to become universally available for the LGBTI
community, it does not follow that everyone in the community should be
expected to have children, much less genetically-related children.366 As
more LGBTI couples and individuals begin to behave according to
heterosexual norms, this may result in the creation of a subordinate class
of people, discriminated against for not complying with the (now larger
and even more powerful) dominant culture. It is for this reason that I have
subtitled this Article “Cautious Optimism,” as we must be mindful of the
unintended consequences that may attend the push for reproductive

take the Religious Right at its word, the ability of gay women, or gay men, to co-procreate
should validate their right to become married.”).
363. Id.
364. Orentlicher, supra note 56, at 651, 653.
365. Darnovsky, supra note 362, at C-9.
366. Some queer theorists have expressed a similar concern with regard to same-sex
marriage. See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS AND
THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999). Warner argues that the gay movement has become a
normalizing movement toward a “post-gay” pseudo-dignity, awarded by the heterosexual
dominant culture for disavowing sex and politics surrounding sex. This results in the
establishment of a hierarchical order in which one queer ethically dominates another,
allowing the dominant culture to decide who gets to accept whom. Id. at 41–80.
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cloning by the LGBTI community. Nevertheless, it remains important to
fight for political goals even as a group remains committed to critique and
transformation.
In lobbying for cloning rights and regulation, the LGBTI community
should take steps to ensure that the use of reproductive cloning does not
serve to create new, internal social hierarchies among those members of
the community who do and do not have genetically-related children. At
present, cloning opponents continue to rely on homophobic fears and
heterosexist assumptions about what families “should” look like.
Unfounded theories about a gay agenda must be challenged for what they
are—outright bigotry and fear-mongering. More sophisticated criticisms
focused on maintaining diversity in the gene pool, protecting the welfare of
the child, and addressing ethical issues surrounding the sometimes slippery
slope of using artificial processes in reproduction should be responded to
by relying on sound reasoning and the best evidence available to cloning
advocates. The LGBTI community should work to simultaneously expose
the base homophobic assumptions behind such arguments and to debunk
the myth that homosexuality is immoral, unnatural, and harmful to society.
In the foreseeable future, the debate over cloning is likely to remain
complicated and tense. There is still much to be learned about cloning
before it can be declared safe and efficient. As technology so rapidly
changes and develops, it is likely that new reproductive methods that are
similar to cloning or with a similar mission will become available. These
technologies will likely create new challenges, new vocabularies, and more
ethical debates. Yet the opposition to new reproductive technologies,
especially those that would further the expansion of nontraditional
families, would likely fall victim to similar arguments and opposition.
However, heterosexist arguments should not provide the grounds on which
the feasibility of cloning or other reproductive technologies are
determined. While every technology should be treated and considered for
itself, this Article provides tools to deconstruct these arguments. Public
dialogue on cloning regulation should include the LGBTI community as
we work together to create a safe, effective, and promising new
reproductive future.

